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Summary 
This thesis argues that Western feminist theoretical models of identity can be 
productively complicated by the insights of postcolonial feminisms. In particular, 
it explores ways that Western feminist theory might more adequately sustain a 
focus on 'women' while keeping open a space for differences such as race and 
nation. Part One identifies a number of themes that emerge from recent Indian 
feminist scholarship on the intersections of sex, gender, race, nation and 
community identities. Part Two uses these insights to look critically at the work 
of four Western theorists, Rosi Braidotti, Judith Butler, Donna Haraway and Luce 
Irigaray. I argue that strategies which privilege sexual difference as primary 
cannot deal adequately with differences such as race and nation. But I also argue 
that strategies which privilege destabilizing identity can be equally constrained 
by the logic of dualisms which has made it so difficult for feminists to sustain a 
focus on women and their differences. Part Three discusses how the insights to 
be drawn from Indian ferninisms might be taken on board by Western ferninisms 
in order to develop more complex models of power, identity and the self. 
Throughout the thesis I draw on a Foucauldian understanding of power as 
productive, and on Foucault's insight that subjects and identities emerge, not 
through the imperatives of a single symbolic system, but through the intersection 
of multiple networks of discourses, material practices and institutions. I argue 
that, by attending to women's complex location within intersecting landscapes of 
gender, nation, race and other community identities, feminist models of identity 
can dispense with a logic of dualisms in order to redefine, and not only 
destabilize 'women' as the sub ect of/for feminism. This requires working against j 
purity on three levels. First, it requires a model of power that gives up on the 
search for pure, power-free zones and works instead with the instabilities power 
produces as it both enables and constrains women. Second, it requires seeing 
'women' as a complex, impure category that bleeds across the apparently coherent 
borders of identity categories such as gender, race and nation, and contesting 
discursive constructs of 'Woman' as the pure space of origin upon which these 
apparently discrete categories stand. Third, it requires the development of 
alternative models of the self that take these complex, impure spaces as a valid 
and valorised position from which to act and to speak. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has seemed very rare for feminist theory to hold race, 
sex1gender, and class analytically together - all the best 
intentions, hues of authors, and remarks in prefaces 
notwithstanding [ .. ]'Me evidence is building for a needfor a 
theory of 'difference' whose geometries, paradigms, and logics 
break out of binaries, dialectics, and naturelculture models of 
any kind. Otherwise threes will always reduce to twos, which 
quickly become lonely ones in the vanguard. And no one learns 
to count to four. 77tese things matter politically. 
Donna Haraway, 'Gender'for a 
Marxist Dictionary, 1991 
I now want to suggest thatfeminist theory came into its own, or 
became possible as such in a postcolonial mode. 
Teresa de Lauretis, Eccentric 
Subjects, 1990 
Have white Western feminists become any better at maths since Donna 
Haraway set us the sum quoted above six years ago? Thinking about the 
differences between women while developing alternative theoretical models of 
the self, self-other relations, identity and agency has proved one of feminism's 
greatest challenges. How do we maintain the focus on 'women' that is 
feminism's theoretical and political project, while keeping open the borders we 
necessarily draw around that category? In particular, can feminists keep open 
a space in which to consider the intersections of sex, gender, race, nation, and 
the 'embarrassed et cetera' in constituting identities (Butler, 1990, p. 143), 
while holding on to a category 'women' that is sufficiently coherent to form 
the basis of effective theory and politics? 
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Recognizing that these intersections exist and need to be taken into account is 
not a particularly new insight for white Western feminist theory. It is almost 
twenty years since the growing critiques of theory offered by black and non- 
Western feminists meant that 'white women [ ... I discovered (that is were 
forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of the category 
"woman"' (Haraway, 1991, p. 157). When de Lauretis evokes feminist theory 
'in a postcolonial mode' in the passage quoted above, she is arguing for 
feminist theory that acknowledges that non-innocence of the categories 
'woman' and 'women' in two ways. First, in recognizing that there is no pure 
site of identity organized around a single axis of gender or sexual difference, 
feminist theory needs to problematize the apparent coherence of the category 
of 'women' by considering the multiplicity of positionings with which women 
contend. Second, in recognizing that there are no pure power-free sites from 
which to speak and act, feminists need to be attentive to the workings of 
power differentials between particular groups of women, within their own 
theorization and politics (de Lauretis, 1990, p. 13 1). 
In this thesis I will argue that, despite twenty years of acknowledging the 
problem, white Western feminist theory still has difficulty 'counting to four' 
when it considers women and their relation to social processes of identity- 
constitution. I will also argue that these difficulties can be addressed by 
exploring more fully the possibilities of 'feminist theory in a postcolonial 
mode'. One way of doing this which has been neglected by Western feminist 
theory, is to engage more extensively with the insights of feminist scholars 
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working in non-Western contexts. In this thesis, I look at how insights from 
the work of selected Indian feminist scholars can productively complicate the 
theoretical models of identity underpinning the work of four Western feminist 
thinkers: Rosi Braidotti, Judith Butler, Donna Haraway and Luce Irigaray. 
1. THEORY IN A POSTCOLONIAL MODE 
It is still rare for Western feminists to 'do theory' through an extended and 
detailed engagement with feminist scholarship emerging from non-Western 
contexts, or even from diasporic communities in the West. Even when it is 
recognized that this work is engaged in developing feminist theory, and not 
just in providing the empirical 'raw material' for Western feminists to 
theorize, references to it tend to be brief, general and consigned to footnotes. 
While there is much Western feminist scholarship that takes the situation of 
women in non-Western contexts as its object of enquiry, there is still little that 
attends to the work of non-Western feminists in order to see how it changes, 
complicates or challenges the theoretical assumptions and models we work 
with. This project aims .. to sustain just such an extended and detailed 
engagement around the theoretical questions of identity, agency and models of 
the self. 
Which 'Postcolonial I.? 
By characterizing this project as an effort to develop feminist theory 'in a 
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postcolonial mode, I open it to the highly charged field of contestations over 
what constitutes 'the postcolonial'. Strong claims have been made for the 
transformative possibilities of the postcolonial: as the site for a privileged 
subject-position that celebrates marginality and hybridity, and as a new model 
for 'doing theory". These. have led to equally strong contestations over how 
to define 'the postcolonial', who gets to belong to it, what is gained and what 
is lost by using the term. Is the posteolonial an historical period or a particular 
theoretical model? Are Australia, Canada, and even the United States 
I postcolonial' in the same way that South Asia and Africa are? Does the 'post' 
suggest that the effects of colonialism are at an end, or does it mean that they 
need to be acknowledged, while moving beyond their constraints? Does 
evoking 'the postcolonial' lead to an undifferentiated celebration of hybridity 
and diaspora as features- of the (singular) postcolonial position? Does 
postcolonial theory put too much emphasis on discursive processes alone, 
arguing that a single, overriding 'logic of language' structures social processes, 
whose complexity is then reduced to a simple mirroring of language as a 
system? These are just some of the issues that different appropriations of the 
term have elicited. 
1 See, for example, Ashcroft, et. aL (1989), and Adam and Tiffin (1991). 
2 See, for example, Frankenburg and Mani (1993), Loomba (1991), Mishra and 
Hodge (1993), McClintock (1993), and Parry (1997), as well as Williams and 
Chrisman's (1993) summary of debates over the term in their Introduction. 
Among the many unresolved issues is whether the term should be hyphenated. 
I take no position on this question; having started with de Lauretis' 
unhyphenated version, I continue with this usage for the sake of consistency 
only. 
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My own usage of the term here is both narrower and more open-ended than 
most of the participants in these debates would accept. First, in referring to 
'postcolonial feminists, ' I use 'postcolonial' as a short-hand (if still 
contestable) way of referring to feminists in and from non-Western countries 
that have been on the receiving end of colonialism. While not without its 
problems, I find the term less problematic than the other available options: 
'Third World' begs the question of which are the other two worlds; 'South' 
or 'East'. or even 'non-Western' tend to reinforce the centering of the West 
as norm and privileged vantage point; 'developing countries' raises yet another 
highly charged field of contestation and debate over models and standards of 
development, which is outside the framework of this project. 
Second, I find 'postcoloniality' a useful term for designating a specific, 
historically located time in which we live: after the period of formal 
colonization, but still confronted with the effects of colonization and 
decolonization, and with new forms of globalization, which are still informed 
by assymetric power relations. We all have to deal with this generalized state, 
if from very different locations. For white Western feminists, remembering 
that we live in a postcolonial world, in this sense, is important if we are to 
keep to the fore the differences between women that emerge from power 
relations structured by race, nationality and ethnicity, as well as by economic 
difference. 
Therefore, third, 'a postcolonial mode' is also a conceptual space in which 
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constructs of East and West, margins and centre, as purely discrete and 
opposed locations, are problematised. For white Western feminism, this 
suggests an important shift, in perspective in terms of what constitutes the 
'proper' boundaries for our theorizing. To what extent do we still see the 
'West' as a hermetically sealed, discrete field on/in which to theorize, as if 
what happens 'out there' does not impinge on what we theorize 'in here'? If 
white Western feminism has learned to be cautious about making totalizing 
statements about all women, based on its own limited experiences, it still, for 
the most part, has not taken on board a second insight of 'a postcolonial 
mode': that the connections still need to be made, if on a different basis. 
Developing that different basis might begin by recognizing that we all live in 
what Avtar Brah has called 'diaspora space', in which the genealogies of 
dispersal and those of staying put are inextricably entangled. Brah argues that 
in this impure space, the subject-position of 'the native' is seriously 
problematised (Brah, 1996, p. 18 1). White Western feminists need to think 
about how their status as natives, who stay put within the geographical and 
conceptual space of 'the West' is problematised, and what this can mean for 
the questions they ask of theory. 
Why theory? 
A common, and necessary, reaction to recognizing the 'non-innocence of the 
category woman' among white Western feminists has been to be careful not 
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to impose Western theory on non-Western contexts. But this can lead to a 
position of effectively leaving theory out of the field of cross-cultural dialogue 
and contestation. For example, in her recent book on Feminisms and the Se4f, 
Morwenna Griffiths explains how she chose the cross-cultural material to 
engage with for her project. In particular, she explains why she decided not 
to focus primarily on theoretical material from Black and postcolonial 
feminisms. Theory's usefulness is limited, Griffiths argues, for a number of 
reasons: because it is the activity of an elite and so doesn't reflect the concerns 
of the majority of women; because it can be difficult to do it justice when one 
doesn't know much about the different philosophical traditions from which it 
emerges; and because, as abstraction, it is even more difficult to situate in its 
specific context than are descriptions of experience (Griffiths, 1995, pp. 34-42). 
My point is not to challenge Griffiths' caveats about the difficulties of 
engaging with theory, nor to challenge her decision to interweave her 
engagement with a variety of theoretical materials with narratives of personal 
experience. But I do want to note that her discussion of theory's limitations 
assumes that there is only one question to be asked of it when we are listening 
for different voices: does it 'capture' the elsewhere for us in all its complexity, 
will it allow 'us' to represent 'them' to ourselves in all their complexity? But 
there are also other questions Western feminists can ask. If 'postcoloniality' 
means that there are important connections between 'here' and 'there', then we 
can also ask how listening to voices from elsewhere might complicate our view 
of ourselves. 
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If all we ask of theory is how it can represent the experiences of 'the other 
woman' in all her complexity, then we always come up against the problem 
of the multiple mediations through which experience is filtered. So, for 
example, in evaluating different materials for her project, Griffiths asks, 
'where are the voices unmediated. by an education in the WestT (ibid, p. 34). 
If what we are looking for is an 'authentic voice' from elsewhere, then 
mediation is a problem. But if we want to resist recourse to a logic of 
authenticity which concepts like postcoloniality, or 'diaspora space' have 
problematised, and if we want to ask what the 'elsewhere' can tell us about 'in 
here', then it is precisely the mediated voices that we should be listening to: 
the voices which share this impure space of feminist theory with us. Feminist 
theoretical approaches which may have originated in the white West come back 
to us permanently changed and complicated when they have been put to use 
outside a white Western framework. These changes and complications can help 
make more visible the questions that have not been asked, and that still need 
to be asked by white Western feminists. The answers we arrive at may be very 
different from those developed by postcolonial feminists, but the first step is 
to recognize the importance of this impure, mediated space of 'theory in a 
postcolonial mode'. 
2. COMPLEXITY, IMPURITY AND A GEOMETRICS OF 
DUALISMS 
Two broad strategies and.. qbjectives co-exist within contemporary feminist 
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theoretical approaches to identity. The first is to redefine and revalue what is 
specific to women, what might be called the specifically female, in order to 
contest the ways in which models of the subject, of agency, of universal norms 
and 'truths' are, in Irigaray's phrase, 'always appropriated by the masculine'. 
The second is to rethink, complicate or destabilize the identity category 
f gender' in a number of ways. One way of complicating it has been to rethink 
its interrelationship with other identity categories, such as race, nation, 
et nic ty and class. Another has been to rethink the apparent usefulness and 
coherence of the sex/gender, nature/culture, biology/society binaries that much 
of Anglo-American feminism worked with in the early Second Wave period. 
These two strategies are by no means applied in any homogeneous way within 
contemporary feminist theory, nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, as I 
will argue throughout this thesis, some aspects of both are necessary if 
feminist theory is to sustain a simultaneous focus on women and their 
differences. The four Western feminists I have chosen to focus on in this thesis 
each take up distinctive positions on this strategic spectrum. If Irigaray might 
be characterized as the strongest advocate of the 'redefinition' strategy among 
the four, Butler might stand as the staunchest representative of the 
'destabilization' position. Braidotti wants to complicate an Irigarayan feminism 
of sexual difference by combining it with more attention to multiplicity. 
Haraway wants to add to the destabilizing move a positive redefinition of 
identity through an 'ontology of impurity'. 
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In this thesis I will be looking at how these different strategic positionings 
make space for the complexity that is required if the double focus on women 
and their differences is to be sustained. By reading each of these theoretical 
projects 'in a postcolonial mode, I will be looking for those moves that open 
up a space in which to consider women's positioning in a complex landscape 
of gender, race, nation and other community identities. I will also be looking 
for those spaces where, to borrow Haraway's terms, a geometrics or logic of 
dualisms reasserts itself in order to reduce that complexity to sameness. 
Why 'Against Putity I? 
As the title of this thesis suggests, I will be arguing that sustaining a space for 
complexity requires working against conceptual models of purity on a number 
of levels. In her landmark study Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas argued: 
that ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and 
punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose 
system on an inherently untidy experience. It is only by 
exaggerating the difference between within and without, above 
and belowl male and female, with and against, that a semblance 
of order is created. (Douglas, 1966, p. 4) 
For Douglas, establishing order in an inherently untidy reality through 
concepts of purity is a universal and necessary activity of human society. She 
recognizes that dualistic paradigms of purity and belonging are exaggerations 
imposed to create a semblance of order where complexity continues to exist. 
But for her, one of the ineviiable consequences of 'civilization' is to establish 
that semblance of order through ideas of purity. 
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But as our mathematical and scientific paradigms move from concepts of linear 
order to the non-linear dynamics of complex systems, in which the relationship 
between 'order' and 'chaos' or complexity, is revisioned', does Douglas' 
conclusion about the inevitability of purity models still stand? Perhaps most 
importantly, the possibility of alternative paradigms of impurity leads us to ask 
what we lose by establishing order through the logic of dualisms that underpins 
purity models. 
Politically, we have seen the tragic consequences of what Paul Gilroy calls 
'ethnic absolutism', with i6 views of immutable differences between pure 
categories of racial and cultural difference (Gilroy, 1993, p. 2). Theorists of 
difference such as Gilroy, and Avtar Brah, argue for the more difficult, but 
possible alternative of a paradigm of identity that begins from the assumption 
of impurity. For Brah, it is more useful to defy 'the search for originary 
absolutes, or genuine and authentic manifestations of a stable, pre-given, 
unchanging identity; for pristine, pure customs and traditions or unsullied 
glorious pasts' (Brah, 1996, p. 196). 
In the chapters that follow I will be looking at how purity models of identity 
impinge on women's discursive and strategic positioning within unequal 
3 See Hayles (1990) on the two strands within chaos theory. One works with a 
model of emerging from chaos into order (which sustains the kind of purity 
model Douglas examines), while the second conceptualises 'the orderly descent 
into chaos' (Hayles, 1990, p. 9). This second approach suggests a model in 
which the aim is not to reimpose a semblance of order on an inherently 
complex system, but rather to find ways to live within complexity. 
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relations of power. I will also be looking at how the constraints of purity 
paradigms can be reimported into feminist projects to rethink identity through 
the models of power and language underpinning them. Finally, I will be 
looking for those alternative models of the self, agency and resistance that 
emerge when feminist theorists work with the creative possibilities of impurity. 
Some Impure Categories 
As part of my own 'orderly descent into chaos', I want to clarify how I will 
be using some of the highly contestable, but nevertheless crucial terms that I 
will be using throughout this thesis. 
i) Female and Femi n ine; Sex and Gender 
In using these terms I want to hold on to both the distinctions between them, 
and the problematising of that distinction that has emerged in recent feminist 
theory4. I want to be able to refer to the specifically female, as that which 
refers to social positioning based on the 'sexing' of bodies. I want to be able 
to distinguish this from the feminine, as those 'gendered', culturally and 
historically variable qualities and activities that are usually, but not necessarily, 
assigned to those persons identified as female. At the same time, I want to 
resist basing that distinction on any stable nature/culture paradigm. Biology, 
bodies, sex and therefore the female, are not pre-discursive and unchanging 
See, for example Gatens (1996), Chapter One; Haraway (1991), Chapter 
Seven; and Battersby (1995), especially pp. 249-50. 
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givens, but are rather historically and culturally mediated productions. 
The distinction is of specific importance to this project, because I will be 
tracking the ways in which both the female and the feminine, the sexed body 
and the gendered qualities, emerge and are put into play across multiple 
categories of identity-constitution, ways which do not always converge. I will 
also be looking for the space that different feminist theoretical models allow 
for considering the problems and possibilities of specific female embodiment. 
ii) Race, Nation and Ethnicity 
I take these three notoriously slippery terms as culturally inscribed markers of 
difference and belonging that posit boundaries of community based on notions 
of shared origin. They are all, to borrow and broaden Benedict Anderson's 
now-famous formulation 'imagined communities', in that the stability of their 
composition is always contestable, especially in those cases when their 
composition is framed in terms of immutable, biological givens. However, 
their effects are no less 'real' in terms of social divisions and individual 
identities. 
Floya Anthias, and Nira Yuval-Davis suggest that 'ethnicity' is the broadest of 
the three terms, referring to a wide variety of constructs of collectivity and 
belonging postulated through notions of common origin or destiny (Anthias 
and Yuval-Davis, 1992, pp.. 2-5). Constructs of 'race' tend to harden their 
definitions of the boundaries of belonging through 'an immutable biological or 
13 
physiological difference [ ... ] grounded on the separation of human populations 
by some notion of stock or collective heredity of traits' (ibid, p. 2). Constructs 
of 'nation' add claims for separate political and territorial representation to the 
notions of common origin and shared culture (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, 
p. 2). This agrees with Anderson's definition of the nation as 'an imagined 
political community' which is 'both inherently limited and sovereign' 
(Anderson, 1991, p. 6). 
What holds these three terms together for the particular purposes of this 
project is that they all work with notions of common origin as the basis for 
community identities. This focus on questions of origins suggests that women, 
and the female capacity of birth, will be of particular significance to these 
social processes of identity constitution. My focus in this thesis, therefore, will 
be less on delineating clear dividing lines between claims of national, racial or 
ethnic identities, but on exploring how women are positioned within the 
competing and shifting claims about origins and belonging. 
It is also because of this particular focus on the relationship between 
community identities, origins and women that my 'embarrassed etcetera' rarely 
includes class. I would agree with some aspects of recent feminist criticisms 
that the turn to questions of identity in feminist theory has led to losing sight 
of questions of class and economic inequalities. But I also suspect that 
questions of class-belonging and class-positioning, while certainly engaging 
5 Seel for example, Coole (1996) and Fraser (1995). 
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women in very important ways, might not relate to the question of origins in 
the same way as do narratives of racial and ethnic identities. As such, 
questions of class would need more specific attention than this project allows. 
iii) A Note About 'Scare Quotes' 
In the UK, it is common to out scare quotes around the term 'race', in order 
to signal the writer's contestation of notions of racial difference as an 
immutable, biological given. In the US and continental Europe, where the four 
Western theorists I discuss in this thesis live and write, this convention is 
much less common. In the context of this thesis, I use race, without scare 
quotes; however, as the above discussion should make clear, I understand it 
to be as slippery, culturally mediated and contestable a term as sex, gender, 
ethnicity or nation. 
Perhaps contradictorily, I retain the use of scare quotes for 'women' and 
'Woman'. when I am referring to the particular discursive versions of the 
feminine at play in identity narratives ('Woman'), or to 'women' as a category 
of analysis or as the objects or targets of particular forms of mobilization, 
behaviour or activity in identity-constituting processes. I do this because a 
crucial part of my argument in this thesis will be that there can be more than 
one version of the feminine at play in identity-constituting processes, that is, 
there is no singular 'Woman'; and that these processes engage particular 
groups of female embodied persons, 'women', in specific ways. More 
generally, I want to retain, throughout this project, an awareness of the 'non- 
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innocence' of these particular conceptual categories for white Western 
feminists attempting to make connections with feminist scholarship that 
emerges from non-Western contexts. 
3. FOUCAULT, 
SUBJECTS 
PRODUCTIVE POVWR AND IMPURE 
While this thesis is primarily concerned with conversations among feminists 
in order to privilege complexity, I need to further complicate my project by 
introducing an additional voice. Throughout the thesis I will be drawing on my 
reading of the work of Michel Foucault, and in particular on his understanding 
of power and its relation to subjects and knowledge. My purpose here is not 
to engage with the large body of feminist scholarship debating the usefulness 
and problems of appropriating Foucault's project for feminism'. Nor is it to 
follow up on the intriguing possibilities of recent feminist scholarship which 
employs previously overlooked aspects of Foucault's work linking sexuality 
and race in order to reread colonial histories'. I will be developing my 
discussion of Foucault's usefulness for feminist theory throughout the thesis, 
and in particular, will be expanding on my version of a Foucauldian feminist 
model of power in Chapter Seven. Here, I want to briefly introduce some of 
the Foucauldian concepts that I draw on in critically evaluating the feminist 
6 See, among many others, Bartky (1990). Bordo (1989), Fraser (1989), 
Hartsock (1990), McNay (1992), Ramazanoglu (1993), Sawicki (1991), Singer 
(1989) and Smart (1989). 
See especially Stoler (1996). 
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theoretical material that is discussed in the following chapters. 
The key Foucauldian insight for my argument in this thesis is his 
characterization of power ý9 productive of bodies, knowledges and subjects. 
It seems to me that neither feminist critiques, nor most feminist appropriations 
of Foucault, have fully thought through the implications of the conceptual shift 
that this model of productive power inaugurates. As we shall see, Foucault's 
move calls for a shift from a logic of repression, exclusion and abjection, to 
one of proliferation and productivity, in ways that have implications not only 
for how we conceptualize women's positioning within relations of power, but 
also for how we conceptualize language, subjects, agency and resistance. 
Foucault argued that: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power 
in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 
'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals. ' In fact power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of 
him belong to this production. (Foucault, 1977d, p. 194) 
Putting aside the problematic use of the term 'him', Foucault's challenge here 
is of great significance to feminist theoretical attempts to make space for 
complexity. Conceptual izing* power as productive means resisting those models 
where: 
one single and identical 'formula' of power (the interdict) 
comes to be applied to all forms of society and all levels of 
subjection [ ... ] [where] power is conceived as a sort of great 
absolute Subject which pronounces the interdict. (Foucault, 
1977b, p. 140) 
Foucault's claim means that power works in complex ways that are not easily 
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contained within binary paradigms: 
Power comes from below: [ ... I there is no binary and all 
encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root 
of power relations and serving as a general matrix - no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and 
more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 94) 
There is no one general form of domination which is then reproduced 'at the 
level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviours' (Foucault, 1977d, p. 27). 
Rather there are a multiplicity of networks in which relationships of force take 
shape and come into play (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Thus, whilst there may be 
links and continuity between different forms of power relations, and whilst 
different networks of power relations may indeed converge in the same bodies, 
each needs to be considered in its specificity. Foucault resists seeing these 
multiple forms of power relations as either 'analogous or homologous', as 
variations of the same theme, repeated in slightly different circumstances 
(Foucault, 1977d, p. 27). '-Thus productive power is not a homogeneous, 
monolithic force, but is rather local, multi-vocal and diffuse. 
Of particular importance to this project is the way in which Foucault situates 
language and its relationship to the subject within this framework of complex, 
heterogeneous and multi-vocal networks of power relations. Foucault does not 
argue for a single symbolic system, whose overriding logic informs the way 
power is exercised and identities are constituted, in the manner of much 
current poststructuralist thought. Instead, Foucault works with a model of 
multiple discursive and non-discursive systems, practices and institutions: 
18 
So it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in a 
symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the 
subject is constituted. It is constituted in real practices - historically analyzable practices. There is a technology of the 
constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems 
while using them. (Foucault, 1983, p. 369) 
Power is productive in that it does not sit 'in a position of exteriority with 
respect to other types of relationships' but is rather immanent in them 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 94). Crucially, power is productive of knowledge, or rather 
power and knowledge exist in a state of mutual dependence. Knowledge does 
not emerge from a suspension of power relations: there are no 'power-free 
zones', nor is power's sole effect to repress or eliminate knowledge. Rather 
it produces certain kinds of knowledges and invests them with the legitimacy 
of 'truths' (Foucault, 1977d, p. 27). 
Equally important, power is productive of bodies and subjects. Power is 
exercised not on but through bodies and subjects: what Foucault has called 
disciplinary power works by making bodies 'knowable' and 'useful' as power 
is exercised through them.. 'What makes power hold good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that 
says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produces discourse' (I 977a, p. 119). Power 'needs' to be able to 
make bodies useful in specific ways, to enable subjects of a particular kind, 
in order to be articulated. 
Thus for Foucault, modern forms of disciplinary, normalizing power require, 
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not abjected 'objects', but impure subjects. Within a logic of exclusion and 
-1-. abjection, power is exercised upon that which is refused and designated as part 
of the 'not-self'. But for Foucault, viewing power as productive puts into 
question this clear distinction between subject and object. To be a subject is 
always to be simultaneously "subjected to' and 'the subject of' (see Foucault, 
1976, p. 97, and 1982, p. 212). In other words, individuals are not onlY the 
'inert or consenting target' of power, they are 'always also the elements of its 
articulation' (Foucault, 1976, p. 98). 
Productive power is continuous, in that it is not just a privilege possessed by 
a dominant social group; it is rather exercised by and through us all, situated 
as we are in multiple networks of 'nonegalitarian and mobile relations. ' As 
Foucault most famously puts it, 'power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere (Foucault, 1978, pp. 93-4). 
Power is continuous also in that it not only extends into, but emerges from 
bodies. What Foucault has called the disciplinary practices of normalization 
and surveillance not only fix individual bodies in space, in hierarchical grids 
of norms and deviations, but also work from the inside out, effecting the way 
we use our bodies and understand them. 
But this also means that power should be understood as fundamentally 
unstable, incorporating 'innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of 
instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, of an at 
least temporary inversion of the power relations' (Foucault, 1977d, p. 27). If 
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one is never outside power, if 'there are no "margins" for those who break 
with the system to gambol in' (Foucault, 1977b, p. 14 1), one is also never 
outside its 'odd term'I resistance (Foucault, 1978, p. 96). 
As there is no one source of power, there is no 'single locus of great Refusal. ' 
Resistance may indeed at times take the form of great radical ruptures, but it 
also, and most often, appears in mobile and transitory forms of temporary 
unities and regroupings, in w hich even individuals' relationships to their bodies 
and identities are in a process of flux (ibid). This means that, for Foucault, the 
possibilities of change are 'very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible' 
(Foucault, 198 1, p. 155. ) 
Recognizing that power works by producing impure subjects, by 
simultaneously enabling and constraining subjects in specific ways, means that 
both the dangers and possibilities of resistance are highlighted. As Foucault 
explained: 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is 
dangerous. [ ... ] If everything is 
dangerous, then we always 
have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but 
to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. (Foucault, 1983, p. 343) 
I will be returning to all these points, and to their specific implications for 
feminist theories of identity, in the chapters that follow. 
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4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The two chapters of Part One introduce 
a number of themes, theoretical approaches and complicating factors that 
emerge from recent Indian feminist scholarship on the intersections of gender, 
race, nation and other community identities. Chapter One focuses on work 
exploring women's strategic and discursive positioning in the emergence of 
these multiple social identities. Chapter Two looks at Indian feminist 
discussions on questions of agency, models of the self and collective identities. 
At the end of Part One, I identify four complications or challenges relating to 
the category 'women' that emerge from my reading of Indian feminisms, and 
that I argue Western feminisms need to take on board. 
In the four chapters of Part Two, I use these insights to critically evaluate the 
work of Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti and Donna Haraway. I 
argue that strategies which privilege sexual difference as primary cannot deal 
adequately with differences -between women, such as race and nation. But I 
also argue that strategies which privilege deconstructing or destabilizing 
identity can be equally constrained by the logic of dualisms which has made 
it so difficult for feminists to sustain a simultaneous focus on women and their 
differences. 
In the two chapters of Part Three, I explore how the insights to be drawn from 
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Indian ferninisms might be taken on board by Western feminisms in order to 
develop more complicated models of power, identity and the self. Chapter 
Seven works 'against purity' to argue for a feminist model of power and 
resistance that gives up on the search for pure, power-free zones and works 
instead with the instabilities power produces as it enables and constrains 
women. Chapter Eight offers a reading of 'women' in a postcolonial mode as 
a complex impure category of identity, and as a site for developing alternative 
models of the self. 
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Part One 
INDIAN COMPLICATIONS 
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Chapter One 
WOMEN AND COMMUNITY IDENTITIES 
IN INDIAN FEMINISMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Returning home to India after several years studying feminist theory in the US, 
feminist scholar Mary John ends her recent book with a call for Western 
feminists to see the East as something more than an object of their inquiries: 
Western feminists need to reconsider what they are out to learn 
from the distant places they visit. Instead of developing ever 
more theoretically sophisticated twists on the cross-cultural 
construction of gender, why not attend. also to feminist voices 
from elsewhere? (John, 1996, p. 144, emphasis in the original) 
In Part One of this thesis, I will be taking Mary John's advice to heart, 
although I would also want to re-phrase her formulation. This project is about 
developing a theoreticallY more sophisticated understanding of women's 
identity, by attending to feminist voices from elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
attending to feminist voices from anywhere is not a simple process, and I want 
first to clarify which Indian feminist voices I am using, what I am listening 
for, and how I propose to put those voices together with the Western feminist 
theoretical projects which are the principal object of this inquiry. 
This project aims to consider how postcolonial feminisms, such as those being 
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developed in India, can productively complicate theoretical approaches to 
identity prevalent in Western feminisms. The Indian feminist voices I engage 
with are, therefore, limited by a number of factors. They are limited, first, to 
Indian feminists who are interested in engaging in this particular process, who 
locate themselves in an intellectual space of taking up ideas that may have 
originated in Western feminist movements, but which they are now in the 
process of changing to suit a different context. For me, this is part of the 
multi-directional process of theorising in a postcolonial mode. It is important 
that Western feminists make the effort to notice how the theories they work 
with can be changed and complicated when put to use outside a white Western 
framework. 
Second, I have selected material in which I have been able to identify either 
an explicit or implicit engagement with theoretical models of identity. This 
means that I am using some material which is not self-consciously 'doing 
theory' together with some that is, and that I will be putting different 
theoretical approaches together and taking them in directions their authors 
might not have intended, and may well disagree with. I draw on feminist 
historical studies of India's nationalist movement for independence from 
Britain, and on studies of representations of women in literature from and 
about the nationalist period. I also look at political and cultural analyses of 
women's place in contemporary Indian society, particularly in the context of 
the recent rise of right-wing communalist movements in the Hindu and Muslim 
communities. What holds these disparate texts together for me is that they all 
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speak to questions of identity, and more particularly, they focus on identity- 
constituting sites where intersections between gender, nation and race identities 
are highlighted. This is a self-consciouslY selective engagement that is 
animate by a Western feminist location and a recognition that Western 
feminism has had difficulty in dealing adequately with just these intersections. 
Third, I have tended to privilege work that is interested both in questions of 
representation and in material practices and activities that effect women's 
identities. In my interpretations of the material I have selected, therefore, I try 
to identify distinctions between 'Woman' and 'women', and between the 
female and the feminine. Building on the Foucauldian framework established 
in the Introduction, I work with a sense of multiple discursive systems, rather 
than a single Symbolic order; thus I am also concerned to identify the different 
versions of 'Woman' and 'women' at play in identity-constitution processes. 
I am, therefore, interested in showing how (specific and limited) groups of 
women are being discursively and strategically positioned. By discursive 
positioning, I mean their location in a variety of cultural, political and 
historical narratives. By strategic positioning, I mean how women's activities, 
as filtered through those discourses, are located within particular networks of 
power relations, and produce material effects. At the same time I recognize 
that none of these positionings is ever fully stable, complete or closed, their 
effects are not always as intended, nor are they homogeneous. 
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Respecting the complexity and specificity of work produced in another context 
is always difficult. The material I engage with in these two chapters is, quite 
rightly, more concerned to speak to the complexities of Indian society than to 
Western feminists, and recognizing and respecting that space is part of what 
postcolonial theory is about. As Donna Haraway has noted, there is always a 
'very fine line between appropriation of another's (never innocent) experience 
and the delicate construction of the just-barely-possible affinities, the just- 
barely-possible connections that might actually make a difference in local and 
global histories' (Haraway, 1991, p. 113). It is difficult to imagine completely 
avoiding the risk of a Western feminist constructing yet another East to serve 
Western purposes, and my engagement with Indian ferninisms remains open- 
ended in recognition of this. 
But another part of what the postcolonial mode means is that there are no pure 
spaces called 'East' and 'West', 'centre' and 'periphery', and this inevitable 
impurity and intermingling is what makes those connections just-barely- 
possible'. I think it also means that the changes and complications effected on 
feminist theory in a place like India can help make more visible the questions 
that have not been asked, and that still need to be asked, by white Western 
feminists in our own impure spaces. 
It should be clear by now that this project is not about representing India, or 
even Indian feminisms, to the West. My purpose is not to attempt a 'complete 
picture' of the many women's movements in India, nor to argue that such and 
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such a theoretical approach best suits Indian conditions. I recognize that many 
other intellectual currents, which I do not discuss, exist among Indian women 
scholars and activists. Thus, for example, I am not engaging with those who 
argue in different ways for a sharp demarcation from what they identify as 
'Western feminism'. While Western feminists no doubt have much to learn 
from the challenges these women present to our knowledge-claims, they have 
in a sense placed themselves outside the particular conversation this project is 
interested in. 
Also, I have tried to make clear that when I write about 'Woman', or 
'women', I am doing it in relation to a particular discourse under discussion, 
or a particular feminist's take on a specific group of women's activities, and 
am not making any universalised claims about (all Indian) women or a singular 
construct of 'the Indian Woman'. Nevertheless, whilst I am not making any 
claims to represent the situation of Indian women or the state of Indian 
feminism, I am seeking to generalize from the selective work I have engaged 
with. I have tried to identify certain commonalities and connections between 
these materials, relating to women's discursive and strategic positionings 
across the categories of social identity such as sex, gender, race and nation, 
in order to suggest the contours of a more generalized 'economy' or 'logic' 
with which women need to contend, if always in specific ways, and which 
feminist theoretical models -need to make space for. Finally, I want to note 
that, whilst I refer to all the feminists discussed in this chapter as Indian, I 
recognize that they are not all located in India. There is, however, a steady 
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intellectual flow between work produced by 'diasporic' Indian academics and 
those 'at home', which is yet another condition of the 'postcolonial mode'. 
Part One is divided into two chapters. In this first chapter I focus on Indian 
feminist discussions of the relationship between sex, gender, nation and race 
in identity-constitution. I begin in section one by looking at how different 
Indian feminists take the intersection of these identitY categories as a starting 
point for examining a two-way process: on the one hand, what these different 
identity categories 'do' to. produce women's sense of self; but also, on the 
other hand, what women do to help produce those categories of identity. 
Women's productive role in constituting national and raced identities at legal 
and discursive levels is discussed, as is the importance of the specifically 
female body. In sections two and three of this chapter I look in more detail at 
Indian feminist discussions of how and why the female body becomes a 'useful 
body' to identity-constituting processes. Section two considers appropriations 
of birth and the mother-figure, while section three looks at women's 
positioning in time and space. 
Throughout Chapter One I suggest a tension in Indian feminisms between 
tendencies to limit women's 'usefulness' in the emergence of community 
identities to one of passivity, and other approaches that suggest a more active 
productivity of 'women' at both strategic and discursive levels. In Chapter 
Two, I discuss these differences of approach more explicitly, when I turn to 
Indian feminist work on questions of women's agency, and feminist alternative 
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models of the self and collective identities. 
1. WOMEN AND IDENTITIES: SEX, GENDER, NATION, 
RACE 
My reading of Indian feminisms focusses on the question of 'Woman's' and 
'women's' discursive and strategic location in the emergence of national, 
racial, religious and other community identities. Much of the work I have 
examined from India suggests an approach to identity that keeps women central 
to the analysis whilst also recognizing that what is under analysis cannot be 
completely accommodated within a frame of gender or sexual difference. 
Discursive constructs and appropriations of 'Woman', the feminine, and the 
female, as well as the material practices and activities of women, emerge and 
are put into play within a complex network of 'games of truth' that, while 
being necessarily and deeply gendered, are also and at the same time, 
intimately concerned with national, racialised and community identities and 
relations of power. 
In their introduction to one of the first collections of feminist historical studies 
of the nationalist movement, Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid argued that 
underpinning 'every attempt towards identity has been a redescription of 
women, (Sangari and Vaid, 1990, p. 9). Many other Indian feminists have 
shared this interest in tracking the distinct ways in which 'redescribing women' 
has formed part of redefining national and other community identities. wo 
historical moments seem particularlY significant to the Indian feminists I 
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discuss here for highlighting women's strategic and discursive locations across 
the apparently discrete categories of sex/gender, race, nation and community. 
The first of these is the nationalist opposition to British colonial rule through 
the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. Women's status and their 
participation in the pro-independence struggle became key issues shaping the 
politics of the anti-colonialist period. But equally, contestations over definitions 
of the feminine, over the norms and ideals invested in 'Woman', - and over the 
meanings to be read into women's activities and feminized spheres of social 
life were to bear enormous symbolic weight in the emerging versions of the 
postcolonial Indian nation. 
The second moment of particular significance is the more recent rise of Hindu- 
Muslim communalism' in the 1980's and 1990's. Here again, both the 
political and the cultural focus are not directly, or not at first glance, on issues 
of gender or sexual difference. The games of truth emerging in the highly 
charged context of communal conflict turn around questions of both 
nationhood and race. On the one hand, the project of the Hindu right pivots 
around the purifying imperative of a Hindu rashtra (Hindu nation) that would 
reduce the postcolonial Indian sense of nation-ness - always a precarious 
balancing act between an officially secular state and a complex, multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious people - to a Hindu component alone. On the other hand, 
The term communalism is used commonly in India to refer to 'partisanship or 
chauvinism deriving from religious identity; communal conflict occurs between 
members of different religious communities, most often Hindus and Muslims' 
(Basu, 1995, p. 180, fn 1). 
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the physical, political and symbolic conflicts that characterize communalism, 
are marked by rival attempts to fix unchanging truths about essential, birth- 
based differences between the religious groups. In this sense, communalism 
racialises religious difference, and religion is used as a racial denominator or 
dividing-line within the broader community of the Indian polis (Sarkar and 
Butalia, 1995, p. 6). 
Complexity Models 
Clearly, neither of these historical moments can be approached adequately 
through the critical lens of gender or sexual difference alone. Nevertheless, 
'Woman' and 'women' remain highly visible, and, some will argue, even 
central components of these identity-constituting processes. What Kumkum 
Roy has called this 'curious visibility of women' (Roy, 1995, p. 10) in colonial 
and postcolonial discourse and practice has led many Indian feminists to work 
with models of identity that privilege complexity, particularly in terms of the 
ways in which gender intersects with nation, race, class and caste. As Roy 
summarizes it, there is 
an understanding that the concern with constructing and 
reconstructing women stems from a variety of agendas which 
are not necessarily women-centred, as a result of which 
women's identities are constituted through processes which are 
complex and by no means bounded within the framework of a 
single logic. (Roy, ibid) 
Roy suggests here one aspect of working with a complex model of identity, 
that is, the ways in which women's identities emerge through these competing 
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agendas and multiple categories of social identity. Kumkum Sangari makes a 
similar point in relation to understanding women as agents when she argues 
that 'notions of femaleness, self or identity' are so tied up with questions of 
family, class, religion, and other forms of collectivity that they cannot be 
framed in terms of 'a singte unified axis' (Sangari, 1993, p. 871). Sangari 
continues that it is necessary to work with a concept of 'multiple identities' 
that emerge 'through several criss-crossing ideologies rather than a single one', 
and that existl not as atomised entities, but in close relation with each other 
(Sangari, ibid). 
One of the practical reasons motivating Indian feminists to adopt a complex 
model of women's identity is suggested by Gabriele Dietrich in her discussion 
of the impact of the recent'f ise in communalism on the women's movement. 
For Dietrich, '[i]f one thing has become clearer over the past few years, it is 
the fact that caste and religious community are much stronger in women's lives 
than gender, at least in situations of communal strife' (Dietrich, 1994, pp. 43- 
4). If feminism is to speak to women's lived experience, then it must take this 
insight on board. But Dietrich's discussion also suggests a second facet that 
can emerge when feminists take complexity as a starting point; it is not just a 
question of what various categories of identity 'do' to women, but also how 
women can be necessary to, and productive of those categories at the same 
time. As Dietrich argues: 
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As women are crucial in the organisation of the home and the 
socialisation of children, cultural control over them is 
fundamental to the continuity, not only of the race, but of 
tradition and communal identity itself. [ ... I The south Indian concept of karpu (chastity) is founded on the very real anxiety 
in men that if women's sexuality is not controlled, actual 
identities will change in unimaginable ways. (Dietrich, 1994, 
p. 44) 
It is this second aspect of complexity models, of thinking through how and 
why 'Woman' and 'women' are key to the emergence of national, raced and 
other community identities., -that provides some of the most distinctive work 
from Indian feminists and suggests some of the most productive complications 
that can come from theorising identity 'in a postcolonial mode. ' 
'Women's work' and community identities 
For example, in her discussion of Muslim women in the context of the current 
rise of communalism in India, Zoya Hasan argues that when religious identities 
are heightened and gender loyalties subordinated in communal conflict, this 
doesn't mean that women are less of a focus. They continue to be 'important 
signifiers of differences between groups; community identities are often 
defined through the conduct of women' (Hasan, 1994a, p. viii). Hasan takes 
as her starting point one of the most hotly contested and debated events to 
focus directly on women in Indian politics in recent years, the 'Shah Bano 
case t2 . 
See also Pathak and Rajan (1992) for another account of the Shah Bano case. 
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The Indian legal system includes a separate sphere of 'personal laws' for each 
of the major religious communities, dealing mainly with issues of marriage, 
divorce, inheritance and family. For ten years, Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, 
had contested the inadequate maintenance terms of her divorce under the 
Muslim personal law. In 1985 the Indian Supreme Court ruled in her favour. 
But this ruling then sparked a complex and bitter struggle over the personal 
law system, the desirability of a uniform civil code that could override or 
replace the personal laws, and the ways in which the rights and distinctive 
identities of India's different religious communities should be defined and 
recognized. The immediate controversy that followed the Supreme Court 
decision resulted in a comp'iomise Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in 
Divorce) Act in 1986. 
But the issues sparked by the Shah Bano case continue to inform communal 
conflict, and Hasan contends that Muslim women have remained at the very 
centre of the communal political imagination and of redefinitions of national 
identities. Indeed, she argues, in the post- independence period the symbolism 
of a united Muslim community identity has come to rest entirely on laws 
pertaining to the family and women (Hasan, 1994b, p. 61). The rights of 
Muslim women have served as the locus of debates about conservatism versus 
modernization, pluralism versus national integrity, secularism and women's 
equality, a uniform civil code and distinct religious laws (Hasan, 1994a, 
pp. xviii-xix). 
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For Hasan, issues like the Shah Bano case indicate that it is largely through the 
regulation of women that attempts are made to homogenise and narrow a 
definition of Muslim community identity. When identity discourse is locked 
into a near-exclusive focus on family codes, the main target of which is always 
women's behaviour, gender interests are set up as opposed to community 
interests, and women are -asked to choose between their gender rights and 
Muslim identity (Hasan, 1994b, p. 59). 
In the Shah Bano case, the success with which major players from both 
Muslim and Hindu communities managed to shift the terms of the debate from 
one of women's rights to one of minority rights, had the result of reinforcing 
the view of those who would subsume women's identities under that of a 
homogenised and fixed community identity (ibid, pp. 65-6). The resultant 
Muslim Women's Bill ignored the multiple identities which both men and 
women possess and, in Hasan's view, denied the fact that women might 
experience conflict between their minority and gender identities. By only 
recognizing an ungendered identity for Muslim women, and by foregrounding 
Muslim personal law as the sole basis of community identity, the state 
legitimated a narrow interpretation of Muslim community identity, de- 
authorizing other trends of thought and interpretations from within the Muslim 
community in the process (p. 68). 
Hasan's concern with tracking the ways in which particular groups of women, 
and constructs of the feminine, come to 'stand for' the community, and 
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especially for some sense of stable, unchanging truth about the nation or the 
race, is one that is shared in other recent work by Indian feminists. Like a 
number of the feminists reviewed here, Amrita Chhachhi draws on Benedict 
Anderson's landmark study of nationalism, Imagined Communities (1991) in 
her examination of the place of 'Woman' and 'women' in recent 
fundamentalist and communalist discourse. Despite his own silence on matters 
of gender, many feminists have found Anderson's understanding of nations as 
'imagined communities' a useful starting point for reflecting on how imagined 
constructs of 'Woman' play' A part in delineating the boundaries of community. 
Chhachhi cites Anderson as she discusses how nationalism appropriates the 
feminised language of 'kinship' and 'home' in order to appear as both natural 
and given. The merging of nation and community with images of the selfless 
mother and devout wife evokes the desired response of defence and protection 
by the male national subject. The linking of nation to 'mother', 'nature' and 
'home' reinforces its claims to authenticity (Chhachhi, 1990, pp. 163-4). 
What Chhachhi adds to this framework is a feminist concern with women's 
strategic location with respect to these symbolic constructs. Within these 
paradigms, 'Woman' marks the boundaries and contours of the national 
community and provides access to its truth about itself. However, those 
borders, and that so-called 'truth' then work to constrain and regulate the 
activities of the community's women (ibid, pp. 165-7). Fundamentalist or 
communalist constructs of an imagined community further contract the space 
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for women to act as participants in defining the content of community identity, 
since their emphasis is on projecting an unchanging and monolithic image of 
that community (p. 148). 
Chhachhi's work takes a slightly different direction from Hasan's consideration 
of the relationship between women and community identities under 
communalism. Hasan wants to identify a distinct gender identity and gender 
interests, and both analytically and politically, separate gender from national, 
raced or community identities. But for Chhachhi, women cannot sidestep their 
implication in community identity. They need to counter the myth of 
monolithic community identities, while insisting on their place within the 
process of defining those communities (pp. 168-9). 
Useful Bodies 
What Chhachhi suggests, but doesn't explicitly discuss, is why 'Woman' and 
I women I should prove such useful boundary markers for community identities. 
One of the points most frequently made in much of the material discussed in 
this chapter involves some variation on the statement that 'the identity of a 
community is constructed on the bodies of women' (Kannabiran and 
Kannabiran, 1995, p. 122). Clearly, it is the female body's capacity for birth 
that makes women crucial to the preservation of a particular community's 
integrity and purity. 
39 
Urvashi Butalia's exploration of the violence surrounding the 1947 partition 
of India and Pakistan, makes this link between the female body and community 
identities more explicit. In the partition violence, both the protection and 
transgression of a community's purity were materially marked on the bodies 
of its women. Women were killed in order to save them from being 'polluted' 
and so save the community's purity. Mass suicides of women to protect their 
own status as pure were valorised as the acceptable face of women's agency. 
Conversely, the rape and mutilation of women marked them as 'taken' by the 
other side and made indelibly impure (Butalia, 1993, pp. WS14-5). Butalia's 
discussion of recent communal violence shows many of the same practices at 
work today (Butalia, 1995). 
Historical analyses of social practices under contention during the colonial 
period identify similar symbolic roles invested in the bodies of women. 
Mrinalini Sinha examines how the gaze of both 19th century colonialists and 
Bengali nationalists was directed at women's bodies in order to establish norms 
of femininity, and through them, norms of relative national worth. So, for 
example, around the issue of child marriage, a whole series of normalizing 
questions were directed at the female body: when does the female body 
menstruate 'naturally'9 Is a body that menstruates earlier than the Western 
norm f unnatural'? Who has the right to name the mature body? Is the female 
body naturally passionless -or libidinous? This problematization of the 
female 
body ties the 'naturalness' or propriety of practices involving groups of women 
to evaluations of norms of both masculinity and nationhood. In the colonial 
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context, contestations over the 'truth' about the female body become the 
discursive ground for debating whether a male child born of an 'unnaturally' 
immature mother is effeminate, and whether a nation which carries out such 
unnatural practices is degenerate, barbaric, and incapable of self-rule (Sinha, 
1987, pp. 217-231). 
Lata Mani's genealogy of the official discourse on sati (widow-burning) in 
colonial India is one of the best-known examinations of the ways in which 
women can become a focus for games of truth that privilege a male national 
subject. For Mani, the burning body of the widow is a powerfully contested 
and multivocal symbol at the heart of a number of normalizing discourses and 
practices. Mani shows how the struggle for power between colonialist and 
nationalist forces produced a new hierarchy of scriptural, legal and traditional 
knowledges about sati, which then became the basis for laws and normalizing 
practices effecting women's lives (Mani, 1990, pp. 99-111). Norms of 
nationhood and womanhood emerge and vie for legitimacy as colonial interests 
and Indian national supporters and opponents of the practice sift through, 
classify, selectively discount and confirm aspects of the past. 
What does the widow's burning body say? For the colonialist it becomes 
evidence of a norm of nationhood that does not deserve to rule itself, and that 
must be replaced with new, Western norms. For the nationalist opponent of 
sati, it signifies the need to restore to purity a debased and distorted tradition 
that has been imposed by mis-readers of the scriptures. For the nationalist 
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supporter of sati, it already represents that pure tradition- The tremendous 
malleability of the widow's body in cultural interpretation and in law contrasts 
cruelly with its absolute fixity - its reduction to ashes - in reality. But then, 
Mani argues, real women, denied any agency or access to complex subjectivity 
in any of the norms on offer, are not the proper subjects of this particular 
debate. Nor are they even the principal objects of the debate. For Mani, norms 
of womanhood, inscribed on women's bodies, rather constitute the ground 
upon which norms of nationhood, including notions of tradition, authenticity 
and relative national worth, are contested (ibid, pp. 117-8). 
I began this section by considering what Kumkum Roy has called the 'curious 
visibility' of women within colonial and postcolonial discourses and practices 
that focus on national, raced and other community identities. I end it with Lata 
Mani's characterization of women's discursive and strategic positioning as the 
ground upon which groups of men contest norms of national identity. Clearly 
there are important differences between these two ways of conceptualizing 
women's location within Processes of identity-constitution. To speak of 
women's visibility is to suggest that they are foregrounded in these processes. 
As Zoya Hasan puts it, it is to suggest that women are at the very centre of 
redefinitions of national or. community identities. To speak of women as the 
ground of identity-defining processes can suggest that women's location is 
characterized by exclusion and abjection, by invisibility. 
Hasan's approach suggests a focus on the female body as a useful body, in the 
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Foucauldian sense, both enabled and constrained within specific relations of 
power. Mani's formulation, if applied too unilaterally, suggests that the female 
body is only useful when it is abjected and objectified, made to serve as a 
passive ground for 'games of truth' which concern only men. Too simple or 
monolithic a reading of this move can result in a view that women always 
disappear; that all discourses objectify women; that there is no difference in 
the end between, for example, the 19th century reformers who wanted to 
abolish sati and those who wanted to preserve it; that it makes no difference 
whether the women in question live or die'. Mani herself has argued against 
such a view, insisting that feminists must not concede to colonial or patriarchal 
discourse what it has at times attempted to achieve - the erasure of women 
(Mani, 1992a, p. 403). 
On the other hand, only to speak of women as visible and foregrounded. carries 
the risk of covering over. the fundamental assymetry in male-female power 
relations that makes women's bodies useful in highly constrained ways. The 
Indian feminist material I find most productive holds these two moves 
together, combining an attention to women's subordination with an 
acknowledgement of the ways in which they are also enabled, foregrounded 
and made central to processes of identity-constitution. In the following 
sections, I look at two specific themes in which this double focus on the 
useful-but-constrained female body emerges in Indian feminist scholarship. In 
section two I look at appropriations of birth and the mother-figure. In section 
' My thanks to Tanika Sarkar for clarifying this danger for me. 
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three, I look at the female body in relation to questions of time and space. 
2. APPROPRIATIONS OF BIRTH FOR NATION & RACE 
IDENTITIES 
As we have seen, many Indian feminists seem to share an understanding that 
the female body, and especially its capacity for birth, plays an important 
symbolic and material role in the emergence of national or community 
identities. But there are also differences over how to define, or where to locate 
that importance: is it only a question of 'domesticating' birth and evoking the 
maternal as passive in order to appropriate it for other purposes? Or is there 
a more complicated 'managing' of the maternal at work, that acknowledges a 
certain female or feminine power, in order to have something powerful to 
serve particular identity-building processes? 
One site for these debates is scholarship on the place of the mother-goddess 
and concepts of birth in the metaphysical and mythological groundings of 
Hindu culture. It should be noted that almost all Indian feminist discussions of 
cultural images of birth and -the mother-figure take place in a Hindu context; 
these are mainly feminists from the Hindu community reading both Hindu 
culture and its appropriations within nationalist and communalist movements. 
Indeed, one of problems raised in this material is the way (mainly upper caste 
and mainly Bengali) Hindu icons of mother-goddesses take over the space of 
the nation through their reincarnations as Mother India. 
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This occurs most obviously in contemporary Hindu communalist projects; but 
it was also a problem historically within the nationalist movement that claimed 
to promote a secular inclusiveness of all India's religious/racial communities. 
The women's movement has also at times been complicit in using specifically 
Hindu cultural images to represent all Indian women (Agnes, 1995). During 
demonstrations in support of Shah Bano, for example, Muslim women were 
placed in the front lines, but were asked to march alongside predominantly 
Hindu cultural symbols (Butalia, 1995, personal interview). 
Stepping into this complex discursive space for someone who is neither an 
expert in Hindu metaphysics nor in Indian history, is not easy. But there is a 
significance here that goes beyond the space of Indian feminisms, which makes 
it worth negotiating the risks to identify a number of points. Discussions of the 
place of the mother-figure in Hinduism suggest that there can be a variety of 
metaphysical models in which the specifically female is managed in identity- 
constituting processes that continue to privilege men. This is important for 
three reasons. First, it is a warning to Western feminists who may still be 
tempted to look beyond the West for pure alternatives to the metaphysical 
models that bedevil them. Second, it suggests that the specifically female 
For evidence that such temptations still exist, see Clement (1994) who, 
in her exploration of the concept of syncope as an alternative to the 
'classic Western concept of the Subject' (Clement, 1994, p. 156), 
constructs a univocal India as a privileged site where this suspension 
of time and the individuated self enjoys free play. In the process, 
Clement also asserts that India is a site where the feminine is 
unproblematically valorised, and where the transgressive blurring of 
boundaries between masculine and feminine is more possible than in 
the West (see, for example, pp. 138,143, and 243). Clement reaches 
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needs to be attended to when considering how differences like race and nation 
emerge; it is not something that feminists can discount. Third, it suggests that 
the margin, or the excluded and repressed outside, is not the only 'proper' 
space for 'Woman' within symbolic or social systems that subordinate women. 
Indian feminists are, it seems, faced with a chorus of maternal voices in 'the 
Hindu tradition', especially since the latter is not, in fact, a single tradition but 
'a mosaic of cults, sects and deities constituted through plurally authored, 
multiply motivated myths which must be read not only as alterations and 
reinterpretations but also as appropriations and contestations' (Pathak and 
Sengupta, 1995, p. 288). Feminists too are involved in these multiply motivated 
appropriations and contestations. 
Some Indian feminists tend to privilege those voices which link the originating 
power of the universe - shakti - with female birth. Kamala Ganesh, for 
example, looks at a wide. yariety of powerful mother-goddesses in Hindu 
scriptures and iconography, and argues that at least some of these goddesses 
are never fully domesticated or constrained by male gods (Ganesh, 1990). For 
Ganesh, such manifestations of the mother-goddess, which bind together 
dualities of life and death, nurturing and destruction in the female body, and 
which are represented as unconstrained by lineage, husband or family, can be 
a persistant disturbing presence (ibid, pp. WS59-63). 
her conclusions without any reference to the work of Indian feminists. 
For more detail, see Gedalof (1996). 
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Other feminist scholars focus on traditions that posit the mother as passive 
field sowed by the active seed of the father (13hattacharji, 1990 and Dube, 
1986), or that subordinate the potentially unruly mother-figure to the 
domesticated figure of the wife (Chakravarti, 1983). Kumkum Roy notes that 
spiritual birth, defined as masculine, often takes precedence over physical 
birth, as in those initiation ceremonies where upper caste Hindu boys are 
'reborn' from their spiritual priest-teachers (Roy, 1995, p. 16). These 
appropriations of birth may acknowledge its power, but only by distancing 
birth from specifically female physicality, and under conditions over which 
women are expected to have little or no control (Roy, 1995, pp. 15-16). The 
symbolic distancing of birth from women is also suggested by the small 
number of important mother-child relationships in classical mythology', and 
the lack of any significant myths about mother-daughter relationships 
(Chakravarti, 1983, p. 68). 
When the debate turns to ways in which this chorus of maternal voices has 
been put into play in nationalist and communalist movements, there are again 
some differences of approach. Some feminists privilege the image of a self- 
sacrificing Mother India that constitutes a passive, nurturing ground for a 
nationalism that is largely defined by and for men. Jasodhara Bagchi, for 
example, looks at what she describes as the ideological mobilisation of 
Chakravarti argues that the only prominent example of mother-child 
relations in the classical literature is that between Krishna and his 
mother Yashoda, and that, 'even here the focus is primarily on Krishna 
rather than on the mother' (1983, p. 68). 
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motherhood in the service of nationalism in late 19th century Bengal. Her 
reading of the Bengali tradition of maternity stresses an 'undying spirit of self- 
sacrifice for the family' (Bagchi, 1990, p. WS65) which is then pressed into 
service by the nationalist movement in two ways. On the one hand, it glorifies 
motherhood for actual women, displacing movements to reform women's 
social status. On the other hand, it glorifies an abstract motherhood as the 
ground for asserting national selfhood and identity against the colonial 
presence - the mother-nation becomes a 'domain one could claim for one's 
own' (ibid, pp. WS65-66). 
At the same time, Bagchi notes how the incorporation of a Hindu mother- 
goddess figure into the centre of the emerging sense of Indian nation-ness 
helps to exclude Muslim Indians from that 'imagined community' (p. WS70). 
As this particular appropriation of the mother-figure excludes Muslim anti- 
colonialists, from its frame of reference, so too, for Bagchi, does it exclude 
most women. For her, what lies behind this glorification of the mother is 
largely the anxieties of men, and their need for authentication and valorisation 
in the face of the colonial rulers. The legitimacy -a revalorised national 
identity - that emerges from the process is passed on to their sons, and not 
their daughters (p. WS71). 
Bagchi is one of a number'of Indian feminists to acknowledge the importance 
of the mother-figure to national identities; but for Bagchi and many others, 
that importance seems to derive largely from the supposed passivity of the 
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maternal-feminine 6. In these narratives, those unsettling, excessive voices of 
the mother-goddess seem to have been completely domesticated. But as Ania 
Loomba has argued: 
For the Indian woman to be cast as Mother India and to serve 
a wide spectrum of political interests in colonial times, she had 
to be rewritten as more-than-victim. As an agent of Hindu 
tradition, or nationalist interests, a certain amount of volition, 
and even desire had to be attributed to her. (Loomba, 1993, 
p. 216) 
Tanika Sarkar complicates the reading of 19th century Bengali nationalism 
given by Bagchi and others to suggest instead ways in which the strong 
mother-goddess figure is acknowledged, put into play and managed within a 
discourse that still foregrounds the male subject. In her examination of 
nationalist discourse as expressed in 19th century Bengali poetry and literature, 
Sarkar stresses the flexibility of nationalist appropriations of the mother-figure, 
and the many meanings read onto the image of the mother. By tapping into 
both sides of the life-death duality discussed by Ganesh, these nationalist 
appropriations draw on traditional evocations of the mother as both power and 
powerlessness. They also engage with new meanings of the maternal 
introduced by the colonial presence and discourse (Sarkar, 1987, p. 201 1). 
Sarkar focusses on the evocations of country as mother-land and the different 
strains woven into this image. On one level, she argues, the glorification of 
country as female, as Mother India, is a defiant response to the colonial power 
that represents itself as Imperial (male) lion, and that denies masculinity to the 
See also Sen (1993), Lakshmi (1990). and Natarajan (1994) for further 
examples of use of-the mother-figure within nationalist discourses. 
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colonised Bengali which it characterises, by its own value system, as 
'effeminate'. But this defiant image can only work because it draws on those 
traditions of female originating power (shakti) and of mother-goddess worship 
which retained their resonance in 19th century Bengal (ibid, p. 201 1). 
At the same time, the mother-figure is also being evoked as authentic, stable, 
unchanging origin, to whom the male Indian subject can return in his quest for 
authenticity, shaken by his failure in the terms of the West's discourse of 
progress (p. 2011). Thus Sarkar notes a never-fully resolved tension between 
evocations of those aspects of militancy and sexuality in the mother-goddess 
as icon of anti-colonial struggle, and the desire to contain this militancy within 
the safer frame of the innOCent, nurturing and healing mother-figure who 
passes power back to her sons (p. 2012). 
In the 20th century independence struggle, Gandhi also adopted for himself a 
powerful maternal persona as a way of heightening his authority, evoking what 
Meena Alexander calls the 'virile Mother-India' figure (Alexander, 1989, 
p. 371). For Sarkar, the theoretical discordance between the powerful, militant 
mother-figure Gandhians, helped to promote, and their resistance to following 
through on the implicatioiig of that image for reordering gender relations, 
remained a key unresolved tension of the nationalist movement (Sarkar, 1987, 
p. 2014). 
In the context of the contemporary Hindu communalist movement, that virile 
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Mother India persona can also be directly taken up by women. Sarkar notes 
how in some of the recent literature of the Hindu right, motherhood is 
'emptied of its customary emotional and affective load and is vested with a 
notion of heroic political instrumentality' (Sarkar, 1995, p. 188). Communal 
women leaders take up the same strain of heroic mothers willing their children 
to die for the Hindu nation, and the rank and file mothers of the communal 
movements are mobilised as pivotal 'political creatures and agents' in the 
right's bid for hegemony at the level of everyday relations, personal habit and 
domestic ritual and practice (ibid, p. 189). 
Sarkar makes the point that this kind of symbolic and strategic appropriation 
of both the Mother-India figure, and of the activities of real mothers, has a 
directly political significance in the context of the communal movement (ibid). 
This is not just something which happens in a separate, or ancillary ideological 
or cultural field. I want to suggest that Sarkar's point might apply beyond the 
specific context of communalist politics. Discursive and strategic 
appropriations of birth such as this might be understood as examples of the 
kind of productive bio-power Foucault describes. Here, the specifically female 
body, and its capacity for birth, becomes a useful body in the Foucauldian 
sense, invested with particular truths and engaged in producing particular 
material effects, as it is enmeshed in specific power relations. In the following 
section, I will look at how this theme is further expanded through considering 
women Is location in time and space. 
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3. PURITY MODELS - TIME/TRADITION AND SPACE/HOME 
One recurring issue in the Indian feminist scholarship I have examined is the 
different ways in which 'Woman' has been linked with notions of timeless 
tradition in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. This reinforces the 
sense of 'Woman' as stable, unchanging ground upon which an active male 
subject re-builds a sense of self shaken by the uncertainties of colonial and 
postcolonial societies. So, Sangari and Vaid argue, 'the recovery of tradition 
throughout the proto-nationalist and nationalist period was always the recovery 
of the "traditional" woman. - her various shapes continuously readapt the 
"eternal" past to the needs of the contingent present' (Sangari and Vaid, 1990, 
p. 1o). 
It is a familiar argument among both feminists and non-feminists that women 
play a key role in preserving and transmitting cultural traditions, especially in 
Third World societies. Anthias and Yuval-Davis have argued, for example, 
that since women have less access to the public sphere, they are often less 
assimilated socially and I. inguistically into the wider society with all its 
f modern' or Western influences. And since they tend to have primary 
responsibility for child rearing, they are particularly well-placed to transmit 
this heritage of traditional symbols and ways of life (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
1989, p. 3). The equation of women= tradition thus seems quite straightforward 
and unproblernatic. 
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But the work of a number of Indian feminists suggests a rather different, and 
certainly more complex understanding of the woman-tradition connection. 
Sangari and Vaid note that neither tradition nor modernity is available in a 
value-free or unproblematic sense. Rather, they argue for a focus on 
how change is made to appear as continuity [since] the 
ideologies of women as carriers of tradition often disguise, 
mitigate, compensate, contest actual changes taking place. 
Womanhood is often part of an asserted, or desired, not an 
actual cultural continuity. (Sangari and Vaid, 1990, p. 17) 
Urna Chakravarti's study of the re-scripting of India's past in the colonial 
period argues that women do not simply transmit a self-evident already- 
constituted body of tradition; tradition is rather being constantly re-invented, 
woman's place in that tradition is constantly re-interpreted, and contemporary 
women's self-definition is being re-produced in relation to that invented 
tradition (Chakravarti, 1990, pp. 27-57). Chakravarti focusses on the complex 
intersections of caste, class, gender, national and imperialist interests that 
converged in the process of 'scripting' a lost Vedic-Aryan Golden Age and 
placing it at the centre of Indian historical consciousness. She argues that for 
women in particular this perception of a lost glory has 'led to a narrow and 
limiting circle in which the image of Indian womanhood has become both a 
shackle and a rhetorical device that nevertheless functions as a historical truth' 
(ibid, p. 28). 
In Chakravarti's account, a version of a pure unchanging tradition, which 
places a pure traditional Woman at its centre, emerges and claims its continuity 
from a decidedly impure and discontinuous field of contestations. The 
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sometimes convergent, sometimes contradictory agendas of Western Orientalist 
scholars (both male and female), and upper caste Hindu literati, who were also 
sometimes Hindu revivalists and/or nationalists, meet in the apparently still 
space of this traditional Indian Woman (pp. 29-45). The pure space occupied 
by this Traditional Woman is only secured by covering over a multiplicity of 
caste, class and religious differences between women, and by disqualifying 
those counter-discourses which question whether the Golden Age 'she' 
embodies ever existed (pp. 66-76). 
Nevertheless, 'she' is presented as the unbroken link back to that lost Golden 
Age, ready to take on active roles to preserve family or caste honour in times 
of crisis, and to produce children as part of the physical regeneration of the 
weakened Aryan race (pp. 50-60). Both aspects suggest variations on the 
militant mother-goddess figure we examined earlier, whose power and 
privileged access to origins, both in terms of spiritual ity/tradition and birth, 
is at once acknowledged and- contained within the framework of a community 
or national agenda. 
In the postcolonial context, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan points to popular cultural 
representations of the 'new Indian woman', a construct that aims both to 
reconcile, in her person, the conflicts between tradition and modernity in 
Indian society, and to deny the actual conflicts that women experience in their 
lives (Sunder Rajan, 1993, p. 129). As an example of this process, Sunder 
Rajan looks at advertisements on Indian State Television that promote the 'pan- 
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Indian' subject, as opposed to specific regional, religious or communal 
identities. She notes that this is only achieved, ironically, by 'westernizing' the 
Indian male consumer, whose project of 'modernization-without- 
westernization' is saved by the presence of 'the Indian woman, perenially and 
transcendentally wife, mother and homemaker' whose specific role is to 
balance (deep) tradition and (surface) modernity (ibid. p. 133). 
In these representations, according to Sunder Rajan, 'Woman' and religion 
occupy the same conceptual space; in both cases, the traditional is defined as 
timeless, and hence able to embrace, and make space for, modernity as a 
transitional phase disguising the permanent essence of tradition. 'Woman' is 
made to serve as the harmonious symbol of historical continuity, rather than 
as conflictual subject (ibid, pp. 134-5). Women's emancipation (the 'new' part 
of the 'new Indian woman' construct) is made to appear as a matter of 
individual women's achievement and choice, in ways that fit comfortably with 
a tradition preserved intact in an idealized conjugal and domestic sphere. 
Again, as in the rescripting of the Golden Age examined by Chakravarti, this 
version of tradition can only survive by what it excludes. Here, Sunder Rajan 
argues, this is achieved by redefining precisely those aspects of 'tradition' that 
are the most frequent sites of women's oppression - sexual harassment, 
domestic work, dowry demands, marriage rituals. By sanitising, glamorising 
or trivialising these moments, the advertisements project them instead as sites 
for 'remaking female identity' (p. 132). 
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Sunder Rajan identifies this same move at work in Hindu communalist support 
for recent cases of sati, where 'modern', educated young women are 
represented as being able to negotiate their way through modernity and, 
through the act of sati, reconfirm the timeless, authentic identity of their 
communities (pp. 17-8). But it is not just through such highly charged and 
visible acts as sati that the Hindu right mobilises the woman-tradition- 
authenticity package. Sarkar notes that, in projecting itself as a religious, 
rather than political movement, the Hindu right draws on the notion that faith 
is timeless and above historical change and political manipulation. Demands 
made in the name of religion, then, refer back to this timeless faith and not to 
any modern variant that is open to political appropriation. Women become 
central to this argument because they are seen as the custodians of this timeless 
faith (Sarkar, 1995, p. 209). 
V. Geetha and T. V. Jayanthi note that in Hindu communities, it is often 
through activities for which women are responsible that a community's 
structuring of time marks it as Hindu. Women are responsible for the 
observance of pollution and purity rituals; for breaking up calendar time into 
fasting and festival days, or auspicious and inauspicious moments; for 
patterning meals to suit these sanctified blocks of time. All this inscribes 
religiosity into women's lives and bodies in caste and culture-specific ways 
(Geetha and Jayanthi, 1995, p. 245). 
But in turn, woments activities in time also become markers for the 
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community of these religion- and caste-specific identities. The Hindu right 
seeks to displace and re-produce these women-specific activities outside the 
household, both mobilising women's 'private' rituals in a public cause and 
grounding its claims to authenticity in women's presence and activities (ibid, 
p. 247). A pure, 'timeless time' of Woman lends legitimacy to the impermanent 
moment of political contestation. 
The related spatial move in both nationalist and communalist movements that 
has interested Indian feminists is the conflation of 'Woman' with 'home'. 
There is, of course, nothing particularly new in feminists looking at the ways 
in which women have been associated with concepts of the private, 'home' or 
'inside'. One complication that Indian and other postcolonial feminisms have 
brought to this question is their insistence that the feminised space of home is 
productive not only of gendered but also of raced, national and other 
community identities. 
Ania. Loomba, for example , looks at the shifts 
introduced to the meanings of 
public and private by the colonial presence. She argues that, to some extent at 
least, a Western reading of public/private spheres is introduced to Indian 
nationalist discourse through the power struggle over spheres of influence 
between the colonial government and the indigenous elite. In instituting a 
division of labour in which certain 'social issues', designated as dealing with 
moral or cultural questions, were de-linked from the institutions of public 
(colonial) power and handed over as a sphere of influence to the indigenous 
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elite, particular Western concepts of a private realm of moral conscience were 
also being taken on. And, of course, many of these issues defined as private 
centred around women (Loomba, 1993, p-213). 
Samita Sen also explores this redefinition of the private, in which women 
became the arena for playing out agreements and conflicts between the colonial 
bureaucracy and the colonized middle class. 'Home' became designated as the 
private space where the colonised subject retreats from his master; neither 
collaboration nor protest were to impinge on the hearth where 'Woman' is 
constituted as the repository of traditional values and upholder of the moral 
order of the subject-race. For Sen, nationalism inherits a language that links 
and sets up a series of connected binary oppositions between 'the "home and 
the world", the nursery and the nation, the private and the public' (Sen, 1993, 
p. 233). 
In both Sen and Loomba's discussions, then, we see the familiar public/private 
binary extended beyond gender to include questions of nation or race. But I 
think it is possible to suggest other ways in which Indian feminist scholarship 
complicates the way we think about the relation between women and space. 
Perhaps because this particular reading of 'Woman' as home was born out of 
the very public anti-colonial struggle, this 'private' was also very evidently a 
presence in the public sphere. There is a sense here of nationalism constructing 
a private sphere which women can then carry around with them into the public 
sphere, so that women are mobilised and contained at the same time. 
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On this question, as in her consideration of the mother-figure, Tanika Sarkar 
points to the tension between moves to enable and constrain women. On the 
one hand, there is the promise of reordering gender relations implicit in a 
certain 'feminisation' of nationalist discourse, and in the political mobilisation 
of real women. On the other hand, there is the containing of women by the 
nationalist movement within its own patriarchal norms. 
This 'feminisation' of the movement through a public discourse of home 
worked through this tension on several levels. For example, the move to invest 
moral authority and purity in the feminine-home sphere represents a potential 
challenge to patriarchal perceptions of women's actual authority in the family. 
But investing women with this moral ascendency was often linked to rejecting 
the importance of formal education for women, so that the household, centred 
around domestic work and an oral tradition of stories from the epics, becomes 
woman's religious text, su fficient to her needs (Sarkar, 1987, p. 2013). 
The foreign presence, in the form of false knowledge and foreign goods, was 
often characterised as a foreign parasite attacking the body; in these nationalist 
discourses, health and life therefore depended on women's authentic 
knowledge and traditional healing, shopping and feeding skills, in the interior 
space of the household (ibid, p. 2013). Gandhi also took over traditional 
home-based rituals as rituals of the public movement. Sarkar argues that, on 
one level, this utilisation 'extended domestic, feminine ritual into the world of 
men and public affairs. There was a mingling of male and female spaces and 
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practices. The sharing opened up possibilities for the reordering of gender 
relations' (p. 2014). 
But, although Sarkar does not put it in these terms, because 'Woman' has to 
be the pure private space of home, and not just visit it as 'Man' does, women 
can never stand in the same relation to this 'privatised' public movement as its 
male participants and leaders do. Sarkar notes the tendency in nationalist 
literature to conceptualise home and women's bodies as integrally linked, and 
as the one safe hiding-place for the national subject's battered independence: 
Very often, an implicit continuum is postulated between the 
hidden, innermost private space, chastity, almost the sanctity of 
the vagina, [and] political independence at state level; as if, 
through a steady process of regression, this independent self- 
hood has been folded back from the public domain to the 
interior space of the household, and then further pushed back 
into the hidden depths of an inviolate, chaste, pure female 
body. (ibid, p. 2014) 
But if Woman is the pure, chaste body in which the independent self lives, 
then there is no space for female desire, either sexual or political, and the self 
that needs a hiding place, or a ground to stand on, must be male. 
What emerges is a complex sense of women's location that is actually not that 
easily contained within the familiar man-world-public/woman-home-private 
binary which Sen and Loomba suggest. Woman, and women's activities may 
often figure as the home men can retreat to, but women's activities also bring 
that home into the world in complicated, impure ways. Women are enabled as 
participants in political contestations, but their presence is also used to claim 
60 
an authenticity of identity for the national or raced subject who remains 
stubbornly Man. 
Beyond the frame of nationalist or communalist politics, Seemanthini Niranjana 
also suggests a more complex locating of women in space in her study of the 
mapping of cultural spaces in a village community. Niranjana found that much 
of what was said in the village about femininity, the female body and the 
activities of women was governed by a strong spatial narrative. But at the 
same time, descriptions of space, the community, and its identity are, in turn, 
mediated through references to female morality, shame, honour and rules of 
movement (S. Niranjana, 1994a, p. 5). 
The manner in which woMdn inhabit space becomes a key to preserving the 
physical and moral parameters of particular groups. This is, first, because 
considerations of female honour and sexuality both inform the rules underlying 
women's use of space and are also the hinge along which groups such as 
households, castes and villages draw their boundaries. Secondly, it is women 
who are often the central actors in this process of cultural reproduction (ibid. 
p. 13). 
Additionally, what appears at first sight to be a simple echo of the 
public/private split, with men's space designated 'outer' and women's 'inner' 
turns out to be more complex. Notions of inner-ness and outer-ness are 
flexible and shifting. The 'inner', as women's space can, depending on 
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context, mean the village, the shared space of kinship or caste group, or the 
household-, women's presence lends an inner-ness each time to a different 
configuration of relations. What remains constant is that female sexuality and 
its regulation remain both the target of and the medium through which not only 
female identity, but also the boundaries of community space come to be 
negotiated (pp. 14-5). 
CONCLUSION 
My reading of the Indian feminist material examined in this chapter suggests 
a complex discursive and strategic positioning for women. First, discursive 
constructs of 'Woman' and women's activities are seen as productive of, and 
often central to the emergence of national, raced and community identities. 
Second, one of the ways in which 'Woman' and 'women' become necessary 
to the emergence of these identities is through acknowledging and 
appropriating the privileged access to origins that the female capacity of birth 
represents. But third, the stability of these community identities relies on 
locating 'Woman' and 'women' as pure origin, as timeless tradition and the 
fixed place of home. The female body becomes a highly useful body, in the 
Foucauldian sense, by linking it to models of purity and unchanging, authentic 
identities. 
This complex positioning, of 'Woman' and 'women' raises two important 
theoretical issues for feminism. The first is whether the familiar binary logic 
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of self/other, inclusion/exclusion, public/private divisions, on which so much 
of feminist theory relies for its paradigms, can adequately reflect this 
complexity. In particular, Js the familiar characterization of women as 
marginalized, excluded, or abjected, one that can be sustained? Or do we need 
to look also at how women are foregrounded, made visible and useful in the 
constitution of specific community identities? 
This leads to the second issue we need to consider: how does this complex 
positioning impinge on questions of women's agency? If we move away from 
simple inclusion/exclusion paradigms, then we cannot posit women as ever 
fully passive and without agency. But at the same time, the particular ways in 
which women emerge as 'useful' bodies and subjects will make some forms 
of agency more acceptable than others within prevailing relations of power. 
How have Indian feminists dealt with these questions of women's problematic 
visibility and problematised agency? What do they propose as feminist 
alternative models of the individual self, of the subject-agent, and of collective 
identities? It is to these questions that I turn in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter Two 
AGENCY, THE SELF AND THE 
COLLECTIVE IN INDIAN FEMINISMS 
INTRODUCTION '' 
As I argued in Chapter One, one of the issues to concern Indian feminists in 
recent years has been the 'curious visibility of women' in colonial and 
postcolonial discourses and practices centering on national and other 
community identities. This has raised a number of conceptual challeges for 
Indian feminists when they turn to the question of women's agency and 
resistance. How are feminism's claims for women to be distinguished from 
other discourses and practices that might focus on 'Woman' and 'women', but 
which don't seem to advance the cause of women very much? Do these 
discourses and practices always constitute 'Woman' and 'women' as a passive, 
silenced and powerless ground upon which national or raced identities are 
constructed? Is this only a question of women being objectified across a more 
complicated set of networks, but with the same moves of exclusion, repression 
or objectification being enacted across those different categories? And 
conversely, is any foregrounding of women as active agents necessarily a form 
of resistance to this subordination? 
In the first section of this chapter I suggest that different theoretical starting 
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points can affect the ways in which Indian feminists have answered these 
questions. I begin by discussing two contrasting Indian feminist analyses of 
women's active presence in the contemporary Hindu communalist movement. 
This debate suggests broader theoretical differences within Indian feminisms 
over how to characterize women's agency and positioning within predominant 
power relations. 
Section two explores a number of Indian feminist discussions of when and how 
women's agency is valoriged within discourses and practices that centre on 
community identities. Section three links the limitations placed on women's 
agency with the ways in which the female body is conceptualized. In section 
four, I consider how women's location within specific communities 
problernatises their access to subject-positions that are not defined by a single 
community. In particular, I consider Indian feminist discussions of women's 
access to the status of citizen. This leads, in section five, to a consideration of 
the problems and possibilities for alternative feminist models of the self and 
the collective. 
1. VIABLE WOMEN 
The foregrounding of women as militants and leaders within the right-wing 
Hindu communalist movement has sparked some important theoretical 
reflections on the question of agency, and has revealed some significant 
differences of approach within Indian feminisms. The feminist historian Tanika 
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Sarkar has been researching the question of women leaders and militants 
within Hindu communalism for a number of years (see Sarkar 1991 and 1995). 
Sarkar presents a many-layered picture of women's complex location within 
the discourses and practices. of the Hindu communalist movement. 
This is in part because of the complex nature of the movement itself, its 
versatility and its use of shifting icons, images, and versions of Hindu 
'tradition' (Sarkar, 1995, p. 192). But it is also because, in at least some 
versions of the communalist project, women are being offered a space within 
the movement as militant, actively and radically political beings, in ways that 
depart from conventional norms of domesticity and that add political 
dimensions to more traditiofial norms of femininity (ibid, pp. 188-9). 
Sarkar argues, for example, that in previous national and communal 
movements, the 'fetishised sacred love object to be recuperated has been a 
feminised figure', a 'Mother-India figure'. However, in the contemporary 
movement that position can also belong to a specifically male deity, the god 
Ram, and women are being pressed into action to liberate him: 
The reversal of roles equips the communal woman with a new 
and empowering self image. The woman has stepped out of a 
purely iconic status to take up [an] active position as a militant. 
(Sarkar, 1991, pp. 2057-8) 
Sarkar's research suggests that it is not enough to view women active in the 
Hindu right as victims of false consciousness or as pawns being manipulated 
in a movement which goes against their interests. indeed, the involvement of 
these women has complex consequences which suggest the need to constantly 
66 
problernatise the whole question of interests, and whether it is at all useful or 
even possible to demarcate a distinct and stable category of gender interests. 
While recognizing that the ways in which women have been mobilized in the 
Hindu right's various organizations is class- and caste-specific, Sarkar finds 
that, for those touched by the movement, there has been an enabling effect that 
needs to be acknowledged. In part, this can be because religion gives women 
a forum in which to discuss a world of meanings beyond their immediate and 
limited experience; these discussions are then given a political dimension 
through the organizations of the Hindu right (ibid, p. 2060). 
Sarkar also suggests that, in projecting the communal woman as militant 
warrior, the movement opens a space in which issues of women's self- 
protection and respect within their own environment can come to the fore 
(p. 2061). Sarkar has found that political involvement in the right-wing Hindu 
organizations can give women unprecedented bargaining power within their 
families, and that their example leads other local women to feel dissatisfaction 
with early marriages, or with the burden of housework which prevents them 
from political engagement (Sarkar, 1995, personal interview). This sense of 
an increased room for manoeuvre on domestic issues for women militants of 
the Hindu right is echoed in other studies (see, for example, Bacchetta, 
1994b). 
How to understand this foregrounding of women in the Hindu right 
is a subject 
of some debate within Indian ferninisms, and 
in ways that suggest the 
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importance of theoretical starting points in terms of models of power, identity 
and the subject when feminists aim to theorize women 'in a postcolonial 
mode'. For Sarkar, the foregrounding of women, and its possible enabling 
consequences for some women, is something that needs to be acknowledged. 
But acknowledging this does not mean that she concludes that the Hindu right 
is a feminist movement, or that it represents a qualitative challenge to women's 
subordination. On the contrary she argues against any simple belief that 
women in the Hindu right will eventually 'see the light' and turn it into a 
feminist movement (Sarkar, 1995, personal interview). If the Hindu right has 
offered an alternative versi . on of normative femininity within some of its 
women's organizations, 
the thrust of the transformation is to obliterate the notion of 
selfhood, to erase concern with social and gender justice and to 
situate the public, political, extra-domestic identity on 
authoritarian community commands and a totalitarian model of 
individual existence, every particle of which is derived from an 
all-male organisation. (Sarkar, 1995, pp. 188-189) 
Thus, while some Indian feminists have read Sarkar as identifying some kind 
of 'bourgeois feminism' within the Hindu right (see, for example, John, 1996, 
p. 140), 1 would argue that she is instead trying to clear an analytical space in 
which every foregrounding of women does not necessarily refer back to a 
feminist project. 
Sarkar does not make her theoretical allegiances explicit, but in my reading, 
she is working with an underlying understanding of power that enables as it 
constrains all subjects, including women. There is no pure space where 
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unproblematically defined gender interests can be separated off from other, 
historically specific networks of power relations. As a consequence, notions 
of the subject, agency, interests, and categories of social identity such as 
gender, race, class and nation, are all problematised. Within such a 
framework, foregrounding. women as agents can be one way of constraining 
them within power relations that continue to privilege men. 
Kumkum Sangari has also argued, more generally, that patriarchies work in 
part through obtaining consent from women and not just through coercion. 
Granting women agential capacities may be one of the ways in which this 
consent is obtained. She sees consent as 'part of this uneven process of the 
reconstitution of patriarchies' (Sangari, 1993, p. 869), and wants a more 
complex understanding of both patriarchies and women's place in them, linked 
to specific modes of production, class structures, and caste/class inequality. 
While Sangari does not mention questions of race, nation, and community 
specificity in this context, her argument that 'women's consent may itself be 
one of the nodes of the condensed articulation of patriarchies with other social 
structures in specific historical conjunctures' (ibid) does suggest a space in 
which to consider women's productive implication in constituting these 
different categories of social identity. 
In contrast, other theoretical approaches operative within Indian feminisms 
seem to find it much more difficult to deal with this double move of 
enablement and constraint. Because of their pertinence to the Western feminist 
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projects I will be examining in future chapters, I want to focus here on how 
that difficulty is expressed in some Indian feminist appropriations of 
poststructuralist models. 
In one of the most direct recent attempts by Indian feminists to apply 
postmodern and poststructuralist theory to Indian politics, Susie Tharu and 
Tejaswini Niranjana look at a number of recent cases where 'Woman' and 
women are foregrounded' * in problematic circumstances. These include 
women's involvement in Hindu communalist organisations, and the 
appropriation of a language of women's rights and agency in communalist, 
caste and class politics. In each of the cases they look at, a particular image 
or version of the 'model Woman' is projected in ways that cover over caste, 
class or religious differences between women (Tharu and Niranjana, 1994, 
pp. 96-109). 
On one level, Tharu and Niranjana's examples, or 'metonyms', as they call 
them, can be read as another reflection of women's complex location across 
a variety of categories of social identity: women's activities and discursive 
constructs of Woman emerge as crucial to the elaboration of caste/class, 
national and community identities. In this sense, Tharu and Niranjana provide 
more examples of the picture of women's complex location that emerges from 
the work of Sarkar, Hasan and others, which I discussed in Chapter One. 
They also quite rightly point. to the limitations of a liberal feminist framework 
that asks only that women be included as citizens, agents and subjects without 
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problematizing the terms within which such categories are defined within the 
prevailing social order. 
But it is what Tharu and Niranjana do with their appropriation of postmodern 
and poststructuralist theory that does make a difference. They take as a starting 
point, the now familiar narrative that the 'subject' of modernity, or of 
'Western humanism' (ibid, pp. 95-6) is produced through exclusion - exclusion 
of women, of lower classes and castes, of minority or other 'othered' 
communities. Underpinning this narrative is a view that power also works 
primarily through exclusion and through making those who are excluded 
invisible. Feminism has contested this invisibility and insisted on women being 
included among the visible. Women's visibility is, in their view, therefore 
inevitably linked to feminism. 
But wherever Tharu and Niranjana look, Woman's and women's 'new 
visibility' places them in some highly contestable situations, with less than 
admirable allies. The problem for them then becomes feminism, along with the 
concepts of secularism, democracy, rights and citizenship that emerge together 
with the humanist subject (p. 96). The only kind of political resistance they 
seem comfortable with is a celebration of the micro-politics of the local 
(pp. 114-5). 
A number of consequences flow from this analysis. Where Sarkar struggles to 
hold on to the complexities of situations in which women's foregrounding or 
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even centrality are both acknowledged and problematized, for Tharu and 
Niranjana every foregrounding of women is conflated with feminism. The 
direct and necessary line they seem to draw from 'Woman' to feminism to the 
subject of feminism (p. 101) flattens out the ways in which 'Woman' can also 
be productively invested with a variety of meanings in ways that continue to 
subordinate women. 
Nor is this 'new visibility' necessarily completely new. While Sarkar does 
suggest certain unprecedented particularities in the 'model Woman' of the 
contemporary communalist movement, her own work on the anti-colonial 
nationalist movement (Sarkar, 1987) indicates that the foregrounding of women 
can also be found in earlier historical periods. The work of Mani and Sinha 
discussed in Chapter One also suggests this. 
In addition, while there is no doubt that feminism can be complicit with moves 
to exclude, objectify, 'other' or oppress, this is not to say that any move 
which foregrounds women is by definition feminist. Similarly, if feminism's 
language of women's rights, agency and choice is appropriated by non-feminist 
social forces for a variety of political ends, this does not necessarily disqualify 
feminism's use of that language; it only suggests that the meanings of these 
terms are never fully stable, embedded as they are in a field of socially 
specific power relations. 
Recognizing this instability would seem more consistent with Tharu and 
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Niranjana's desire to dispense with the 'humanist subject', and the notion of 
pre-discursive, pre-social or pre-symbolic 'essences' or 'truths', than does 
their insistence on connecting every evocation of 'Woman' or 'women' to 
feminism. Instead, by suggesting that the language of rights, citizenship, 
democracy, and secularism, and of women and feminism, is indelibly tainted 
by stain of humanism, they actually ascribe a certain stability of meaning to 
these terms. At the same time, they concede the macro-political terrain of 
contesting and redefining these concepts, and retreat to the 'safer' ground of 
local micro-struggles. 
Finally, Tharu. and Niranjana's work suggests another danger of some 
appropriations of poststructuralist models. In granting primacy to the linguistic 
and social gesture of exclusion, they can overstate the degree to which women 
are, in fact, erased from view. For example, in Chapter One we saw how 
Hasan's work on legal constructs of 'the Muslim Woman' within the context 
of communalism suggests ways in which women become central to the 
communal political imagination. In contrast, Tharu and Niranjana's 
appropriation of poststructuralist language models leads them to claim that the 
Indian Muslim Woman becomes unrepresentable, a linguistic non-possibility 
(Tharu and Niranjana, 1994, p. 108). If meaning is secured only through 
exclusion, as in the language model that underpins their approach, then 
'Indian'-ness and 'Woman'-ness need to exclude 'Muslim-ness in order to 
make sense to the communalist. 
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Here again, Tharu and Niranjana seem to be flattening out the complexity of 
women's location to a single move of marginal ization. Their starting premise 
is the need to capture the ways in which the apparently stable category 
twomen' can cover over ciaste, class and community differences. But in the 
end their approach seems to create less space in which to consider the 
specificities of differences between women. This is because Tharu and 
Niranjana's approach reduces those specificities to the single binary of 
exclusion versus inclusion. 
In contrast, Sarkar works with a more complex model of power in which 
women's positioning is not easily contained within this exclusion/inclusion 
binary. By acknowledging t he ways in which women can be simultaneously 
enabled and constrained within the communalist project, she turns attentions 
towards the ways in which women are both implicated in the emergence of 
national and racialized differences, and are affected by those differences. At 
the same time, she takes questions of agency outside the simple frame of 'true' 
and 'false' interests, and turns attention to the need to situate women's agency 
in the impure field of specific power relations. Within this more complex 
frame, women are never fully invisible or passive, but specific constraints are 
placed on their access to subject-agent status. Their agency can be legitimated 
or disqualified in context-specific ways. 
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2. VALORISED AGENCIES 
Urvashi Butalia raises the question of the conditions under which women's 
agency is valorised or dismissed in the context of the violence surrounding the 
1947 partition of India and Pakistan. During this period, individual and mass 
suicides by women, in ord er to prevent forced conversion or capture, were 
seen as a valorised form of agency. Butalia argues that these actions were 
approved because women were protecting the purity of the community whose 
borders they constitute (Butalia, 1993, pp. 15-16). 
Butalia also shows how this process worked differently when, after partition, 
it came to deciding the repatriation of women caught on the wrong side of 
those borders. Those who. resisted repatriation, whether because they were 
settled in a new life, or feared a hostile welcome as 'soiled goods', now found 
that exercise of choice disqualified (ibid, p. 16). Of course, the whole concept 
of 'choice' is further problematised by the complex conditions of intersecting 
gendered, racial-religious and national conflict in which women found 
themselves. But the particular point that Butalia focusses on here is that 
women's agency is often seen as problematic when it threatens to complicate 
the simple equation of Woman = community. When women act in ways that 
suggest that they might want to, or might have to negotiate a more complex 
set of locations, their actions are seen as 'inauthentic' agency that must be 
disallowed Obid, p. 19). 
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Kumkum Sangari looks at militant women leaders of the contemporary Hindu 
right to discuss another form of valorised agency for women: female 
ineitement, or women entering the publie sphere in order to eall upon men to 
act (Sangari, 1993, pp. 872-3). She argues that it is only when the female 
militant is projected as fully submerged within the interests of the community 
that her power and agency can be safely recognized. By contrast, when women 
name themselves as women, and insist on the right to name their interests as 
women, this is viewed as 'dangerous incitement' (ibid, p. 880). This suggests 
not only that the articulation of distinct gender interests by women is 
considered dangerous to the stability of community identities, but also that 
women's access to an individual sense of self is seen as threatening. 
Uma Chakravarti also analyses the place of the powerful Hindu woman in 
myth and literature. She argues that, in these narratives, women may be 
invested with the power to preserve and regenerate the nation or the 
community, but that power often depends on a simultaneous obliteration of the 
self (Chakravarti, 1983, p. 73). 
3. PROBLEMATIC BODIES 
That it is a specifically feinale self that needs to be obliterated is suggested 
also when the female body is viewed as something to be overcome if women 
are to be recognized as agents. Amrita Basu, for example, notes that the three 
most powerful female orators of contemporary Hindu nationalism, Vijayraje 
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Scindia, Uma Bharati, and'ýadhvi Rithambara, are all celibate and promote 
their chastity publicly in order to heighten their iconic status and present 
themselves as pure representatives of community spirituality (Basu, 1995, 
p. 161). Scindia is a widow, and therefore marked as past the dangers of 
sexuality, Bharati and Rithambara both wear the orange robes of the Hindu 
sanyasin (renouncer). Thus they draw on a well-established narrative in both 
Hindu metaphysics and mythology, and its appropriations by the anti-colonial 
nationalist movement, of the Hindu woman who becomes heroic by 
sublimating herself and transcending her sexuality (Chakravarti, 1995, personal 
interview). 
Uma Chakravarti provides an example of this narrative persisting even within 
oppositional discourses in her 1989 article 'The World of the Bhaktin in South 
Indian Traditions - The Body and Beyond'. The bhakti movement, which 
began in South India in the 6th century AD, developed as a counter-tradition 
to the highly hierarchical ritual order of Brahmanical Hinduism. It asserted 
that all souls were equal before god, that self-realisation was accessible to even 
the lowliest of persons (including women), and that this could be 
accomplished, without the medium of a priestly class, through individual 
devotion to a personal god (Kishwar, 1989, pp. 3-8). 
Chakravarti looks at the legends that have emerged around the lives of four 6th 
- 12th century women saints within the bhakti tradition 
in south India, and at 
their own poetry. She considers both the space this tradition provided for these 
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particular women to expand their own selfhood, and the manner in which the 
female body shaped or impinged upon their sense of identity as agents. In each 
of the cases Chakravarti examines, the woman must in some way deny her 
specifically female body in order to attain that sense of complete selfhood 
which is expressed as union with a personal god, and which gives her the right 
to act as a subject-agent: to teach, to formulate a code of ethics, to assume a 
social position of authority over men (Chakravarti, 1989, p. 24)'. 
One, Avvaiyar, passes over the stage of female fertility by being transformed 
into an old woman. The second, Karaikalammaiyar, gives up the female form 
altogether to be turned into a monster. A third, Andal, refuses to marry any 
living man, and is absorbed into a stone replica of the god Vishnu when 
married to him. The fourth, Akka Mahadevi, follows a more complicated 
trajectory. Rejecting her earthly husband, she throws away her clothes and 
uses her nakedness to defy the earthly norms imposed on her sexuality that 
signify the female body as vulnerable. Of the four, Chakravarti argues, only 
Akka Mahadevi works her way towards complete selfhood from within the 
female body, approaching her god, not as a domesticated wife but as a more 
Chakravarti's examination of these four bhakti women poets is not 
meant to be an exhaustive evaluation of the role of women in the bhakti 
movement. For other views on this question, see Sangari (1990) and 
Mukta (1994). For ekample, Mukta's discussion of the life and poetry 
of Mirabai contrasts with Chakravarti's account of these four Maktins 
in southern India. In Mirabai's poetry, the female body and sexuality 
remain a strong presence; Mukta argues that in Mirabai's case the 
problem was the way in which the male priests interpreted her poetry 
to transform the body into soul, and sexual love into the kind of 
spiritual devotion they deemed appropriate. 
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equal lover. Yet she too is, in the legends, finally absorbed into the image of 
her god (ibid, pp. 19-27). 
Chakravarti notes that these myths offer women a different ideal for living 
than that offered bhakti men. On the social level I, women had to choose either 
marriage and the household, or devotion to a personal god (p. 23). By contrast, 
the male sage-poet could rely on the unqualified devotion of a wife to do the 
'body work' for him (p. 21) while he acted as a social and ethical agent in the 
world. On the symbolic level, bhakti men are portrayed as achieving union 
with their god at a metaphoric level; it is a metaphysical union which leaves 
the body intact. For these women, the union is much more explicit in requiring 
a sacrifice of bodily existence (p. 28). Thus, despite the increased space 
afforded these women within the bhakti tradition as social and ethical-religious 
agents, they are still working within a model of selfhood that takes the male 
body as norm, and for which the female body is a problem to be overcome. 
If we recall the Indian feminist material discussed in Chapter One on how the 
female body becomes a useful body to identity-constitution processes, we can 
see why the notion of a female embodied agent-self becomes so problematic. 
As we saw in Chapter One, the female capacity for birth, and the privileged 
access to origins this represents, are repeatedly appropriated within narratives 
of community identities. But they are appropriated as the site of pure origin, 
as timeless tradition, as the fixed place of 'home'. The female body is a highly 
useful body to these 'games of truth', but its usefulness requires that this body 
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9 stays put'. The mobility required of the individual self as agent does not fit 
with the kind of work women and women's bodies are being asked to do 
within this discursive frame. 
4. WOMEN AND/AS CITIZENS 
Another way of looking at this dissonance between women as agents and the 
'body work' they are being asked to do is through women's problematic 
relationship to the concept. of citizen. Vasanth and Kalpana Kannabiran, for 
example, have argued that while men become citizens and claim democratic 
rights in the public space of modern civil society, they still depend for their 
identity on a sense of rootedness in older forms of community, which, in 
modern India, tend to centre on the family and what they call a 'religio- 
cultural fringe'. Maintaining the stability of these older forms of community 
is seen as the primary responsibility of women (Kannabiran and Kannabiran, 
1995, pp. 124-5). A tension is therefore set up between women's identity in/as 
the closed and stable space of community and their demands for democratic 
rights as citizens in the open-ended space of civil society. 
Similarly, Mrinalini Sinha has argued that the modern community of the nation 
represents its constituents as citizens, that is as abstract individuals not bound 
by a particular family, religious or community group (Sinha, 1995, p. 49). 
But the modern nation continues to legitimise itself by appropriating to itself 
the particularism of pre-modern, 'organic' ties like the family, caste and 
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religion (ibid, p. 50). An uneasy relationship is thus sustained between the 
supposedly 'free' individual-citizen of the public domain of civil society, and 
a private domain of sexualized, racialized, and class subjects (p. 49). 
The move which Sinha does not make, but which is strongly suggested by the 
preceding discussion, is to consider how men and women might be differently 
located within this model of the citizen's relationship to national and other 
community identities. If, as we have seen, women are often called upon to 
serve as key markers of both the nation and the 'pre-modern' or 'private' 
categories that Sinha says are still being accommodated and reconstituted 
within conditions of modernity, it becomes more difficult for their claim to the 
status of unbound ind iv idual -citizen to be acknowledged. 
If the issue of personal laws and a uniform civil code discussed in Chapter 
One is placed in this theoretical context, we can see why it has become a focus 
of such intense contestation. If, as Hasan has argued, in the context of 
communal conflict, personal laws and the normative 'Woman' they produce 
can come to bear the symbolic weight for a community's united identity 
(Hasan, 1995, p. 61), then a community which perceives itself as beleaguered 
will insist even more on the fixity of 'Woman' as its protective border. This 
strengthens the hand of fundamentalism and attempts to project a homogeneous 
narrative of community identity that, as in the Shah Bano case, places further 
constraints on that community's women. 
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However, as we have seen, community identities are not just imposed on 
women; women help to constitute them in turn. There is no simple way of 
separating women's identity 'as women' from their location in specific 
communities. Therefore, simply opposing the personal laws in the name of a 
generic category of 'women's interests' covers over the differences between 
women. In the context of unequal power relations between majority Hindus 
and minority Muslims (an. d. other religious groups), treating all women the 
same in the name of equality, can result in treating minority communities like 
the Hindu community. This would have the effect of subordinating them to 
Hindu norms and practices. 
It is in this way that the Hindu right can support a uniform civil code, 
couching their project in the language of equal rights (Kapur and Cossman, 
1995, p. 101). But when feminists do not take seriously the inter-dependence 
of gender and specific conimunity identities, they too have been complicit in 
this kind of hegemonizing move, both by relying on exclusively Hindu cultural 
images in their counter-narratives of Indian women, and by positing a pure 
gender unity outside the context of specific community differences (see Agnes, 
1995, pp. 139-154). 
One result of attempting to negotiate this conceptual minefield has been, for 
some Indian feminists, to focus on the concept of citizenship that underpins the 
question of a uniform civil code. Without going into all the details of the 
different positions on the civil code that have emerged - for these are beyond 
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the constraints of this project -I want to point to some of the productive 
complications this debate has generated. These complications take the form 
more of questions than of firm answers at this stage, but they are questions 
that may also be pertinent to feminists outside the particular conditions of 
contemporary Indian politics. 
At issue in these debates is the conflict posed for women between attempts to 
fix singular birth-bound identities on and through their persons, and their 
access to the more fluid and multi-layered space of civil society (Menon and 
Butalia, 1995, personal interviews). The challenge posed by an egalitarian civil 
code is to find ways of insisting on the same recognition of complexity for 
women as might be available for men. All citizens need the space in which to 
negotiate between the 'personal' and the many layers of the 'public' realm, and 
an egalitarian civil code is one way of acknowledging that space. 
This would not free women from the need to negotiate their way through the 
complex networks of power relations in society, any more than it would free 
men, who are also differentially located within those power relations. Women 
in different communities would still need to struggle with men regarding those 
traditions that subordinate women, and that are encoded in the personal laws 
(Chakravarti, 1995, personal interview). But the demand for an egalitarian 
civil code can become a site for demanding the same 'privilege' of complex 
subjectivity for women as for men (see Mani, 1992a, p. 397). It raises the 
question of how legal definitions of women might start from an assumption of 
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social heterogeneity rather than the singular fixities of birth-bound identities 
(Sangari, 1995, personal interview). Ultimately, it foregrounds the questions 
of women's access to the status of 'citizen' and of their role in redefining 
concepts of citizenship. I will return to this point in Chapter Eight. 
5. COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND MODELS OF THE 
SELF 
The tension between moves to fix 'Woman' as the ground of community 
identities and the mobility required of women as agents, has also led some 
Indian feminists to rethink the relationship between the individual self and 
collective identities. Some of them start from the assumption that, if the 
individual subject-as-agent i-fiodel on offer proves problematic for women, then 
perhaps the solution is to rethink identity and agency in terms of collectivity. 
Rethinking the Collective 
Sikata Bannerjee, for example, in reflecting on the dangerous attractions of 
communalist discourse to provide a sense of belonging to women, argues that 
feminism needs to offer women an alternative but equally compelling sense of 
collective identity (Bannerj e e, 1995, pp. 228-29). Seemanthini Niranjana has 
suggested that the concept of the individual self is fundamentally a Western 
imposition, at odds with Indian metaphysical preferences for a more relational 
model of agency and subjectivity (S. Niranjana, 1994b, p. 32). 
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For Rajeswari Sunder Rajan some concept of the collective subject is one of 
the necessary moves feminism must make if it is to break out of the impasse 
of viewing the subject of feminism as either the powerless subaltern woman-as- 
victim or the powerful individual modeled on hegemonic paradigms of agency 
(Sunder Rajan, 1993, pp. 119-120). Sunder RaJan argues that the postmodern 
move to decenter the autonomous subject of Western modernity needs to be 
accompanied by an attention to the role of solidarity and collectivity in forming 
subjectivities, an attention-. we can draw out of the Marxian tradition (ibid, 
120). 
While not wanting to simplistically over-idealise collective life, nor to lock 
concepts of collective praxis into Marxist paradigms of social change, Sunder 
Rajan argues that models of collective social agency and leadership should be 
reclaimed for feminism. She points to examples of all-women village 
governing bodies in certain parts of India, which, in admittedly modest ways, 
are both changing the political agenda in gender-specific ways, and altering 
models of agency- leadership (p. 122). 
Ania Loomba has also argued that feminists need to frame the question of 
agency in terms of collective subjectivity, although her reasons for doing so 
are somewhat different from Bannerjee's, Niranjana's or Rajan's (Loomba, 
1993, p. 220). Loomba wants to stress a notion of a collective subject, first, 
as a way of getting beyond the constraints of framing agency in terms of 
individual will alone. So, for example, contemporary episodes of sati - which 
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are often discussed only in terms of their voluntary nature - need to be 
connected to the politics of the community and the nation, and to the 
articulations of gender wit4in each of them. They need to be seen as part of 
a context in which various types of murder have been constructed as questions 
of female choice, including dowry murder interpreted as suicide and abortions 
of female foetuses read as expressions of the mother's choice (ibid, pp. 221- 
2). 
But, second, Loomba wants to focus on the notion of a collective subject in 
order to denaturalize it; it is important that feminists, as an organized political 
movement intervening 'for'- women, do not take their right to represent women 
as an unproblematic. given, but rather reflect on the nature and limits of the 
collective subjects they construct. Collective female agency is, for her, 
'wrought out of precariously achieved political intervention' (p. 222). 
Loomba's reflections on the potential dangers of an unproblematised 
celebration of collective identity are particularly pertinent given the ways in 
which notions of collectivity inform communal politics. As we have already 
seen, the Hindu right offers a version of collective identity that is underpinned 
by an obliteration of the individual self, and this is particularly dangerous for 
the women who have to 'stand for' that community. Sarkar argues that, in a 
number of Hindu communalist narratives, theories of individual rights are 
characterised as thq alien and alienating effects of colonialism, and are 
counterposed to 'traditional' notions of community obligations and mutuality. 
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An indigenist reasoning is then used to oppose notions of civil liberties, 
democratic rights, social equality and gender justice (Sarkar, 1995, pp-213- 
214). Without a concept of the individual self, and an attendant theory of 
individual rights, it becomes difficult to counter the homogenizing and 
hegemonizing imperatives of such a version of the collective (Sarkar, 1995, 
personal interview). 
More generally, given the ways in which the stability of national, racialized 
and other community identities seem to depend on a conflation of 
'Woman/women' with community, and on the disallowing of a specifically 
female self, it seems important that feminists insist on holding on to some 
concept of the individual self for women. At the same time, and for the same 
reasons, it seems important that this model of the self proceeds on a different 
basis, one that will not posit the female bodY as a problem to be overcome, 
but which also resists yet another variation on the models of purity which have 
proved so problematic for women. On way of doing this is, as I discussed 
above, to rethink the individual self-as-citizen, and to insist that women have 
access to this complex, mobile and 'impure' subject-position, rather than 
remain fixed in/as the pure space of community identities. Another source for 
such alternative models of the self is to re-work the impure spaces assigned to 
'women' in contemporary cultural forms. I want to conclude this chapter by 
looking at a speculative experiment in tracing the contours of an alternative 
model of an impure, female self from one of these cultural spaces. 
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A Female Selp. 
Vidya Rao offers an intriguing glimpse of an alternative model of the self, 
based on a morphology of the specifically female body, in her 1990 article 
'Thumri as Feminine Voice'. Thumri is a small, intimate form of singing, with 
an erotic or romantic content, generally written by men and performed by 
women for men. For Rao, therefore, it is constructed in the male gaze, and 
articulates female desire as patriarchally constructed (Rao, 1990, p. WS31). 
Nevertheless Rao will argue that thumri contains a subversive edge, to be 
found in its structure and form, which defy easy classification by the 
predominant norms of traditional Indian music, and which can be read as 
specifically I feminine' (ibid., p. WS32). I understand Rao to be referring here 
to a 'feminine' which cannot be fully contained within a patriarchal order and 
which thereby contests that order. If the following summary of Rao's 
description of thumfi is fairly detailed, it is not because I wish to defend her 
interpretation as definitive (I am in no position to make this kind of judgement) 
but because I am interested in the language she uses, in what she, as a feminist 
working in a context which is not my own, is looking for as a specifically 
female voice. 
Rao begins with notions of space within the thumri form, and what would 
appear to conform with traditionally feminine allocations of space 
in society; 
she describes it as working on a small canvas, with a 
limited repertoire of 
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tunes and lyrics, a smaller number of notes than in the regular scale, 
performed in an enclosed space, with singer and listener in close proximity. 
But then she points to uses of space which contest this sense of enclosure: the 
music expands the space available to it, not linearly but laterally, not outwards 
but inwards, 'relentlessly questioning the established and accepted structures 
of music' (p. WS32). It both shares and subverts the consensus of ideas about 
what is and is not musical (ibid), suggesting, if music is a form of language, 
a space both in and not-in a particular discursive frame. 
For Rao, thumri does this in a number of specific ways. It multiplies the forms 
of improvisation available to the singer, increasing the number and modes of 
acceptable points of departure from the 'text', so that 'all meanings exist 
together, reflect each other, create further meanings' (p. WS33). The singer 
uses vocal texturings to create different voices within a piece, repeating lines 
in different voices., or with a different stress, or both combined, in order to 
multiply both space and meaning, thereby creating a drama which moves away 
from simple first person narrative to a dramatic narrative with multiple 
viewpoints (pp. WS33-4). 
Other texts are inserted into the body of the main song as quotations, thus 
playing with notions of ambiguity and certainties of meaning (p. WS34). This 
is not done according to the conventions of classical Indian music, in which 
two songs are combined to create a third, or in which one distinct melody 
follows another. Rather, 'the points of weakness - the margins and boundaries 
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- in the raga's structure are used as points at which other ragas are allowed 
to enter into the "body" of the main raga' (p. WS35). For Rao, this is done in 
a playful, humorous spirit of transgressing the boundaries and dangerous 
thresholds erected to keep pollution at bay'. 
According to Rao, the listener can be fooled into thinking he is hearing a 
different scale each time: 'the point is that several scales can and do co-exist 
at the same time harmoniously - that there is no one truth, each voice speaks 
it differently but without contradiction' (p. WS35). This playing with structures 
suggests an always-shifting standpoint, in which the ground, centre or starting 
point is always changing. Thumfi laughs ironically at the pedantic differences 
set up between different ragas or forms of music, like 'the foolish third child 
of the fairy tales, or the trickster'. It is a play of 'traps, rows upon rows of 
reflecting mirrors, ' in which all certainties are dis-ordered (p. WS36). 
All this leads Rao to draw links between thumfi's form and the female body - 
an open body, incapable of closure, both always vulnerable to pollution and, 
at the same time, the source of life and continuity. And this recovered female 
body and feminine voice, Rao suggests, should lead us to question not just the 
identity of the individual, but the nature of identity itself. For her, thumH 
suggests a model of identity which does not seek to close the border and guard 
against transgression, but rather to remain open and vulnerable, and through 
In this light she cites Mary Douglas' insight that 'the structure of 
[pollution's] symbolism uses comparison and double meaning like the 
structure of a joke' (Douglas, 1966, pp. 122-3). 
90 
this, to expand the space available to it, according to its own rules for 
negotiating those transgressions (p. WS37). The self is not dissolved (it has 
rules, it can negotiate), but neither is it defined by containment or closure. 
Rao's feminine voice does seem to speak to the complex location of 'Woman' 
and 'women' delineated by the Indian feminists I have discussed in Part 1. It 
redefines the self by breaking out of the confined and fixed place of origin or 
'home' to travel across the apparent certainties and stabilities of community 
identities. Yet it also holds on to a sense of locatedness in the impure space of 
complex power relations. 
Reading Rao from the perspective of Western feminisms, there are also clear 
resonances between her work and some of the theoretical projects I will be 
exploring in Part 11. The language of non-linear flows and multiplicity in 
identity, the desire for a position that is both in and not-in a discursive order, 
the images of mirrors and laughing tricksters will all be revisited - in differing 
degrees - in the work of Irigaray, Haraway, Butler and Braidotti. 
What 
remains to be seen is whether the landscape in which these figurations are 
located in these Western feminist projects is complex enough to take 
differences of nation, race and community into account. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the two chapters of Part 1,1 have identified four ways in which a critical 
engagement with Indian feminist scholarship can complicate our theoretical 
approaches to the question of identity and differences between women: 
First, women play a simultaneously productive and subordinated role in the 
emergence of multiple categories of social identity, including gender, nation, 
race and other communities; 
Second, women's location within this intersecting landscape of gender, nation, 
race and community identities is a complex one, that is not easily contained 
within an exclusion/inclusion binary; 
Third, it is not only discursive constructs of the feminine that are important to 
the emergence of nation, race and community identities - the female body, 
meanings invested in the specifically female and women's activities also need 
to be taken into account; 
Fourth, destabilizing the concept of an individual self may not be sufficient if 
feminists are to develop models of agency that take women's differences into 
account - redefining models of the self and 
its relation to collective identities 
may also be necessary. 
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In Part 11,1 will bring these complications to bear in examining four Western 
feminist theoretical approaches to identity and evaluating to what degree these 
approaches keep a space open for considering the differences between women. 
I begin, in Chapter Three, with the work of Luce Irigaray. 
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Part Two 
WESTERN FEMINISMS AND IDENTITY 
94 
Chapter Three 
LUCE/LOOSE CONNECTIONS: LUCE 
IRIGARAY, SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, RACE 
AND NATION 
INTRODUCTION 
At first sight, the theoretical project of Luce Irigaray is a difficult place to look 
for ways to open up the space within feminist theory for consideration of the 
differences between women. A feminism of sexual difference suggests an in- 
built hierarchy of differences, an irreducible privilege being accorded to the 
question of sexual difference as 'the issue of our age' (Irigaray, 1984, p. 5). 
Irigaray has little to say herself about the differences race and nation may 
make, and some of the few references she has made to these issues are, as we 
shall see, problematic. 
To date, there has been little discussion within feminist theory of the problems 
and possibilities of bringing-issues of race and nation into a sexual difference 
framework. Rosi Braidotti's attempt to open up a space for these issues will be 
explored in detail in Chapter Five. In the next chapter, I will look at Judith 
Butler's work in Bodies that Matter to bring questions of race into conversation 
with both Irigaray and Lacan. But in general, engagements with sexual 
difference feminism have tended either to ignore the questions of race and 
nation, or simply to note that their absence within the framework is a problem 
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that will need further exploration (but not in the article or book in question). 
Tina Chanter has made the stronger claim that Irigaray's project to think 
otherness 'otherwise' (Chanter, 1995, p. 176) actually opens up a space for 
considering other differences such as race (ibid, p. 126), although as we shall 
see, there are problems with the way she develops this argument, and it 
remains a very small part of her overall consideration of Irigaray's work. 
In this chapter, I want to explore some of the problems that Irigaray's 
theoretical framework creates by insisting on an absolute privileging of sexual 
difference. But I also want to argue that some of the issues and theoretical 
moves that she has had a major part in bringing onto the Western feminist 
theoretical agenda have their parallels in certain developments in postcolonial 
ferninisms, and that these r esonances can suggest productive directions for 
thinking feminist theory 'in a postcolonial mode'. 
I will look at these two aspects of Irigaray's project through three points. First, 
I discuss the relationship between sexual difference and other differences in her 
overall theoretical framework. Second, I look at her explorations of 'Woman' 
and 'women' as the outside and ground of male-centred theory and of an 
'economy of the same', focusing on her early work in Speculum of the Other 
Woman (1974) and This Sex Which is Not One (1977). 1 concentrate especially 
on Irigaray's discussions of how an economy of the same relies on masculine 
appropriations of the female capacity of birth and, through it, of access to 
ongins. Third, I examine Irigaray's discussions of alterity and the need for an 
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veconomy of the interval', looking especially at her work in Speculum and An 
Ethics of Sexual Difference (1984). 1 conclude by considering the alternative 
model of the self that emerges from her work, and what possibilities this model 
of the self offers for feminist politics. But before moving on to these specific 
points, I want to clarify how I propose to read my way through this complex 
and controversial woman-philosopher. 
1. READING LUCE IRIGARAY 
Luce Irigaray considers herself first and foremost as a philosopher, more 
specifically as a woman doing philosophy, the thing which she says, in a recent 
interview, is most denied to women (Hirsch and Olson, 1995, p. 97). Most, if 
not all, of her written work involves an intense intertextual dialogue with and 
contestation of philosophy on a number of simultaneous levels. Her 
partners/targets in these dialogues include both a particular canon of Western 
male philosophers, from Plato onwards, and her male philosopher 
contemporaries who are also engaging with and contesting that canon, 
especially Lacan and Derrida. 
How is a feminist who is not a philosopher, for whom many of these 
simultaneous conversations are barely discernable, to read her? If, to borrow 
and rework an Irigarayan.. phrase, we cut Luce loose from her (paternal) 
archives (Irigaray, 1974, p. 182) and read her principally for what she brings 
to debates within feminist theory, do we lose too much? Certainly the early 
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reception of Irigaray in Anglo-American feminism, which ignored the 
philosophical inflections of her work and dismissed her too simply and 
simplistically as a biological determinist-essentialist, indicates the potential 
risks involved in such a move'. More specifically, in my own case, how is a 
feminist who wants to resist botb the Lacanian psycboanalytic, and the 
Derridean deconstructive frameworks Irigaray engages with so intensively, to 
read her? 
On the one hand, I have to recognize that the Irigarayan moves that I find 
productive for feminist the 0 ry have, to a large extent, only emerged because 
of the Lacanian and Derridean trajectories she has critically appropriated. On 
the other hand, I do not want to follow her too far along those trajectories. 
Finally, since I am trying to open a space where Western feminist theory can 
be productively complicated by postcolonial ferninisms, I have to ask myself 
a further question. If we follow Luce too closely in her guerilla forays into the 
thicket of Westem philosophy, does she lead us to place where it is still 
possible to speak to the nop-Western feminist who, while certainly effected by 
the Western philosophical tradition, will find much of the landscape decidedly 
Eurocentric? 
Related to all this, for me, is the difficult political problem of transparency in 
style and language. I recognize that, for different reasons, both Lacanian and 
See the discussion of Irigaray's early reception in Anglo-American feminist circles in 
Schor (1994a), Whitford (1994) and Chanter (1995), esp., Chapter 1. 
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Derridean theoretical frameworks require a consistent troubling of the apparent 
transparency of language, and that for both, any discursive exploration of a 
theoretical concept or a social condition must, at the same time, turn in on 
itself to interrogate the linguistic conditions of its production. The difficult 
style of texts that take up these theoretical frameworks, therefore, follows quite 
logically from the view of language that underpins them. But aside from the 
question of whether these views of language are adequate or enabling (an issue 
to which I will return throughout this thesis) the feminist who sees feminism 
as both a theoretical and political project, needs to confront the problem of the 
distance between theory and potential practice that this kind of style produces. 
Doing theory in this way means cutting oneself off from the large number of 
people in the world who will not (or cannot) make the necessary investment 
of time that would be required to get 'inside the frame' and understand what 
is going on. Only then can one begin to form an opinion about how it might 
help to change things. 
But we reach a paradox at this point, which is what keeps me trying to find a 
way to read Luce Irigaray the woman-philosopher, rather than abandoning her 
to this rather elitist project. The paradox is that Luce Irigaray at her most 
programmatic and 'transparent', where she is apparently speaking directly to 
women, rather than to Western philosophy, (see, for example Thinking the 
Difference (1989) and Je, Tu, Nous (1990)) has rather less that is distinctive to 
contribute to the kind of feminist conversation I am looking for than Luce 
Ingaray in her more philosophical and 'opaque' mode. 
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My strategy is, as the title of this chapter suggests, to loosen, but not 
completely cut, Luce's ties to the space she has carved for herself within 
philosophy, and to read Luce-the-woman-philosopher politically. By this I 
mean that I am looking for the places where Irigaray's engagements with 
Western philosophy suggest different ways of proceeding for feminism as a 
theoretical/political project. It means identifying those politically productive 
moves that emerge because she has followed a particular philosophical 
trajectory, and those that emerge because she steps aside from and contests that 
trajectory. I think it is possible to read her in this way without distorting her 
project too much precisely because of the way she delineates the space of the 
woman-in-philosophy - the guerilla fighter jamming the machinery of 
philosophy that works to exclude her as a woman. Irigaray's insistence on 
bringing the specificities of women's bodies and women's access to su ect- 
status into the field of phijosophy, which, she believes, is grounded in their 
exclusion, is as much a political as a philosophical move, and I take this 
convergence as my entry point to her work. 
I also propose to read Luce 'loosely' in another sense. As mentioned in the 
introduction, I intend to show that Irigaray's model of privileging sexual 
difference over all other differences presents real problems for opening up a 
space in which feminism can consider questions like race and nation. But I will 
also argue that particular Aspects of her work can be used in opening up that 
space. In order to do so, however, those aspects need to be 'shaken loose' 
from 
the sexual difference framework in which they are anchored 
in Irigaray's 
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model. 
2. SEXUAL DIFFERENCE AND OTHER DIFFERENCES 
Tina Chanter has argued that, far from closing down considerations of the 
differences between women, Irigaray's feminism of sexual difference offers a 
new way of bringing these differences into feminism. At the outset of her book 
Ethics ofEros, Chanter claims that'Irigaray's questioning of sexual difference, 
rather than precluding serious consideration of other differences, requires that 
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they be taken into account' (Chanter, 1995, p. 8). According to Chanter, this 
is because of the way Irigaray approaches the question of sexual difference; by 
insisting on the need for radical alterity, to think otherness 'otherwise', Irigaray 
is pointing to the need to develop models of self-other relations that go beyond 
the prevailing Western model of an 'economy of the same', in which difference 
is always cast as the poor cousin of sameness (ibid, pp. I 1- 12). Thus, Chanter 
argues, Irigaray's model can move beyond the question of sexual difference 
because it recognizes 'the importance of specifying multiple ways of existing 
in a society' (ibid, p. 126). 
In support of this view, Chanter points to Irigaray's refusal, from her earliest 
works, to close down definitions of 'what it means to be a woman', or to 
determine the 'truth' of the feminine. She cites those passages in This Sex, 
where Irigaray emphasizes that each woman's struggle will be different, and 
will depend on which f6iin of oppression is 'for her most immediately 
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unbearable', and distances herself from attempts by the Women's Liberation 
Movement to 'condemn women who might have immediate objectives that 
differ from theirs' (Irigaray, 1977, pp. 166-7, quoted in Chanter, 1995, p. 175). 
On one level, I would agree with Chanter's argument. Irigaray's exposure of the 
economy of the same, and her insistence that difference can and must be 
thought within another model of self-other relations, does provide feminism 
with an important insight on which to build models that approach the 
differences between women as a positivity to be explored, rather than a 
problem to be overcome. But I would also argue that Irigaray has not, herself, 
provided those models, nor can she as long as sexual difference remains her 
privileged entry point to the question of sameness and difference. 
In support of her argument, Chanter notes a number of places where Irigaray 
refers to questions of race, but if we actually look closely at what Irigaray is 
saying in these passages, we see that she is not actually saying very much - 
and that this is more an exercise in 'spotting the word race' than in serious 
analysis. For example, Chanter quotes Irigaray's comment in Je, Tu, Nous, that 
'sexism is the most unconscious form of racism' (ibid, p. 302, ffi8). But why 
should sexism be an unconscious form of racism? Why unconscious? What 
does this really mean? Is it enough, or even necessarily appropriate, to simply 
draw analogies between the two forms of oppression? In this context, we might 
remember Irigaray's own critique of Freud's use of analogy as the 'time- 
honoured device' of an economy of the same (Irigaray, 1977, p. 72). Taking 
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seriously into account the differences between women must mean more than 
making a few undeveloped links between racism and sexism; it means actually 
spending the time working out how race and sex might be interconnected in 
an economy of the same. But Irigaray spends all her time looking for, and 
working out that economy in relation to sexual difference alone. 
Joanna Hodge takes a slightly different approach to Irigaray's handling of the 
relationship between sexual difference and other differences, but ends up in a 
very similar space to Chanter. Hodge argues that for Irigaray, the parameters 
of the Western philosophical tradition, what it includes and excludes as its 
'proper' field of investigation, are determined by its founding gesture of 
matricide (Hodge, 1994, p. 194). By contesting this 'originary matricide', 
Hodge suggests, Irigaray is opening up lines of possibility that philosophy has 
closed down: 
Once the figures of the other/woman and of the mother have 
ceased to be the hidden other, some further layer of 
concealment in the text of European culture can perhaps be 
uncovered: perhaps the questions of race, imperialism, 
neocolonialism, indeed of being European. (ibid, p. 207) 
But what Hodge's argument makes even clearer than Chanter's is the hierarchy 
of differences underpinning the Irigarayan project - first we need to uncover 
the figures of woman/mother, then we can move on to other differences. If 
sexual difference is 'originary, are other differences derivative? And if other 
differences derive from sexual difference, then there always remains the 
suggestion that they can be subsumed within sexual difference, and need not 
be taken into account in terms of their own complexities and role in 
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constituting bodies, knowledges and subjectivities. 
Indeed, in her later work, there are some suggestions that Irigaray does set up 
such a hierarchy of differences. For example, in Thinking the Difference, 
Irigaray seems to suggest that, while the struggles of other minorities remain 
within the limits of the dialectical logic of patriarchy, women alone can, to 
some extent stand outside this logic (Irigaray, 1989, p. 6). While she does not 
take this analysis very far, it remains a problematic assumption that separates 
the struggles of (undifferentiated) women out from other struggles against 
oppression, and invests these women's struggles with inherently superior 
transformative possibilities. 
It remains unclear to what degree Irigaray is conscious of the ethno-speci fi city 
of her own project, as speaking to a white Western tradition and counter- 
tradition. On the one hand, in articles like 'The Poverty of Psychoanalysis, 
Irigaray is scathing in her critique of the 'gentlemen psychoanalysts' of the 
Lacanian school who deny the cultural and historical specificity of both their 
theory and practice, and who claim for it the status of universal truth 
(Whitford, 1991a, p. 80). She rejects their attempts to define the symbolic as 
a funiversal innocent of any empirical or historical contingency' and instead 
argues that it is their fantasies which 'lay down the law', their 'imaginary 
transformed into an order, into the social' (ibid, p. 94). To the extent that 
Irigaray's project is about subverting and reworking psychoanalysis from within 
psychoanalysis (Whitford,. I. 991a, p. 5), then she, too, must 
be bound by the 
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cultural and historical locatedness she wants its theoreticians and practitioners 
to acknowledge. 
On the other hand, Irigaray's work displays at times a lack of vigilance 
regarding both offensively racialised remarks and the pitfalls of an orientalist 
reading of the East as exotic other. For example, in recounting the myth of 
Kore/Persephone, she refers twice to Hades as 'the black man all little girls 
fear', without feeling the need to comment on the racist genealogy of such a 
statement (Irigaray, 1989, P. 104). In the same text, she projects a version of 
India which seems to derive more from her need to construct an other for the 
West, and its refusal to allow women access to the divine, than ftom any 
serious investigation of that culture's complexities. India here is reduced to the 
function of counterpoint to the West, and is simply affirmed as a place where 
sexuality is sacred; where women's divinity is recognized; where the mother- 
daughter couple is accorded a symbolic relation to the divine; and where 
women's relation to time and memory is valorised (ibid, pp. 11-13). Not 
surprisingly, Irigaray reaches these highly simplistic conclusions without any 
reference to the work of Indian feminists. 
More fundamentally perhaps, there remains the question of how deeply 
Eurocentric Irigaray's project is in terms of its intense dialogue with, and 
embeddedness within, an exclusively European narrative of the history of 
European philosophy; no voice ftom outside that tradition gets a look-in within 
her project. I see this as a problem in two registers: first, it relates to the 
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questions of style raised in the previous section; second, there is the problem 
of uncrItically inheriting a Western narrative of 'the West' in which race has 
been written out. 
Irigaray's style of refusing to 'mark off the references to the words of other 
philosophers in her own texts with the familiar conventions of references, 
quotation marks or footnotes, is part of a strategy she shares with other 
poststructuralist philosophers. One purpose of this strategy is to subvert the 
claims to authority and impartiality that such conventions represent, and so 
keep the text contestable and open-ended (Hodge, 1994, p. 200). The problem 
is that the game of contesting authority can only be played once one is familiar 
enough with the authorities, and this requires a considerable familiarity with 
a particular tradition of continental European philosophy on the part of the 
reader. The open-endedness and contestability of the text only work, to a 
certain extent, from within the boundaries of the tradition. The boundaries 
themselves - and especially the exclusions of the non-West, the non-European, 
that are part of their constitution - are not seriously troubled by such a textual 
strategy. 
Here, the question of style merges with the second register of exclusion. 
Theorists like Said (1978) and Gilroy (1994) have argued that orientalism and 
racism must be seen as not merely accompanying certain periods of European 
history, but rather as part of the constitutive ground of modem Western 
European thought. Work like Martin Bernal's Black Athena (1987) suggests 
106 
some of the ways in which exclusions of Africa and blackness might lie at the 
heart of those modem philosophical narratives which construct a purely 
European Greece as their point of origin. 
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of such arguments, which cannot be 
my focus here, the work of postcolonial theorists clearly suggests that the 
boundaries of what constitutes Western European thought need to be troubled, 
even by those whose prfficipal target of investigation lies within those 
2 boundaries. In the case of Irigaray, for example, I think it needs to be 
acknowledged that the privileging of sexual difference that she takes as her 
starting point leaves untroubled a specifically European narrative of how 
subjectivity is constituted. To what degree is her strong claim that sexual 
difference is the issue of our age and that the originary crime is matricide, a 
function of the success with which other constitutive exclusions have been 
covered over? If, as a number of theorists have argued, 'whiteness' and 
'Westernness' function as norms principally through their invisibility' we need 
to ask if Irigaray is not perpetuating the erasure of race by insisting on an 
exclusive focus on sexual difference. 
Ironically, some of the ways in which Irigaray works with the word 'white' 
(blanc in French) are very evocative of recent theoretical discussions of 
For a reading that links the challenges posed to Western philosophy by the work of 
Bemal, Said and Gilroy to Derridean deconstruction, see Critchley (1995). 
' See, for example, Dyer (1993) pp. 141-163, hooks (1992) and Frankenburg (1993). 
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whiteness, and could have given her an entry point to a more direct and 
productive consideration of race within her overall project. In playing with the 
homonyms sang blanc (whiie blood) and semblant (semblance/same), and by 
contrasting the sang blanc with the red blood of female birth and menstruation, 
Irigaray enlists whiteness to the cause of a masculine economy of the same 
(Irigaray, 1974, pp. 220-222). In the triumph of white over red blood, whiteness 
is associated with death: 
Blood is burned to cinders in the writing of the text of law 
whereby man produces (himself) at the same time (as) the 
double [ ... ] and the color of blood fades as more and more 
semblances are produced, more atoms of individual egos, all 
bloodless in different ways. In this process, some substance is 
lost: blood in its - constitution of a living autonomous 
subjectivity. (ibid, pp. 221-2) 
Linking whiteness to the draining/fading of color and to death is evocative of 
bell hooks' discussion of representations of whiteness in the Black imagination. 
For hooks, both the experience and writing of American Blacks provide 
powerful evidence of the ways in which an absence of color can signify not 
the benign invisibility White people so often accord their own whiteness, but 
rather the presence of terror and the possibility of death (hooks, 1992, pp. 341-2 
and 344-5). 
Without making any explicit connections between race and the economy of the 
same, Irigaray evokes whiteness both in contexts where sameness is achieved 
through a violent silencing of difference, and where its association with truth 
is achieved through its invisibility. So, for example, in the chapter 'Volume 
without Contours' in Speculum, Irigaray speaks of the 'still immaculate white 
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spaces' that remain after Woman has been 'devoured and torn apart inside' 
(Whitford, 199 1 a, p. 54)4 . Furthermore, in her re-reading of Plato's myth of the 
cave, Irigaray emphasizes the 'white light that cannot be seen as such but 
allows us to see and gives us an awareness of the black' (Irigaray, 1974, p. 258, 
emphasis in the original). For Plato himself the sun and light stood for truth; 
Irigaray's linking of this 'truth' to an invisible whiteness suggests a resonance 
with theoretical discussions of 'whiteness' as the unmarked norm against which 
difference is constituted. Ultimately, however, these remain intriguing 
suggestions of where Irigaray might have complicated her understanding of the 
economy of the same by ponsidering race, and she does not allow them to 
distract her from her primary focus on sexual difference. 
We also need to ask how critical Irigaray is of the universalising aspects of the 
poststructuralist model of language that underpins the Lacanian narrative of 
subjectivity. This narrative's focus on Language as a system (langue), rather 
than on languages or on cultural and historical specificities, carries a powerful 
universalising charge that suggests that there is only ýever one way for the 
human to come into language and subjectivity. Irigaray complicates this model 
by specifying that what Language as a system particularly requires is the 
exclusion of the feminine and the female. She also goes beyond a single 
language model when she suggests that there can and must be two ways for 
In my discussions of this chapter of Speculum, entitled Uincontournable volume' in 
the original French, I use the David Macey translation in Margaret Whitford's The 
Irigaray Reader (1991a) rather than the section entitled 'Volume-Fluidity' in Gillian 
Gill's 1985 English translation. 
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the human to become subject and that we need two symbolics - the'masculine' 
and the 'feminine'. 
As I will discuss further in the final section of this chapter, Irigaray also 
unsettles the model of a univocal Language by insisting on the possibility and 
presence of those subversive incursions when women 'speak (as) woman'. But 
the absolute privileging of sexual difference in this model of language makes 
it difficult not to hear only an unspecified woman, undifferentiated by race, 
nation and other specific locations, speaking (as) woman. The move from one 
to two symbolics, using only the axis of sexual difference to differentiate them, 
also strongly suggests a universalised female/feminine that embraces all the 
differences between women within a closed system. 
For all these reasons, I would argue that there are significant problems with the 
view that Irigaray's ftamework is one that opens up space for considering other 
differences. But the resonances with the postcolonial mode remain, ironically, 
at level of particular theoretical moves within the overall framework. I believe 
that it is more productive to look at these individual moves for what Irigaray 
can bring to feminist theoretical attempts to sustain a dual focus on women and 
their differences. 
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3. AN ECONOMY OF THE SAME AND THE'STILL SILENT 
GROUND' OF THEORY 
In a 1995 interview, Luce Irigaray discussed some of the differences between 
her project and that of Simone de Beauvoir. Her focus is on their differing 
attitudes to the question of 'the other': 
Simone de Beauvoir refused to be the Other because she 
refused to be second in Western culture. [ ... ] What I myself say is that there is no true Other in Western culture and that what 
I want - certainly I don't want to be second - but I want there 
to be two subjects. '(Hirsch and Olson, 1995, P. 99) 
For Irigaray, the strategy is not to overcome otherness as it might be defined 
within the terms of an already existing system, but to 'demand to be radically 
Other in order to exit from a horizon' (ibid, p. 114) that she defines as an 
economy of the same. 
Beauvoir's characterization of Woman-as-Other in The Second Sex (1949) 
remains tremendously influential for feminist theory in both Western and non- 
Western settings. Unlike Irigaray, she also does try to make links between 
women's and other 'othenng' processes, to suggest how sexual and racial 
economies might be connected, although this work is not without its critics'. 
But I will argue in this section that it is Irigaray's departure from the Woman- 
as-Other model, and her delineation of 'Woman' and 'women's' positioning 
See, for example, Elizabeth Spelman (1988), for the way Woman and Black are 
constructed as mutually exclusive categories, and Tina Chanter (1995), for a critique 
of Beauvoir's reading of the master-slave dialectic. 
within an economy of the same, that produces unexpected openings to 
conversations in a postcolonial mode. 
Irigaray shares the idea of an economy of the same with Derrida, who uses it 
to expose the exclusionary processes at work in language, and by extension the 
Western metaphysics limited by that language (see, for example, 'Diff6rance', 
in Kamuf, 1991, p. 70). But while for Derrida the economy of the same is 
principally an effect in/of language, where the 'f6minin' is another name for the 
disruptive potential of diff6rance, for Irigaray it is an economy in which real 
women are constrained by their symbolic exclusion and reduction to a'specular 
feminine' defined by a masculine subject. 
As Margaret Whitford explains, Irigaray asks us to'look for the resistances and 
defences which conceal the original crime of matricide [ ... ] to look for the 
specular relationship, to uncover the buried mother' (Whitford, 1991b, p. 34). 
Irigaray moves beyond Beauvoir's insight, now taken as almost a commonplace 
within feminism, that woman is constituted as man's other - the weak pole of 
the binary. Instead, Irigaray argues that woman is not just marginalized or 
made secondary within Western philosophical thought, but is made to 
disappear altogether. Her exclusion from the world of meaning and from the 
social contract fashioned out of that world of meaning, is the necessary 
condition for philosophy and the worlds we build with philosophy. 
Just as the child, in the Lacanian framework, must exclude the mother to take 
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its place in the world of signification as a subject, Western philosophy begins 
by placing woman outside the frame of reference altogether: this is the crime 
of matricide to which Whitford refers. The woman that exists within the frame 
- the weak side of the binary - is defined by and for man, his own poor 
reflection in a mirror: this is the specular relationship Whitford discusses. This 
is why Irigaray names both patriarchal society and phallocentric thought as an 
'economy of the same' or as 'hom(m) o sexual i ty'. The woman within the frame 
is always a woman defined by the needs, values and desires of man. Men are 
always speaking about men, even when they are speaking about women. 
Putting these two moves together, Irigaray then looks for the ways in which 
woman constitutes the excluded but necessary ground upon which the male 
speaking-subject stands in order to make sense of, and act upon the world, the 
'mute outside that sustains all systernaticity [ ... ] [the] maternal and still silent 
ground that nourishes all foundations' (Irigaray, 1974, p. 365). 
Derrida's work to trouble the economy of the same in language has been 
picked up and developed within a particular strand of postcolonial and Black 
theory'. Perhaps ironically, Irigaray's feminist take on thismode of semblance', 
with its sharper political edge of insisting on women's material (bodily) 
specificity and on both symbolic and strategic exclusions of 'Woman' and 
'women', has been much less discussed in relation to postcolonial. feminisms. 
See Spivak (1987,1989,1991 and 1993), Bhabha (1990), S. Niranjana (1994b), and 
Gates (1986), among many others. 
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In part, this is probably a reflection of the problems of exclusion discussed 
above, in the sense that the'conversations Irigaray has engaged in her work are 
so intensely centred in the West and in a particular tradition of Westem 
philosophy (although the same could certainly be applied to Derrida). In part, 
it is probably also due to the politics of publishing practices, so that what is 
most easily available to feminist intellectuals outside the West is still the 
earliest Anglo-American reception and interpretation of a very partial selection 
of Irigaray's early Work7. And yet, despite the fact that neither side seems to 
be speaking directly to the other, in reading both Irigaray and a variety of 
postcolonial feminists for this project, I hear a conversation in progress. And 
it is particularly around Irigaray's mapping of the specular economy that the 
resonances occur. I want to suggest three sites on the Irigarayan map that can 
also be re-located in a postcolonial space. 
Woman as Groundfor Debates among Men 
In naming the specular economy as hom(m)osexual, Irigaray extends and 
enriches our understanding of the 'exchange of women' as a founding point of 
human society. 'Woman' becomes the ground for all kinds of debates and 
exchanges among men, the ground upon which men gain access to, and define 
For example, one contribution to a debate on the pertinence of feminist theory to India 
in the pages of Economic and Political Weekly discusses a number of American and 
Australian feminists in some detail, but limits its references to Irigaray to the now 
familiar version of her work that predominated in early Anglo-American responses: 
that she equates woman with nature, that woman is defined essentially by her body, 
etc. (Thapan, 1995, p. 1400). .., 
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their truths. Women's subordination, then, comes not only from finding 
themselves on the weaker, losing side of the dialectic, but from being outside 
the field of play altogether; . 
What the anthropologist calls the passage from nature to culture 
thus amounts to the institution of the reign of hom(m)o- 
sexuality. [ ... ] From this point on, patriarchal societies might be interpreted as societies functioning in the mode of 'semblance'. 
(Irigaray, 1977, p. 171) 
Hom(m)m-osexuality is played out through the bodies of 
women, matter, or sign, and heterosexuality has been up to now 
just an alibi for the smooth workings of man's relations with 
himself, of relations among men. (ibid, p. 172) 
As I argued in Part One, locating 'Woman' and 'women', and especially the 
'bodies of women [as] matter or sign, as the ground for exchanges between 
men, is a recurring theme for a variety of Indian feminists when looking at the 
ways 'Woman' and 'women' circulate across the categories of sex/gender, race, 
nation and community. Lata Mani's formulation of women's location within the 
official discourse on sati in nineteenth century India as 'neither subject, nor 
object, but ground' (Mani, 1990, p. 118) is a particularly clear expression of the 
resonance that exists between Irigaray's work on this question and a number 
of the Indian feminists I have already discussed. 
However, as I also discussed in Part One, there remains the question of 
whether this characterization of woman as ground does not lead to an over- 
emphasis on women as excluded, passive and absent, and whether this in turn, 
by reducing the complexity of women's symbolic and strategic locations to a 
single move, does not end up covering over differences between women. The 
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work of Paola Bacchetta, an Italian feminist who has spent several years 
researching in India, is an interesting example of the resonances between 
Irigaray's work and the concerns of a number of Indian feminists, as well as 
the potential problems of adopting an Irigarayan approach. 
Bacchetta's work has focussed on the relationship between women and 
particular organisations of the Hindu right, and on representations of Muslim 
women in Hindu communalist discourse. Bacchetta draws frequently on 
Irigaray in developing her conceptual framework to argue that Hindu 
communalist discourse positions both Hindu and Muslim women, in different 
ways, as the excluded ground of a hom(m)osocial project concerned with the 
production of an ideal Hindu male identity (Bacchetta, 1994a, pp. 191-196 and 
p. 221, ffi46). 
But, like those Indian feminists discussed in Part One who rely on 
poststructuralist language models, Bacchetta's stress tends to be only on the 
way women are made to disappear in this project. Both Hindu and Muslim 
women are, she claims, absent from the material world as constructed by the 
discourses of the Hindu right that she examines; in the symbolic realm, Hindu 
women figure in order to represent idealised Hindu culture, but Muslim women 
are 'totally invisible' (ibid, p. 196). Elsewhere, Bacchetta argues that Muslims, 
and especially Muslim women, stand for that which is 'unrepresentable'; the 
'debt that cannot be acknowledged'; a 'screen upon which the fantasy of evil 
threatening the integrity of the Hindu nation is projected' (Bacchetta, 1994b, 
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pp. 154-5, W). 
Bacchetta compellingly appropriates recognizably Irigarayan moves in order to 
shed light on one aspect of the ways in which communalist discourse and 
practice positions women. But at the same time, her reading of Irigaray seems 
to leave no space for considering the different ways in which communalism 
makes Hindu and Muslim women central, both materially and symbolically 
(see Sarkar, 1995 and Hasan, 1994). As I will suggest in the following 
sections, this is not the only possible way in which to read Irigaray's 
positioning of women in an economy of the same, but it remains a point of 
discordance when we put Irigaray together with the Indian complications I 
have identified. 
Female Birth and OriginS' 
We can return to a site of greater harmony, however, by looking at the theme 
of birth and origins in Irigaray's work. The 'mode of semblance' that Irigaray 
identifies works particularly through the denial of the specifically female nature 
of birth and the masculine appropriation of access to origins. Throughout 
Speculum, one of Irigaray's concerns is to locate those moments where 
philosophy 'cuts up and reworks the subject's links to his archives. And to his 
processItrial of engendering; where the subject severs 'the cord' (Irigaray, 
1974, p. 182) in order to both deny female birth and to appropriate to himself 
the creative power of origins. Woman/Mother needs to be fixed as body, as 
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earth or ground, stripped of her creative possibilities, in order to clear a space 
for the 
singular subject who is charged with giving birth to the universe 
all over again, after he has brought himself back into the world 
in a way that avoids the precariousness of existence as it is 
usually understood. (ibid) 
For the'great male thinkers'of Western philosophy, it is, according to Irigaray, 
'better to work the Earth on the Father's account than to return to it' (ibid, 
p. 352): 'clearing land that still produces its own fertile growth, that is still 
virgin of (his) proper names" (ibid). For her, this same move recurs through all 
the philosophical projects she interrogates: 'it is in search of the lost roots of 
the same that the place is always being ploughed over again in this way' 
(Whitford, 1991a, p. 54). This recurrent search for the 'lost roots of the same' 
suggests a dual understanding of the importance of this move to exclude the 
mother, one which I think touches a theme I discussed in Chapter One: on the 
one hand, the recognition of the power of that moment of connection between 
self and (M)other; on the other hand, the absolute need to deny the specifically 
female nature of birth and to subsume that specificity within a regime of 
sameness. This is the triumph of a'logos that claims to reduce the power of the 
maternal back to the same - the Same - in itself and for itself (ibid, p. 55). 
This is one of the spaces in Irigaray's work where I think it is possible to read 
her resonance with postcolonial feminist projects in a more nuanced way than 
Bacchetta does. For Irigaray, the maternal is not only excluded; its potency, its 
privileged access to origins, is both mobilised and contained through its 
appropriation by the masculine. The move that Irigaray does not make is to 
118 
think about what specific origins, what particular racialised or national 
community identities, are at stake that require this harnessing of the 'power of 
the maternal' to a regime of sameness. If her overall framework did not 
privilege sexual difference over all other differences, she might have made 
more of her observation in 'Volume without Contours' that the father's 
appropriated 'wealth [ ... ] can take the form of a family, a horde, a community, JF 
a people' (Whitford, 1991a, p. 62), to think about the ways in which other 
categories of identities (a community, a people') also work through 
appropriations of birth. 
Woman, Place and Truth 
It is also via this dual understanding - to both mobilize and contain the power 
of the mother - that Irigaray approaches the question of the relation of the 
mother to truth within an economy of the same. The mother is the necessary 
place, or receptacle within which both power and truth reside, the condition for 
their existence, but without any influence on the form they will take. Man 
'continues to feed on her undefinable potency of which place would be, some 
say, the most extraordinary store' (Irigaray, 1974, p. 166). Because Woman 
constitutes place for the male subject, she cannot take her place as a subject 
in her own right: 
Woman is still the place, the whole of the place where she 
cannot appropriate herself as such. Experienced as all-powerful 
where 'she' is most radically powerless in her indifferentiation. 
Never here and now because she is that everywhere elsewhere 
from whence the 'subject' continues to draw his reserves, his re- 
sources, yet unable to recognize them/her. (Whitford, 1991a, 
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p. 53) 
This linking of the figure of Woman/mother with the question of place opens 
Irigaray's project to a key concern within postcolonial ferninisms, which is the 
ways in which the mother-figure is evoked in constituting national, racial and 
community identities. While Irigaray's own treatment of 'place' remains 
unspecified in this respect, this remains a third point on which her specular 
economy is both reflected and refracted in the work of postcolonial feminists. 
Again, we also see a nuan6ing of the position of woman-as-ground, in which 
Woman does not simply disappear, but is both 'all-powerful' and radically 
powerless at the same time. 
If the different forms of the economy of the same that Irigaray explores in This 
Sex and Speculum, and the language that she uses to evoke them, can be heard 
echoed in very different feminist projects, it is, I think, because Irigaray has 
identified a process that is also at work outside the frame in which she is 
looking for it. Irigaray has helped provide feminism with a map and a 
vocabulary for the process of saming. For her, this map continues to bear the 
contours of the Lacanian original that she is in the process of re-drafting, in 
that she continues to privilege questions of sexual difference. Nevertheless, 
many of the locations of saming that she identifies can, I believe, be usefully 
re-visited within a landscape complicated by considerations of race and nation. 
The complications introduced in Part One suggest that 'Woman' can be 
understood as the necessary but excluded, 'still silent ground', not only for 
Man's truths about himself as Man, but also for truths about the nation, the 
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race, the community. 
4. PRIVILEGING THE INTERVAL AND ALTERNATIVE 
MODELS OF THE SELF 
As part of her project to destabilize the economy of the same, and find a space 
from which women can begin to speak as subjects, Irigaray returns repeatedly 
to the concept of the interval - the space between self and other and all the 
binary oppositions around which, in her view, Language as a system is 
structured. In both Speculum and An Ethics of Sexual Difference, we can see 
Irigaray turning to the 'space between' as the space in which difference might 
be able to exist without beffig constrained by a logic of binaries. Privileging 
the interval becomes a way of countering the economy of the same, in which 
the space of the other is always appropriated or colonized by the One. 
In her re-reading of Plato's myth of the cave in Speculum, Irigaray says that 
Plato's account leads the reader to forget two things. The first is the cave itself, 
and its connections to the womb, earth and matter. This founding myth of 
Western metaphysics is, therefore, based on the exclusion of the mother-womb- 
ground (Irigaray, 1974, p. 243-4). The second thing that is forgotten is the 
passage between the prisoners and the men casting their shadows upon the 
back wall of the cave. Forgetting the passage and the space 'between' is what 
founds and sustains: 
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the hardening of all dichotomies, categorical differences, clear- 
cut distinctions, absolute discontinuities, all the confrontations 
of irreconcilable representations. (Irigaray, 1974, p-246) 
By locking difference into this structure of dualisms, Plato's myth initiates a 
process whereby 'all divergencies will finally be proportions, functions, 
relations that can be referred back to sameness' (ibid, p. 247). Irigaray reads 
Plato's myth as an endless play of sames, likenesses, resemblances, repetitions, 
all of which begin by forgetting the 'space between' (pp. 247-8). Against Plato 
and his heirs, Irigaray suggests that recovering the forgotten transition and 
allowing the 'spaces between the figures' that have been 'fixed in oblivion' to 
'come to life' might have the result of 'turning everything upside down and 
back to front' (p. 138). 
In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, 'betweenness' is named 'the interval' and is 
evoked as an undecidable threshold space, that can be seen as both the 
unspoken condition for the binary pair of self and other, and as excessive to 
the logic of a binary economy. It is 'both entrance and space between' 
(Irigaray, 1984, p. 12). The famous 'two lips' of This Sex are a similar attempt 
to defy and exceed binary structures: for Irigaray they are both inside and out, 
one and two, and can evoke the undecidability at the heart of a possible 
alternative female imaginary and symbolic order that might be able to replace 
a binary logic of saming. In An Ethics, Irigaray links the two lips to other 
concepts that cannot be contained within a logic of dualisms, the sensible 
transcendental, and mucous . (Irigaray, 1984, pp. 17-8). 
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On one level, this move to privilege the interval could be read as a 
continuation of the deconstructive strategies Irigaray adapts from Derrida, also 
seen in Speculuni and This Sex. Like Derrida, part of Irigaray's aim in 
adopting these strategies is tQ destabilize binary structures and make visible the 
indeterminacy that is covered over by attempts to fix meaning in logocentric, 
or phallogocentric language and thought. But while recognizing her Derridean 
trajectory, it is also important to note that Irigaray's theoretical and political 
impetus is quite distinct from Derrida's. Irigaray locates 'Woman' and the 
feminine within these strategies in order to find a way out of phallogocentric 
thought, in order to find a speaking-position for women as subjects. This is a 
theoretical and political project which she opposes to Derrida's deployment of 
a disembodied fýminin'that becomes yet another way to allow men to speak. ' 
For Irigaray, then, privileging the interval and other spaces of indeterminacy 
is not only about guerilla attacks on the machinery of Language. It is also 
about finding a speaking-position for women as subjects in the social order, 
and about finding a model of the self and self-other relations that can transforrn 
that social order, by not adhering to a logic of dualisms, which, in the end 
always folds difference back into sameness. These are both philosophical and 
political issues, and politically, the interval is about recognizing the play of 
power relations between self and other. 
See Grosz (1989, pp. 31-37 and 101-104), and Whitford (1991, pp. 130-135) for 
discussions of how Irigaray contests Derrida, and Chanter (1995, pp. 225-254) for a 
reading which focusses more on their convergences. 
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D- 
Recognizing and respecting the space between selves is a way of contesting the 
power effects underpinning most models of human interaction, in which the 
space of the self is secured by denying, encroaching upon or circumscribing 
the space allocated to the other. Respecting the interval therefore becomes part 
of a move to rethink alterity outside of an economy of the same, to respect 
otherness in its own terms. For Irigaray, the other in question is 'Woman': 'The 
question being how to detach the other - woman - from the otherness of 
sameness' (Irigaray, 1977, P. 169). But if saming occurs outside the landscape 
of sexual difference as well, then this move to leave the other his/her right to 
otherness can and should be taken beyond the sexual difference frame as well. 
For example, Tina Chanter describes the view of alterity that exists within 
prevailing self/other models as follows: 
To render the unknowable knowable, to contextualise the 
foreign by placing -it. within the familiar comfortable world of 
the subject's experience is to grasp everything exotic - all that 
is other to oneself - and to make it available for use according 
to one's own purposes and projects. (Chanter, 1995, pp. 220-1, 
emphasis added) 
Chanter defends Irigaray's privileging of the sexual difference frame as a way 
out of this view of alterity, but Chanter's reliance on such terms as'the foreign' 
and the 'exotic' to make her point suggests that the problem needs to be 
addressed within a broader frame that takes differences of race, nation and 
other community identities between women, and between men and women, into 
account. 
Irigaray's earlier work does include some aspects of this more political view 
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of 'the space between'. For example, in discussing her experience as an analyst 
in 'The Limits of Transference', Irigaray stresses the need for a relationship 
between women analyst and analysand that is not based on models of merging 
or fusion (Whitford, 199 1 a, p. 108). There needs to be a 'space or site of liberty 
between two bodies, two flesh, which protects the partners by giving them 
boundaries' (ibid, p. 115). In both this article and her later Je, Tu, Nous (1990), 
Irigaray points to the placental economy as a possible model for self-other 
relations that goes beyond the fusion/aggression dichotomy. The placental 
relation involves a continuous negotiation between self and other, through 
which both are actively modified, while remaining distinct (Irigaray, 1990, 
pp. 39-41). Clearly, Irigaray is concerned here with keeping the space between 
selves intact in a situation where she, as analyst, needs to recognize her 
position of relative power. This suggests that, while Irigaray's principal concern 
is to create and sustain that. intact space for women and the feminine, in and 
beyond a male-centred specular economy, she is also aware of the need to 
secure that space in terms of relations between women. 
In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray continues to develop this question 
of boundaries between self and other. Irigaray is looking for a model of 
relationships between self and other 'which weds without consum(mat)ing' 
(Irigaray, 1984, p. 186). In 'The Fecundity of the Caress', Irigaray returns 
repeatedly to this notion of a relationship between self and other that affirms, 
indeed, in a sense, creates the boundaries of each self while going beyond the 
limitations of the individual self. She writes of 'the other's hands' which 'give 
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me back the borders of my body' (ibid, p. 187), and also of 'giving the other her 
contours [... ] inviting her to live where she is without becoming other, without 
appropriating herself (p. 204). Later on she also evokes 'that subtle palpable 
space that envelops each of us like a necessary border' and that enables one to 
become 'capable of more than the I can" of the body itself (p. 207). One can 
only move to a model of self-other relations that welcomes porosity or 
multiplicity through respect for this space of difference: 'porosity, and its 
fullest responsiveness, can occur only within difference' (p. 19 1). 
Irigaray's position here reminds us of the concerns of some Indian feminists. ) 
discussed in Chapter Two, to retain some notion of the individual self if 
women are to contest attempts to submerge them within community identities. 
Irigaray's position also bears certain similarities to Haraway's notion of the 
'semi-permeable self which will be discussed in further detail in the Chapter 
Six. As we will see it also leads to an understanding of the relationship 
between separation and alliance that is very similar to Haraway's, and that is 
pertinent to the question of how to rethink feminist politics in ways that respect 
the differences between women: 
What is missing is the double pole of attraction and support, 
which excludes disintegration or rejection, attraction and 
decomposition, but which instead ensures the separation that 
articulates every encounter and makes possible speech, 
promises, alliances. (Irigaray, 1984. p. 9, emphasis added) 
In this model, alliance and connection are premised, not simply on the merging 
of selves, but on a different kind of separation of the self, that does not 
appropriate the other to the needs and desires of the one (p. 74). Feminist 
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alliances, especially when'-they attempt to impose unity around a fixed and 
exclusionary definition of woman or women, need to bear this risk in mind. 
The space between selves needs to be privileged in Irigaray's view, in order to 
find an 'elsewhere' to the economy of the same that prevails in a logic of 
dualisms. But this alone is not enough if women are to find that radically other 
elsewhere from which women can speak and act as subjects. A different model 
of the self, based on a morphology of the specifically female body, is also 
necessary. In 'Volume without Contours', Irigaray characterizes that alternative 
model of the female self as 'in-finP, both infinite and unfinished (Whitford, 
1991a, p. 59). It is less than the One-Self model of an economy of the same: 
unable or unwilling to close up or swell definitively to the 
extension of an infinite. [ ... 
] Metamorphoses [ ... 
] where the 
systernaticity of the One never insists. Transformations, always 
unpredictable because they do not work towards the 
accomplishment of a telos. (ibid) 
But it is also more than One; there is a'plurality of the female commodity' that 
the (male) subject is always trying to gather up into a One (ibid, p. 60), a 
multiplicity that cannot be contained within a logic of dualisms: 
Now, the/a woman does not have one sex [ ... ] cannot subsume 
it/herself under one term, generic or specific. (p. 59) 
ThelA woman is never closed1shut (up) in one volume. (p. 65) 
She cannot relate herself to any being, subject or whole that can 
be simply designated. Nor to the category (of) women. One 
woman + one woman + one woman never will have added up 
to some generic: woman. (pp. 55-6) 
As elsewhere in Irigaray's work, women's multiplicity is continuously referred 
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back to a morphology of the female body: the 'sex organs more or less 
everywhere' (Irigaray, 1977, p. 28); the indeterminacy between separation and 
touching, between closure and openness; of the two lips; the multiple flows 
from women's bodies that rnýke her'an other difficult to grasp [ ... ] woman: the 
fluent' (Whitford, 1991a, p. 64). 
Irigaray's lyrical evocations of a transgressive feminine economy that privileges 
fluidity, undecidability and uncontainability, in writings like 'Volume without 
Contours', or 'When Our Lips Speak Together' (Irigaray, 1977) have elicited 
a varied response within feminism. For those unsympathetic to her project, they 
are the space where she falls most seriously into essentialism and surrenders 
to the patriarchal logic that reduces 'woman' to her body (see Moi, 1985, 
pp. 145-7). More sympathetic readings focus on her utopian quality, her mode 
of speaking 'as if, in order to help bring about a desired future (Whitford, 
1991b, p. 51), or on Irigaray's tactical deployment of mimesis in order to 
subvert a discursive order which positions woman as lack (Braidotti, 1991, pp. 
257-8). 
While I would agree that. 4 is important to recognize both the utopian and 
tactical aspects of Irigaray's work, what is less often stressed is how at least 
some of Irigaray's lyrical flights into an elsewhere remain rooted in an 
understanding of how the specifically female is socially and discursively 
located in the here and now. To Irigaray the utopian visionary and Irigaray the 
tactical jammer of the machinery of phallocentric Language, it is possible to 
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add an Irigaray with some sense that, politically, women need to re-define the 
female self In 'Volume without Contours', for example, it is clear that women 
need alternatives to the model of the One that depends on reducing woman to 
'the cohesion of a "body... or to 'the solidity of a land, the foundation of a 
ground' (Whitford, 1991a, p. 64). In Chapter One we saw Woman/women 
positioned as body-land-ground in highly political ways. At a point where one 
might expect Irigaray to be of least use in an immediate and political way - in 
her 'utopian' mode - she nevertheless has a definite political pertinence. At a 
point where one might expect her to be at most risk of positing a universal 
Woman that overrides women's particular location within specific communities, 
she speaks to one aspect of that location quite clearly. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that Irigaray's absolute privileging of sexual 
difference as 'the issue of our age' presents significant difficulties for thinking 
, Ilk aDOUt identity in ways that take seriously the differences between women. I 
have also suggested that her reliance on a model of Language as a system that 
works primarily througb exclusion of the feminine may bave the result of 
folding difference back into a model of sameness, by reducing the complexity 
of women's social and discursive positioning to a single move. At the same 
time, however, I have argued that there are strong resonances between some 
aspects of Irigaray's work and some of the concerns of Indian feminists 
regarding the location of women in the emergence of national, raced and other 
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community identities. Perhaps ironically, these resonances are at their strongest 
when Irigaray insists on the importance of the specifically female, both in 
terms of how appropriations of birth and access to origins play a crucial part 
in underpinning an economy of the same, and in terms of what a specifically 
female model of the self and of self-other relations might look like. 
Yet for many Western feminist theorists, attempts to create a greater space for 
considering differences such as nation or race have focussed on the need to 
destabilize, rather than redefine our concepts of the female and the feminine. 
One of the best-known proponents of this alternative trajectory is Judith Butler, 
whose work is considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
FEMALE TROUBLE: JUDITH BUTLER AND 
THE DESTABILIZATION OF SEX/GENDER 
INTRODUCTION 
As we saw in Chapter Three, Irigaray works within and against the sexual 
(in)difference of poststructuralist models of language and subjectivity in order 
to make a space for the specifically female. She wants to work towards a 
future where sexual difference is recognized on a different basis. In contrast, 
Judith Butler works within a poststructuralist framework in order to destabilize 
the logic of sexual difference. Butler's strategy brings elements ftorn the work 
of Lacan and Derrida together with insights drawn from Foucault, in order to 
complicate feminism's understanding of identity by undermining the apparent 
coherence of such categories as sex, gender and race. While Butler's complex 
and demanding engagement with these three theorists produces some important 
insights, it also produces an unresolved tension in her work between 
incompatible models of power and language. 
In this chapter I will argue that Butler addresses important issues for feminist 
attempts to rethink identity in ways that keep a space open for differences 
between women, but that, in the process, she turns away from considering 
women's specific location in the emergence of identity categories such as race 
and nation. At the same time, she closes off consideration of possible 
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alternative models of the self and self-other relations that take a specifically 
female subject-position as a starting point. 
will look at these tensions in Butler's work through four issues. First, I 
discuss her approach to th'e question of identity through the concepts of 
materialization and performativity. Second, I focus on her re-reading of Lacan 
in order to destabilize the symbolic, and with it, a logic of sexual difference. 
Third, I look at the implications of her approach to identity for questions of 
feminist politics, resistance and agency. Finally, I explore how Butler's strategy 
leads her to reject a focus on the specifically female, and discuss some of the 
implications of this rejection. 
1. PERFORMATIVITY, MATERIALIZATION AND THE 
SUBJECT 
Michel Foucault's work on the productive and normalizing effects of power in 
constructing subjectivities is one of Butler's key reference points. Her reading 
of Foucault underpins the genealogical critiques of gender (in Gender Trouble) 
and sex (in Bodies that Matter) that inform her approach to questions of 
identity-constitution, and, to a large extent, her understanding of the need to 
re-think the basis of feminist politics and resistance. I will return to Butler's 
reading of Foucault on the question of politics in section three of this chapter. 
Here, I want to look briefly at how the Foucauldian strand in Butler's work can 
enable an understanding of the sexed/gendered subject that is open to both the 
possibilities of resistance and to the permeability of other categories of identity, 
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such as race. 
Like Foucault, Butler wants to resist the notion of a subject that exists before 
the taking on of such nonns as sex; rather, she is arguing that the subject, the 
speaking T, is formed through the process of assuming a sex, together with 
other regulatory, productive norms. Her introduction to Gender Trouble 
presents her project in clear. Foucauldian terms: 
A genealogical critique refuses to search for origins of gender 
[ 
... 
]a genuine or authentic sexual identity that repression has 
kept from view; rather, genealogy investigates the political 
stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity 
categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, 
discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin. (Butler, 
1990, pp. x-xi) 
Butler draws on Foucault's argument that the law and its transgression, 
sexuality as norm or'perversion', are signified on and through bodies. By being 
made to appear to be internal to the self, these norms are solidified, reproduced 
and developed by the self as it aspires to subjectivity. Like Foucault, Butler 
argues that modem power is at its most effective in this 'capillary' mode: 
If the 'cause' of desire, gesture and act can be localized within 
the 'self of the actor, then the political regulations and 
disciplinary practices which produce that ostensibly coherent 
gender are effectively displaced from view. (Butler, 1990, 
p. 13 6) 
When, in Bodies that Matter, Butler turns to the question of the 'materiality of 
sex', she argues, similarly, that sexual difference'is never simply a function of 
material differences which are not in some way marked and formed by 
discursive practices' (Butler, 1993a, p. 1) This does not mean that discourse 
causes sexual difference. 'Sex' is a normative category, a regulatory ideal and 
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practice that produces, 'materializes', the bodies it governs. 'Sex' becomes one 
of the norms by which the. 'one' becomes viable, that which qualifies a body 
for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility (ibid, p. 2). Rather than 
seeing sex as the raw material or 'matter' out of which gendered identities are 
fashioned, Butler wants to rethink the concept of matter itself not as site or 
surface, but as: 
a process ofmaterialization that stabilizes over time to produce 
the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter. That 
matter is always materialized has [ ... ] to be thought in relation 
to the productive and materializing effects of regulatory 
power. (pp. 9-10) 
Like Foucault, Butler will argue that both regulation and the possibilities of 
resistance are produced through this process. Because norms need to be 
continuously reiterated and rearticulated, because bodies need to be 
rematerialized, there is always the possibility for rearticulations that call into 
question 'the hegemonic force of that very regulatory law' (p. 2). It is also, in 
part, this Foucauldian understanding of power as working through 'institutions, 
practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin' that leads 
Butler to question whether the regulatory norms of sex/gender can be viewed 
in isolation from other norms, such as race (p. 243, ffil. ). 
Butler is best known for conceptualizing the subject in terms of 
I performativity'. Performativity is not in itself a Foucauldian concept, but 
remains, in Butler's usage, in some sort of conversation with a Foucauldian 
understanding of the relationship between power, knowledge and subjects. In 
a 1994 interview, Butler makes this link herself when she describes her 
134 
trajectory to the concept of performativity: 
I begin with the Foucauldian premise that power works in part 
through discourse and it works in part to produce and 
destabilise subjects. But then, when one starts to think carefully 
about how discourse might be said to produce a subject [ ... 
] it's 
useful to turn to the notion of performativity, and performative 
speech acts - understood as those speech acts that bring into 
being that which they name. [ ... 
] Then I take a further step, 
through the Derridean rewriting of Austin, and suggest that this 
production actually always happens through a certain kind of 
repetition and recitation. Performativity is the vehicle 
through which ontological effects are established. (Butler, 1994, 
p. 33) 
Like Foucault's genealogical project, performativity suggests the need to 
contest and problernatise the notion of the subject as an ontological given. For 
Butler, identities areTabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal 
signs and other discursive means'(Butler, 1990, p. 136). The categories of that 
identity - sex, gender, race, etcetera - are neither essentially true or false, but 
are rather produced as the 'truth effects' of a discourse of primary and stable 
identity. For Butler, recognizing that the gendered (or raced) body is 
performative 'suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various 
acts which constitute its reality' (ibid, p. 136). Rather, the notion of the 
performative suggests 'a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning' (p. 
139), where 'gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in 
an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts' (p. 140). 
Nevertheless, and against ippy of the readings of her work that followed the 
publication of Gender Trouble, Butler argues that understanding identity as 
performative, does not imply that one can voluntari sti call y remake bodies and 
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identities as a kind of radical, improvisational theatre (Butler, 1994, p. 33). 
Butler returns to her readi ng of Foucault to consider the constraints on 
performativity, as a 'specific modality of power as discourse' in which certain 
reiterative chains of discursive production have become norms 'without which 
no bearing in discourse can be taken. The power of discourse to materialize its 
effects is thus consonant with the power of discourse to circumscribe the 
domain of intelligibility' (Butler, 1993a, p. 187). There are, thus, always 
constraints on what can be 'performed' and the terms within which it can be 
performed or materialized. 
However, while identities cannot be simply 're-performed' for Butler, this 
materialization through the regulatory power of norms is never fully stable. 
This is for two reasons: first, because the nonns one is called to identify with 
(eg. 'masculine' and Teminine) are not themselves fully stable or exhaustive 
(ibid, pp. 187-8); and second, because the normative force of performativity 
works, not only through reiteration, but also through exclusion and through 
constructing a 'constitutive -outside'. These exclusions 'haunt signification as its 
-I- I abject borders or as that which is strictly foreclosed: the unlivable, the 
nonnarrativizable, the traumatic' (p. 188). 
This is where Butler steps aside from Foucault who, she argues, does not lend 
sufficient weight to this gesture of exclusion (p. 35). I think it is significant that 
she chooses this point to diverge from a Foucauldian trajectory. Where other 
feminists take their distance from Foucault primarily because of his failure to 
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take sexual difference sufficiently into account, and for his strategy of 
destabilizing gender or sex binaries (see Foucault, 1977c, pp. 219-220), Butler 
holds on to this latter strategy. She moves away from Foucault, to both Lacan 
and Derrida, in order to focus on the gesture of exclusion. But in doing so, she 
turns to models of language, and of power, that produce an unresolved tension 
with the Foucauldian strands that remain in her work. It is as if, having 
problematized ontology through the notion of performativity, Butler concludes 
that there are no more interesting ontological questions to ask. All the 
interesting questions can only be asked through epistemology, through what is 
representable, 'thematizable', 'narrativizable'. But this move to an exclusive 
focus on language is, as we have seen, one that Foucault resists. Instead, 
Foucault argues for a simultaneous focus on 'historically analyzable practices' 
and the symbolic systems they use (Foucault, 1983, p. 369). 
The focus on exclusion also sets up an unresolved tension in Butler's work, 
between Foucault's understanding of power as productive, multivocal and 
diffuse, and one which conceptualizes power in terms of the taboo and the 
negative (Foucault, 1978, p. 150). For Foucault, Lacan's model of the T (like 
other psychoanalytic models) posits a single formula of Power that is made to 
apply to all forms of society and to all levels of subjection. This model is 
predicated on the power of an absolute Sub ect, such as the 'Law of the Father, ' j 
to pronounce a founding interdict (Foucault, 1977b, p. 140). Against such a 
model, Foucault argues that truths, including the truth about the self, are never 
just related to a gesture of repression or exclusion, but also to the productive 
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interplay of power and knowledge. Butler tries to bring the apparently 
incompatible Lacanian and ýoucauldian conceptions of power together in her 
work. She does this, in part, through a series of moves to re-locate and 
complicate the sites of those exclusions, which I will examine in the next 
section. 
2. RELOCATING THE GESTURF, OF EXCLUSION 
Butler's work returns repeatedly to two moves which she draws from a 
psychoanalytic framework: first, the necessary failure of the process of 
identification, so that the subject 'never quite inhabits the ideal s/he is 
compelled to approximate' (Butler, 1993a, p. 23 1); and second, that 'what is 
exteriorized or performed can only be understood with reference to what is 
barred from the signifier and from the domain of [ ... ] legibility' 
(ibid, p. 234). 
With these two moves, Butler brings into play all the elements of what Alice 
Jardine calls 'Lacan's four-comered topology' (Jardine, 1985, p. 123): 
a logic of the real, -imaginary, symbolic and 'the subject in his 
reality'. This sub . ect is put into movement around the four 9 
comers of a square according to a series of displacements 
over which 'it'has no control; the substitution and displacement 
of signifiers, the differential process of language. (ibid, pp. 121- 
2) 
Yet I would argue that while Butler is using this Lacanian topology, she is also 
constantly trying to undermine it, in three different ways. She does this, first, 
by dislocating each of the elements in the system. Thus, at various points in 
Bodies that Matter Butler will argue that the symbolic is an imaginary 
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construct (Butler, 1993a, p. 79); that the imaginary is constructed in the 
symbolic (ibid, pp. 13-4); that the Real also is in fact part of the symbolic 
(p. 207). Here, Butler performs a classic deconstructive reading of Lacan's 
system, displacing each of -the terms in the system to show how the borders of 
each are secured by their exclusion of and differentiation from the other, while 
continuing to be troubled by the 'trace' of the other. 
But at the same time, there is a second, more directly political move that 
Butler makes. She seeks to destabilize the Lacanian system by insisting that all 
the elements in it are constructed within the realm of the social and within 
specific, historically constituted power relations, in ways that leave these 
elements subject to social change. This second move, which I think owes more 
to Butler's reading of Foucault than to Derrida, accompanies the first in a sort 
of uneasy tension with it, as Butler moves back and forth between a focus on 
Language as a system (langue) and on the social field which is in part 
constructed through language, but which cannot be completely reduced to it. 
Butler also makes a third move, which derives mainly from debates within 
feminism around respecting differences between women. She seeks to contest 
the privileged place given sexual difference within the Lacanian system, and 
to broaden the field of constitutive exclusions to consider other differences, 
especially, in Butler's case, sexuality and race. I will look at how Butler uses 
these three destabilizing moves in her treatment of the Lacanian symbolic. 
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Butler argues that it is not enough to locate a space of feminine resistance in 
the realm of the imaginary, while leaving the status of the symbolic intact as 
immutable law, structured by the Law of the Father, in the manner of some 
ferninisms which appropriate Lacan (p. 106). This move valorizes feminine 
resistance in its specificity, but at the same time renders resistance no more 
than a temporary escape from 'the constituting powers of the law', without 
fundamentally altering the'symbolic or its structural sexism and homophobia 
106). 
Butler's altemative strategy is to destabilize the symbolic itself She argues that 
the distinction between the symbolic and the imaginary cannot hold, and that 
'what operates under the sign of the symbolic may be nothing other than 
precisely that set of imaginary effects which have become naturalized and 
reified as the law of signification' (p. 79). Further, she argues, we need to read 
the symbolic performatively, as producing that which it declares. Butler's 
argument here relies heavily on her appropriation of Derrida: 
Is there an original authority, a primary source, or is it, rather, 
in the very practice of citation, potentially infinite in its 
regression, that the ground of authority is constituted as 
perpetual deferral? In other words, it is precisely through the 
infinite deferral of authority to an irrecoverable past that 
authority itself is constituted. [ ... 
] The pointing to a ground 
which is never recovered becomes authority's groundless 
ground. (pp. 107-8, emphasis in the original) 
Of particular interest for thiý project is Butler's rethinking of the symbolic in 
ways that bring sexual difference and race together. She argues that 'the order 
of sexual difference is not prior to that of race or class in the constitution of 
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the subject; [ ... ] the symbolic is also and at once a racializing set of norms' 
(p. 130). Further, she claims, the entire psychoanalytic paradigm needs to be 
subjected to this insight (ibid). Butler suggests three ways in which this might 
happen. 
First, she asks, what happens if we take the assumption of masculine and 
feminine positions to occur not only through a heterosexualizing symbolic, but 
also through a complex set of racial injunctions, operating in part through the 
ý- I- 
talboo on miscegenation? What if homosexuality and miscegenation converge 
as the constitutive outside of a normative heterosexuality which also serves to 
regulate racially pure reproduction (p. 167)? Butler also questions Irigaray's 
reading of Western philosophy which sees the feminine as monopolizing the 
sphere of the excluded from the time of Plato onwards. Butler points to Plato's 
construction of racialized others (the non-Greek-speaking, the slave) whose 
nature is considered less rational than 'man's', and whose exclusion is also 
essential to 'Plato's scenography of intelligibility' (p. 48). 
Second, Butler suggests that 'Woman's' place in the symbolic needs to be seen 
in relation to raced as well as gendered identities. In her reading of the film 
'Paris is Burning', Butler explores the ways in which gender becomes the site 
of articulation of race and class, and shows how the sign 'woman' 'constitutes 
the site of the phantasmatic promise of a rescue from poverty, homophobia, 
and racist delegitimation' (P-130). Butler is identifying here a process which, 
as we saw in Chapter Onej also concerns a number of Indian feminists - the 
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construction of 'Woman' as a way into constituting categories of class, race, 
community. This move builds on an Irigarayan concept of 'Woman as ground', 
and opens it out to the broader landscape of the intersections of sex, gender, 
race, etcetera, that Irigaray herself resists. 
Third, Butler questions the Lacanian model's linking of Language as a system 
exclusively to questions of sexual difference. Lacan's notion of the symbolic 
as the set of laws conveyed by language itself, which compel conformity to 
notions of 'masculinity' and 'femininity', has been taken by many 
psychoanalytic feminists as the point of departure for their work. From this, 
Butler argues, they have claimed that sexual difference is as primary as 
language, that there is no speaking/writing without a presupposition of sexual 
difference. It is their claim that sexual difference is more fundamental than 
other differences which, for Butler, marks so much of psychoanalytic feminism 
as white, since what is assumed is that there is such a thing as sexual 
difference unmarked by race (p. 18 1). What requires radical rethinking for her, 
therefore, is what set of particular social relations compose the domain of the 
symbolic: what convergent set of historical formations of racialised gender, 
gendered race, sexualisation of racial ideas, racialisation of gendered norms, 
make up both the social regulation of sexuality and its psychic articulations 
182). 
However, it is important to note that, in making this argument, Butler seems 
to shift from a focus on the symbolic as the system of Language itself, to a 
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focus on the symbolic as a set of particular social relations and the impact of 
these relations on the individual psyche. Of course Butler would argue that 
these two aspects are inseparable, since our only relation to the social is 
through language. However, here it seems to me the tensions between the 
Lacanian, Derridean and Foucauldian strains in Butler's work are highlighted. 
Clearly, she is working with a more destabilized view of the symbolic than 
Lacan's, but it remains unclear whether she is privileging a Derridean view that 
still focuses on a symbolic system in itself, or a Foucauldian insistence that 
'historically analyzable practices ... cut across symbolic systems while using 
them' (Foucault, 1983, p. 369)? To what degree is the subject defined by the 
laws of language alone, and to what degree are the laws of language 
changeable? As we will see in the next section, these tensions between 
incompatible models of power and language re-emerge when Butler turns to 
questions of feminist politics and resistance. 
3. POLITICS, RESISTANCE AND AGENCY 
Many Western feminist theorists have raised the question of whether 
postmodem or poststructuralist theories threaten the possibility of feminism as 
a political project of resistance and change. Much of this debate has focused 
on definitions and re-deffnitions of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and 
feminism. Judith Butler is one of the few feminist theorists to take this debate 
as an occasion to rethink the other key terms involved in the question - politics 
and resistance. Butler asks if we need to theoretically assume a subject with 
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agency before we can articulate the terms of a political process of change 
(Butler, 1992, p. 13). She asks if feminism would not do better to dispose of 
its attempts to pre-define and describe its subject, the category 'women', the 
'we' of feminism, since 'the 'we' that is supposed to be presumed for the 
purposes of solidarity, produces the very factionalization it is supposed to quell' 
(ibid, p. 14): 
The minute that the category of women is invoked as describing 
the constituency for which feminism speaks, an internal debate 
invariably begins over what the descriptive content of that term 
will be. (ibid, p. 15) 
For Butler this means we need to rethink the limitations of identity politics in 
general. More specifically, she wants feminism to rethink the category of 
'women' as a political signifier, as well as the relationship between this 
category and others like race, ethnicity, and what she has memorably called the 
'embarrassed', 'exasperated' and 'illimitable etcetera' (Butler, 1990, p. 143). She 
suggests that the whole process of forging political unities, formulating political 
demands and taking political action needs to be re-thought so that feminist 
politics do not simply reproduce, in slightly new forms, the power relations 
they are trying to contest. 
If, following Foucault, identity categories are never merely descriptive, but 
always normative, what normative constraints underpin constructions of the 
feminist subject? (Butler, 1992, pp. 14-5). If the subject is always both 
regulated and produced through the workings of power relations, then its 
agency cannot derive from. s9me pure space, defined by primary identities, but 
only from the possibilities that emerge within those power relations (Butler, 
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1993a, pp. 12-15). These possibilities emerge in part from the instabilities of 
those normative power relations, whose results are not always predictable and 
which can therefore produce unintended consequences (ibid, pp. 122-3). They 
emerge in part as well from the fact that power can only regulate those 
subjects it produces while also enabling them, so that it is possible to turn 
power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power, 
to establish a kind of political contestation that is not a 'pure' 
opposition, a 'transcendence' of contemporary relations of 
power, but a difficult labour of forging a future from resources 
inevitably impure. (p. 241) 
All these are identifiably Foucauldian moves. However, as we have seen, 
Butler also wants to interrogate the ways in which identity categories rely for 
their apparent coherence on the construction and exclusion of an abjected 
outside, and on the impossibility of identity categories to satisfy their promise 
of immediate self-presence and completeness. For this, she turns both to 
psychoanalytic and Derridean frameworks. 
Feminism, Butler argues, has been faced with the problem of reconciling the 
apparent need to found its politics on a category of 'women' and the demand 
to problernatize that category and interrogate its exclusions. Identity politics 
seems to promise full recognition. But a psychoanalytic approach suggests that 
identity categories, based on exclusions, can never fulfil their promises of full 
recognition, unity and universality. Disaffection with identity politics, then, can 
be understood as following on from this failure to deliver the promise. 
For Butler, political signifiers such as 'women' are not describing pre-given 
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constituencies, but are rather empty signs which come to bear phantasmatic 
investments. It is the signifier's inevitable failure to fully describe the 
constituency it names that opens it to new meanings and possibilities of 
political re-signification. Butler argues that 'it is this open-ended and 
performative function of the signifier that seems to me to be crucial to a 
radical democratic notion of futurity' (p. 191). Furthermore, it is because 
categories of identification are produced through processes of exclusion and 
a ection, whic continue to aunt ose i en i ic ions, a ese c egories 
remain unstable. Thus, while political contestation has tended to rely on 
identifications for advancing political goals, Butler is suggesting that the 
persistence of disidentifi cations may be as crucial to a politics of change, and 
that disidentificatory practices need to be mobilized within feminist politics 
(p. 4) 
It is, therefore, not a question of giving up on such political signifiers as 
'women', but rather of finding ways in which they can be 'repeated in 
directions that reverse and-displace their originating aims' (p. 123). Feminists 
cannot stand at an instrumental distance from such terms; we are always, to 
some extent, being used by them as we use them. But they remain 'an occasion 
to work the mobilizing power of injury, of an interpellation one never chose' 
(ibid), as an affirmative response to violation. It is the repetitions 'which fail 
to repeat loyally' that constitute resistance (p. 124). 
Butler's model of resistance is perhaps best known through her privileging of 
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parody. Parody destabilizes the symbolic system by resisting any notion of an 
'original' identity (Butler, 1990, p. 13 8). Parodic speech acts expose the 'ground' 
of identities as groundless (ibid, p. 141). For Butler, the boundaries of the 
symbolic system can be extended or displaced by: 
the enunciation that establishes a position where there was none, or that 
marks the zones of exclusion and displacement by which available 
subject-positions are themselves established and stabilized. (Butler, 
1993a, p. 114) 
This type of 'parodic proliferation' challenges the stability of identity categories 
and insists on their permanent 'openness to resignification' (Butler, 1990, 
13 8). 
Rethinking identity categories also means rethinking the connections between 
apparently discrete categories of analysis and resistance. In Bodies That Matter, 
Butler includes her own earlier work among those feminist positions that she 
judges to have 'problematically prioritized gender as the identificatory site of 
political mobilization at the expense of race or sexuality or class or geopolitical 
positioning/displacement' (ibid, P. 116). It is not a matter of relating race, 
sexuality and gender as if these were separate categories. Rather, what appear 
as separate categories are revealed as the conditions of articulation for each 
other. This means that notions of political unities need to be rethought, outside 
of the 'logic of non-contradiction by which one identification is always and 
only purchased at the expense of another' (p. 118). 
For Butler, then, what we need is to 'map out interrelationships that connect, 
without simplistically uniting' (pp. 114-5), and to find a way 
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both to occupy such sites and to subject them to a 
democratizing contestation in which the exclusionary conditions 
of their production are perpetually reworked (even if they can 
never be fully overcome) in the direction of a more complex 
coalitional frame. (p. 115) 
For Butler this means questioning the notion of coherent identity as the starting 
point for political alliance, for to do so is to presume 
that what a 'subject' is is already known, already fixed, and that 
that ready-made subj&t might enter the world to renegotiate its 
place. But if that very subject produces its coherence at the cost 
of its own complexity [ ... ] then that subject forecloses the kinds 
of contestatory connections that might democratize the field of 
its own operations. (p. 115) 
I think Butler is raising important questions here about rethinking the nature 
of coalition politics and about how the constituency of feminist politics might 
be developed in new ways. If the 'we' of feminist politics must always be 
determined beforehand, and if consolidation of a 'we' always involves an 
exclusionary process of setting boundaries, then spaces for the differences 
between women will always be closed down. If we think about the 'we' 
emerging through the process of coalitional politics, it may be possible to keep 
that space open to new possibilities. And yet I think Butler avoids two crucial 
questions which her discussion of these issues invites. 
First, her reliance on a poststructuralist language model closes down the field 
of identity constitution so that she increasingly focusses only on the question 
of exclusion. If subject-positions are, as she says, established and stabilized 
through exclusion and displacement, then opening up the subject-position of 
vwoment as a 'site of permanent openness and resignifiabillty' (Butler, 1992, 
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p-16) can be a radically democratizing move. However, this move cannot 
address those effects of productive power that have already taken 'women' as 
such an open site of 'resignifiability. As we saw in the analysis of Indian 
feminisms in Part One, there is already a proliferation of definitions and 
redefinitions of 'Woman' and 'women' which help to produce community 
identities that, in turn, continue to subordinate women. The overall effect of 
Butler's turn to exclusionary paradigms is, then, to under-emphasize both the 
way women can be constrained by these workings of productive power, and 
the instabilities and possibilities of resistance that can emerge from them. 
Second, if we want to 'rework a logic of non-contradiction in which one 
identification is always and only purchased at the expense of another', do we 
not also need to think about alternate models of the self, and self-other 
relations, in which to ground new ways of relating politically? Furthermore, is 
it possible to do all this work at the level of signification alone, without 
recourse to either an alternative ontology or an alternative ethics? And does not 
the closing down of her f6dus to the level of signification, mean that Butler 
also closes down the possibility of seeing possible sources for those alternative 
models? In the next section I will argue that this is what, in fact, happens as 
a consequence of Butler's failure to re-define a specifically female subject- 
position. 
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4. LOSING THE FEMALE 
In Bodies that Matter Butler questions whether recourse to the materiality of 
sex is necessary 'in order to establish that irreducible specificity that is said to 
ground feminist practice' (p. 29). She wants to establish a Foucauldian 
genealogy of materiality and, as a feminist, wants to uncover the 'problematic 
gendered matrix' (ibid) that serves as ground for that materiality. She seeks to 
uncover the exclusion and degradation of the feminine that constitutes 
materiality, so that feminists do not take on board this exclusion when they 
turn to concepts of the 'body's irreducible materiality' as a 'necessary 
precondition for feminist p*rhctice' (p. 30). 
But what we need to Pay attention to in Butler's trajectory, is whether, in 
destabilizing notions of irreducible materiality, she also does away with any 
recourse to 'the sexed specificity of the female body'. In some places at least, 
Butler does seem to link female specificity necessarily with a notion of 
materiality that has been excluded and degraded (see p. 28). In particular, I 
would argue that we need to see what happens within her framework to the 
female body, the maternal body and the specifically female capacity for birth. 
It seems to me that both in her reading of Irigaray, and in her reworking of 
Lacan to produce 'the lesbian phallus, this female body disappears. 
Furthermore, what disappears with this body is the possibility of feminist 
strategies of resistance that take a specifically female subject-position as the 
starting point for alternative models of the self, self-other relations, and 
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identity. 
Butler's Irigaray 
In Bodies That Matter, Butler's reading of Irigaray centres on the chapter in 
Speculum entitled 'Une M. ýre de Glace', which consists of a selection of 
extracts from Plotinus' Sixth Tractate, 'The Impassivity of the Unembodied. 
Here, Plotinus discusses Plato's concept of matter, also referred to elsewhere 
in Speculum as 'first matter', the 'receptacle' and the 'chora'. All these terms 
refer to a concept of absolute impassivity and unchangeability, of absolute 
absence, within which substance, reality or existence can be contained. 
For Butler, this kind of concept of matter, or materiality, is paradigmatic of the 
constitutive exclusions she' is interested in: what must be placed outside 
signification and outside the realm of the intelligible, in order for signification 
to proceed. Thus, what interests Butler in Irigaray's work is the way she links 
this 'unthematizable materiality' to the feminine, whose exclusion becomes the 
necessary condition for philosophy to proceed and for a phallogocentric 
economy to posture as internally coherent (Butler, 1993a, pp. 37-8). 
As part of her argument that feminism needs to contest the constitutive 
exclusions that ground hegemonic discourses, Butler focusses on this linking 
of the feminine with materiality. She wants to alert feminism to the dangers of 
grounding its project in appeals to notions of materiality that bring with them 
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the abjection and exclusion of the feminine. However, at the same time, she 
wants to contest Irigaray's privileging of the feminine as monopolizing the 
sphere of the excluded (ibid, 'p. 48). While I have argued in Chapter Three that 
Irigaray's project needs to be opened up to consider other differences, I want 
to argue here that Butler's way of proceeding to do so creates its own 
problems. Butler opens the space for other differences only by de-authorizing 
any focus on the specifically female. 
It is clear from her first discussions of Irigaray in the chapter 'Bodies that 
Matter' that Butler's reading will emphasize the similarities between Irigaray's 
project and Derrida! s. For Butler, Irigaray's strategy is not to find a place for 
'her' voice, but rather to effect 
a disruptive movement which unsettles the topographical claim 
[ ... ]a taking of his place, not to assume it, but to show that it is occupiable, to raise the question of the cost and movement of 
that assumption. (p. 36) 
Thus, Butler says that, for Irigaray, the excluded/excessive matter functions 
like the Derridean supplement in language (p. 38). This constitutive outside is 
internal to the system as its 'nonthernatizable necessity' which re-emerges 
within the system, as both incoherence and as threat to systernaticity. The 
feminine is thus 'set under erasure as the impossible necessity that enables any 
ontology' (p. 39). 
These are all very Derridean formulations which focus on the feminine as a 
position in language, or rather as the outside of language. Irigaray is frequently 
mentioned in tandem with Derrida in this section, and Derrida is the chief 
152 
point of reference and comparison in Butler's discussion. Never is any 
distinction made between Derrida's disembodied X6minin' and Irigaray's 
insistence on making links between the position of the feminine in language 
and questions concerning both real women, and the possibility of an embodied, 
specifically female subject-position. However, as we have seen in Chapter 
Three, Irigaray's strategy is notjust a deconstructiveoverreading which mimes 
and exposes the speculative excess in Plato' (p. 36) and other philosophers. By 
only asking Derridean (epistemological) questions about representability, 
intelligibility and thematizability, Butler closes off consideration of the 
(ontological) questions about subject-status and models of self-other relations, 
which are also part of Irigaray's project. Indeed, Butler will argue against 
seeing Irigaray's work as looking for alternative origins in, for example, the 
maternal (p. 4 1), or as being grounded in a 'rival ontology' (p. 45). 
This very Derridean reading of Irigaray gets Butler into trouble when she tries 
to track Irigaray's position on questions of the maternal body and the female 
capacity for birth. On the one hand, she wants to argue that Irigaray, like 
Derrida, would resist linking the abjected, excluded outside of Matter/the 
receptacle/the chora to the matemal body. However, on the other hand, Butler 
has to concede that, for Irigaray, philosophy's constitutive exclusions are bound 
up with a masculine appropriation of origins and of the female capacity for 
birth. Thus, Butler refers to 'the female power of reproduction that is taken 
over by the phallogocentric economy and remade into its own exclusive and 
essential action' (p. 42), and a 'phallic phantasy of a fully self-constituted 
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patrilineality [ ... 
] effected through a denial and cooptation of the female 
capacity for reproduction' (p. 43). 
By the end of this section of Bodies That Matter, Butler's attempt to conflate 
Irigaray with Derrida is straining at the seams. On the one hand, she is still 
only asking questions about the 'feminine in language' (p. 47) and reducing 
Irigaray's multi-layered project to this one move; on the other hand, she now 
claims that Irigaray does take the link with the maternal body as a symbolic 
model for an alternative relationship between the self and origin, and between 
self and other (pp. 46-48). But at the same time, Butler continues to try to 
contain this link within a deconstructive register. Irigaray is, for Butler, still 
largely concerned with the 'linguistic operation of metonymy, a closeness and 
proximity which appears to be the linguistic residue of the initial proximity of 
mother and infant' (p. 48). The focus on the female in Irigaray is lost once 
again. 
It is at this point in her argument that Butler takes issue with Irigaray's 
privileging of the feminine, as monopolizing the sphere of the excluded, and 
criticizes Irigaray for not following through on the 'metonymic link between 
women and [ ... ] other 
Others, idealizing and appropriating the "elsewhere" as 
feminine' (p. 49). Yet I find it ironic that Butler chooses to make her stand for 
I other Others' as this point. In my own reading of Irigaray, which insists on 
maintaining a double focus'on her treatment of both the feminine in language 
and the specifically female, this is one of the points at which Irigaray's project 
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is most conducive to being opened up to a consideration of differences 
between women. As I have already argued, Irigaray's tracking of masculine 
appropriations of birth, of constructions of the mother as 'receptacle' or 'place' 
within which a male-defined 'truth' resides, and of the 'Woman-Mother' as the 
ground for exchanges among men, all find their resonances in the Indian 
feminist work discussed in Part One. However these convergences only 
become visible if we look for the female in Irigaray and are willing to consider 
'woman's' disruptive possibilities, an option Butler has already closed down. 
Indeed, one of the most striking things about Butler's treatment of Irigaray is 
the degree to which Irigaray is not allowed to speak. After the conflation of 
Irigaray with Derrida, we have what is announced as Butler's reading of 
Irigaray's reading of Plotinus' reading of Plato in 'Une Mire de Glace. But, as 
already noted above, 'Une Wre de Glace' is not 'written' in any conventional 
sense by Irigaray; it consists entirely of extracts from Plotinus, a point which 
Butler never makes clear. Without a consideration of this point any conclusions 
drawn about Irigaray's voice, or her project, become problematic, to say the 
least. A further irony is added when Butler uses this chapter of Speculum as 
evidence of Irigaray's 'penetrative textual strategy'of 'writing with and through 
the language of phallic philosophemes' (p. 45). It could be argued conversely 
that, in this chapter of Speculum, Irigaray never penetrates the phallic text at 
all, since her voice is deliberately not there - like the Mother-Matter-receptacle 
which can have no voice of its own? Finally, what is announced as a reading 
of 'Une Wre de Glace' includes only one quote, of part of the last sentence 
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of the chapter. The rest of this 'reading' is Butler's own discussion of Plato. In 
fact, Butler enacts her own set of displacements whose effect is to erase 
Irigaray's voice altogether. First we have Derrida as Irigaray; then Plotinus as 
Irigaray; and finally we have Butler herself speaking in the space she 
announces as a reading of Irigaray. Perhaps this is a clever comment on 
Irigaray's view on the difficulty of speaking (as) woman in an economy of the 
same, but the result is unsatisfactory in what purports to be a conversation 
among feminists. 
I have said that Irigaray's voice is not present in 'Une Mire de Glace', but of 
course she is present to the extent that she has chosen which extracts of 
Plotinus to include, and how to structure them. And if we read Irigaray's 
choices politically (as I have argued in Chapter Three), and in the overall 
context of Speculum, it becomes clear that what is at stake is not only the 
position of the feminine in language, but also the barring of a subject-space for 
women and the construction of a particular version of female-ness' that serves 
the economy of the same. Irigaray's hidden presence in the text stands not only 
for the 'unspeakable' feminine within language, but also as an incursion from 
- and an insistence on the possibility of -a specifically female subject-space. 
'Une Wre de Glace' follows three chapters dealing with the location of women 
in the work of Plato and Aristotle. 'Une Mire de Glace' proceeds slightly 
differently. Women are hardly mentioned at all as Plotinus works his way 
through a variety of arguments in which he progressively rids the concept of 
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matter of all remaining vestiges of dynamism, visibility, activity, and any part 
in the generation of things. Irigaray leaves to the very end the selection from 
Plotinus where matter is equated with the Mother. But this is clearly a 
particular construct of the Mother and of female-ness, stripped of any part in 
generation, 'sterile... female in receptivity only, not in pregnancy', with the 
'impregnating power' assigned 'only to the unchanging masculine' (Irigaray, 
1974, p. 179). 
At the same time as she has constructed the text to build up to this final 
connection o matter to the matemal/female, Irigaray scatters the text with 
indications that this is the direction in which Plotinus is heading. Throughout, 
Irigaray has chosen extracts in which Plotinus has recourse to the language of 
mirrors, echoes, and reflecting vessels (see especially, pp. 169-70 and 174-6). 
Each evocation of the mirror refers the reader to the many levels on which 
Irigaray deploys these terihs: woman as mirror to reflect man's other of the 
same; the woman/mother behind the mirror, supporting the 'little man's' 
trajectory via the mirror stage to the symbolic and subject status; the burning 
glass and concave mirror that might project a different view. Further, the 
characterization of matter as ground (p. 176) and place (p. 178) - terms which 
Irigaray returns to repeatedly throughout Speculum to locate the ways in which 
women are barred access to a subject-space in the specular economy - indicate 
that there is more at stake here than a reiteration of the Derridean location of 
the fiminin' in language. 
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In contrast to Irigaray's strategy of redefining the specifically female, Butler's 
strategy is to reread Plato's receptacle as the prohibited lesbian. She argues that 
the exclusions at work in Plato can be read as an attempt to fix the 
'compulsory gendered matrix', to make sure that masculine and feminine stay 
distinct from each other (Butler, 1993a, p. 5 1). Now, Butler is not countering 
her reading to Irigaray's as the correct one; rather she wants to multiply our 
understanding of the outside, the multiple exclusions at work in securing 
meaning. But the alternative reading she offers is one that resists taking sexual 
difference as a starting point altogether, and one that in a sense de-authorizes 
any attempt to work out an alternative, specifically female subject-position. 
It seems that in tracking the gendered matrix behind and beneath concepts of 
matenality, Butler concludes that any recourse to sexed specificity will fall into 
supporting that same matrix, and that the only solution is to problematise both 
materiality and the sexually specific body. If this exclusionary gendered matrix 
works by fixing masculine and feminine, and insisting that they remain 
resolutely distinct from one another, then the transgressive, emancipatory move 
is to un-fix those distinctions. Any attempt to redefine what might be specific 
to women can only, in her view lead back to supporting that matrix. The 
problem, which I think recurs when Butler rereads Lacan to produce 'The 
Lesbian Phallus', is that this strategy of undermining the sexually specific body, 
is just as susceptible to reappropriation within a 'masculine order' as the sexual 
difference model she rejects here. 
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The Lesbian Phallus 
In Bodies That Matter, the argumentative trajectory that leads Butler to the 
'lesbian phallus' is a complicated, and often confusing one, that takes in 
readings of Freud and Lacan along the way. It is not my purpose here to 
rehearse those readings, or to try to impose my own version of clarity and 
cohesion on a difficult text. Instead, I want to focus only on tracking Butler as 
she again allows the specifically female to disappear. While in her reading of 
Irigaray, Butler effects this erasure through restricting her gaze to the'feminine' 
in language, here the problem becomes the restrictions of the overall model of 
language itself which underpins Butler's analysis, and the way sexual difference 
is 'materialized' through language in this model. 
In the chapter of Bodies That Matter entitled 'The Lesbian Phallus and the 
Morphological Imaginary', one of Butler's aims is to destabilize sexual 
difference by dislodging the phallus from its central and non-transferable place 
as transcendental signifier in Lacan's symbolic order. She starts from the 
premise that, in a Lacanian framework, 'having the phallus' is to assume the 
'masculine' position, both within a heterosexual matrix and within language. 
Conversely, 'being the phallus' equates with the 'feminine' position. Butler then 
moves on to suggest that destabilizing the one distinction ('having the 
phallusTbeing the phallus') is also to destabilize the other distinction 
('masculine'/ Terninine'). Thus, Butler's provocative celebration of the lesbian 
phallus is a way of insisting on the phallus's transferability and of undermining 
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the 'logic of non-contradiction' that appears to hold the two binaries in place 
(pp. 62-3) 
Again, for Butler, the privileged move in terms of social change is the one that 
destabilizes, rather than redefines, sexual difference. However, we might 
respond to Butler by asking: is the link between sexual difference and 
phallocentrism a necessary one? That is, do we have to reject sexed specificity 
when we reject the model that organizes sexual difference around the central 
signifier of the phallus? And is the move to blur these distinctions any more 
immune to re-appropriatiop ývhen we still live in societies where the dominant 
power-knowledge regimes still take the male/masculine as norm? 
Of course, Butler does not deny that bodies can be 'materialized' in sexually 
specific ways. But, for her, what allows these bodies to persist over time in 
their specificity is 'a demand in andfor language' (emphasis in the original); 
what is needed is 'to cast the notion of "bodies" as a matter of signification' 
(p. 67). With this move, Butler takes us away from the female in two ways. 
First, she draws us away from ontological considerations of the female, the 
female body, and its possible relations to models of the self, towards 
epistemological questions of what can be represented about the body. Second, 
the model of language she draws on can only represent the feminine position 
in language within a logic of exclusion and differentiation, where securing the 
distinctness of masculine and feminine requires purifying each of all traces of 
the other. The transgressive move, therefore, is to destabilize those distinctions, 
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rather than attempt to redefine them. Any attempt to redefine would be doomed 
to failure because of the overriding logic of language itself. 
There are, of course, feminist theorists who have tried to combine a Lacanian 
view of language with a focus on the specifically female, most notably Luce 
Irigaray. But as we have seen, Butler's reading of Irigaray closes off this aspect 
of her work altogether; nor is she convinced by Kristeva's attempts to find a 
role for the maternal body in signification (pp. 69-71). For Butler, any attempt 
to 'recover' the repudiated 'maternal' remains locked into the logic of the 
system that repudiated it in the first place (Butler, 1993b, pp. 164-5). The only 
available strategy, then, is to destabilize the central location of the phallus in 
Lacan's symbolic, and with it, the distinctions between masculine and feminine 
subject-positions. While Butler recognizes that the Lacanian privileging of the 
phallus is underpinned by a masculine-marked morphology and an 
'androcentric epistemological imperialism' (Butler, 1993a, p. 73), rethinking the 
female body, or a feminine morphology, is never an option. 
But this strategy only holds if we accept its underlying model of language, in 
which coherence is always purchased at the price of abjection, so that the 
distinctness of 'masculine' and 'feminine' requires purifying each of all traces 
if the other (ibid, p. 87). Bui is this the only way to proceed? Does language 
always only work in this way? Feminist theorists who are less committed to 
a poststructuralist language model have suggested a more complex situation. 
For example, Christine Battersby has argued that the 'feminine' can be 
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appropriated, absorbed and managed by the male genius of Romanticism; her 
work suggests that blurring the boundaries between 'masculine' and 'feminine' 
can be perfectly compatible with discursive systems that subordinate women 
(see Battersby, 1989 and 1995). 
Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter One, destabilizing the distinction between 
masculine and feminine through such figurations as the 'virile Mother-India' 
can be an enabling option for the male national subject, without seriously 
destabilizing gender hierarchies. Is opening up sexual difference 'as a site of 
proliferative resignifications' (Butler, 1993a, p. 89) such a necessarily enabling 
move? Is it possible to contest the still dominant regimes of power-knowledge 
that allow for any 'unmarked' resignifications to be'always appropriated by the 
'Imasculine"' (Irigaray, 1974, p. 133), if there is not also a parallel move to 
valorise and re-define the specifically female? Conversely, if language does not 
only work through the exclusion of all traces of the other, then it should be 
possible to approach the project of redefining the female/feminine without 
taking the relation to the phallus as constitutive, as Butler claims. 
By de-authorizing a focus on the female through her reliance on this kind of 
language-model, Butler also limits the potential impact of a number of 
important insights that she brings to feminist theorizations of identity. For 
example, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, she wants to problematise 
the way that identity categories are designated as origins, when for her they are 
in fact the effiects of multiple discourses, institutions and practices (Butler, 
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1990, P. xi). Yet by turning attention away from the specifically female body 
and from birth, she closes down a space in which she might have thought 
"'k about women's specific relationship to the question of origins, and how this 
relationship figures in the emergence of a variety of identity categories. 
Furthermore, in developing the concept of performativity, Butler points to the 
ways in which authority is constituted through an infinite deferral to an 
irrecoverable past, which becomes 'authority's groundless ground' (Butler, 
1993a, p. 108). Again, this might have been a space in which to consider 
'Woman's' and 'women's' specific relationship to time, tradition and an 
'irrecoverable past' in many models of race, nation and community identities. 
By discounting the female, Butler undermines her own project of bringing a 
greater complexity to feminism's understanding of women's identity and the 
apparent coherence of identity categories such as sex/gender and race. V 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have identified a number of ways in which Judith Butler's 
problematization of identity can be enabling for feminist attempts to keep a 
theoretical space open for the differences between women. First, her 
genealogical critiques of sex, gender and, to a lesser extent race, point to the 
instabilities behind these apparently coherent identity categories. Second, she 
contests the primacy of sexual difference in identity constitution, and works to 
destabilize the Lacanian model of the symbolic both by dislodging sexual 
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difference from its location as sole centre of that model, and by arguing that 
the symbolic's inherent instabilities can be a source of social change. Third, her 
problernatization of identity leads her to rethink'women' as a political signifier 
in ways that provide some important insights for feminist politics. The point 
is not to give up on the category 'women' but to recognize that it is always a 
field of political contestations. Parodic 'repetitions which fail to repeat loyally' 
can mean that 'women' are evoked in radically democratizing ways that 
destabilize the apparent coherence of dominant social systems. 
Nevertheless, there remains an unresolved tension between incompatible 
models of power and language in Butler's work. As we have seen, these limit 
the extent to which Butler. can follow through with these insights to consider 
women's specific relationship to identity constitution. At times, she is working 
with a Lacanian/Derri dean model of power that focusses on the necessary 
exclusion of the'abject'and the 'unrepresentable' that provides the ground upon 
which the subject stands. At other times, she adopts a Foucauldian view of 
power as productive, that enables subjects as it constrains them. As we have 
also seen, the Derridean focus on signification alone and on what can be 
represented within a unitary symbolic system sits uneasily with the Foucauldian 
view of multiple discursive systems that cannot be looked at apart from 
material practices, institutions and social relations. 
I have argued that, repeatedly, Butler's arguments move towards a privileged 
focus on language as a system, and on language working primarily through 
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exclusion. In so doing, she both closes down the possibility of feminist 
redefinitions of the specifically female, and understates the complexity of 
women's specific location in the multiple networks of power relations through 
which particular community identities emerge. This limits both the extent to 
which Butler sustains a focus on 'women' and the space in which she can 
consider specific differences between them. Her strategic focus on destabilizing 
sex and gender is meant to bring greater complexity into feminist 
understandings of women's identity. But this strategy derives from a model that 
reduces the complexities of both language and power by focussing on the 
single move of exclusion. The result is that Butler's intended focus on the 
complexities of 'women', identity constitution, and the relationship between 
them, is also undermined. 
In Chapter Three I argued that a sexual difference model of identity such as 
Irigaray's, causes serious problems for considering women's complex location 
across a multiplicity of identity categories, but that Irigaray's focus on the 
specifically female also produces some unexpected openings to that 
complexity. In this chapter, I have suggested that a strategy of destabilizing 
sex/gender, whilst producing important insights for complicating identity, can 
also create its own difficulties for capturing women's specific relationship to 
that complexity. Is it possible to hold together a focus on women's specificity 
with an attention to multiplicity? In the next two chapters, I look at the 
different ways in which Ro si Braidotti and Donna Haraway have attempted to 
address this double focus. 
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Chapter Five 
'ALL THAT COUNTS IS THE GOING': ROSI 
BRAIDOTTI'S NOMADIC SUBJECT 
INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, Rosi Braidotti's project to 'develop and evoke a vision of female 
feminist subjectivity in a nomadic mode' (Braidotti, 1994, p. 1) promises to 
address at least some of the difficulties identified in the work of Irigaray and 
Butler. She wants to open up Irigaray's feminism of sexual difference to consider 
other differences between women, to capture the simultaneity of 'axes of 
differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, age and others' (ibid, p. 4). 
Like Butler, she wants to unsettle models of identity that are grounded in a desire 
for fixity, but unlike Butler, she thinks that a redefinition of the specifically 
female can offer a way towards an alternative model of the self. 
Her engagement with Foucault and Deleuze promises an attention to the 
relationship between identity and power relations, and to the tensions between 
power's productive and exclusionary aspects. Following Foucault, she speaks of 
the 'set of interdictions and permissions which inscribe one's subjectivity in a 
bedrock of power' (p. 12). Following Deleuze and Guattari, she seems attentive 
to the potential dangers of reproducing hegemonic power relations in the name 
of resistance (p. 5). She refers to both Butler's treatment of performative parody 
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and Irigaray's use of strategic mimesis, not just as ways of troubling the system 
of Language itself, but within a framework of radical political contestation, as 
'spaces where alternative forms of agency can be engendered' (p. 7). 
Nevertheless, I will argue in this chapter that Braidotti's nomadic trajectory fails 
to deliver on these promising beginnings and in fact takes a number of dangerous 
turnings which reintroduce sameness in the name of difference, and hierarchy in 
the name of multiplicity. Braidotti's failure both signals the difficulty of 
sustaining a double focus on 'women' and their differences, and provides some 
important lessons about how theoretical models of power, language and identity 
impinge on feminists' ability to sustain that double focus. 
I develop this argument through six sections. I begin by introducing Braidotti's 
concept of the nomad in section one. In section two, I discuss the problems 
created by Braidotti's failure to adequately consider the question of location in her 
version of nomadism. In sections three and four, I question Braidotti's 
methodology and speaking-position for the way they fail to attend to her own 
location as a white Western feminist, and will show how she de-authorizes many 
of the insights that emerge from postcolonial locations. In sections five and six, 
I discuss how Braidotti's underlying models of identity and language contribute 
to the reintroduction of a hierarchy of differences in her project. 
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1. NOMADIC SUBJECTS 
In her collection of essays written between 1980 and 1993 entitled Nomadic 
Subjects, Rosi Braidotti offers the model of the nomad as a way of rethinking 
'female feminist subjectivity'. The 'female feminist' (which she also sometimes 
terms the 'female feminine') is a phrase Braidotti first used in Patterns of 
Dissonance (199 1). She uses it to refer to the type of project, initiated by Irigaray, 
that takes sexual difference as the starting point for developing new modes of 
thought to counter the specular feminine of the phallocentric order, and thus to 
counter a notion of Woman as 'other of the same'. For Braidotti, the female 
feminist subject is a'new epistemological and political entity to be defined and 
affirmed by women in the confrontation of their multiple differences, of class, 
race, sexual preference' (Braidotti, 1994, p. 3 0). 
Braidotti uses this formulation to add to the Irigarayan. project an attention to the 
multiplicity of differences between women: 
In feminist theory one speaks as a woman, although the subject 
'woman' is not a monolithic essence defined once and for alL but 
rather the site of multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory 
sets of experience, defined by overlapping variables such as class, 
race, age, lifestyle, sexual preference and others. (ibid, p. 4, 
emphasis in the original) 
Braidotti recognizes that the question of differences between women, 'especially 
on the ground of culture and ethnic identity' is not a strong point in Irigaray's 
work (p. 170), and she wants to give this question a more central place within 
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sexual difference feminism. 
It is largely through the figuration of the nomad, adapted from Deleuze and 
Guattari, that Braidotti hopes to achieve this double focus. A 'figuration' is 
Braidotti's term for 'a style of thought that evokes or expresses ways out of the 
phallocentric vision of the subject. A figuration is a politically informed account 
of an alternative subjectivity' (p. 1 ). Figurations are the necessary political fictions, 
new frameworks and images that suggest ways out of predominant paradigms and 
modes of thought (p. 3). 
Braidotti evokes the nomad to tackle questions of subjectivity and identity at a 
number of levels. Here, I want to look at three of these: first, the model of the 
self, and self-other relations implied by Braidotti's appropriation of the figuration 
of nomad; second, how the nomad is evoked to suggest the constituent elements 
of a sense of self, in particular the intersections of sex, gender, race, ethnicity, 
etc.; and third, what Braidotti's use of the nomad suggests in terms of the nature 
and possibilities of agency. 
At the level of models of the self, Braidotti finds the figuration of the nomad 
empowering because it expresses 
the kind of subject who has relinquished all idea, desire, or 
nostalgia for fixity. This figuration expresses the desire for an 
identity made of transitions, successive shifts, and coordinated 
changes, without and against an essential unity. (ibid, p. 22) 
The nomadic subject has not abandoned unity altogether, but its cohesion derives 
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from movement rather than from fixity: 
It is a cohesion engendered by repetitions, cyclical moves, 
rhythmical displacement [ ... ] [T]he point of 
being an intellectual 
nomad is about crossing boundaries, about the act of going, 
regardless of the destination. (pp. 22-3) 
The nomadic self draws its sense of coherence from its mobility, and thus 'aims 
to rethink the unity of the subject, without reference to humanistic beliefs, 
without dualistic oppositions, linking instead body and mind in a new set of 
intensive and often intransitive transitions' (p. 3 1). 
Braidotti's view of the nomadic self has its origins in Deleuze and Guattari's 
project in A Thousand Plateaus to rethink multiplicity outside the constraints of 
systems of binary logic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, pp. 4-5). Binary logic, they 
argue, takes its models from the linearity of trees and roots, plotting points, fixing 
order, locating origins (ibid, p. 7). Deleuze and Guattari's counter-model is the 
rhizome, in which connection exists only in the context of heterogeneity and 
multiplicity: 'any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must 
be' (ibid). 'Tree logic' makes its links through subj ect/obj ect binaries (ibid, p. 8), 
through plotting the place of each unit in relation to a universal 'One' (p. 2 1). It is 
a logic of tracing and reproduction (p. 12). Rhizomatic connections, by contrast, 
are like a map which is open, susceptible to constant modification, and which has 
multiple entryways (p. 13). The rhizome is acentred, nonhierarchical, without an 
organizing memory (p. 2 I). 
Tree logic leads to molar models of identity that privilege being - stable, defined, 
170 
distinct. The molar subject is fixed in position on the grids of sedentary, striated 
space. The logic of the rhizome privileges instead molecular models of becoming, 
and the smooth space that resists hierarchies, enclosure and symmetry. The space 
inhabited by the nomad is a type of smooth space, which is characterized by 
relationships of deterritorialization, rather than reterritorialization. In terms of 
thinking about the differences between women, then, a nomadic model of the self 
can be seen as a way of respecting multiplicity in its own terms, without folding 
it back into the constraints of a logic of the same. 
At the level of the constituent elements of a sense of self, Braidotti evokes the 
nomad as a way of capturing the simultaneity of a variety of 'axes of 
differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, age and others' in the 
constitution of subjectivity (Braidotti, 1994, p. 4). For her, therefore, it is an 
important way of imagining a female feminist subject while respecting the space 
for ethnic and racial differences between women. She also evokes the nomadic 
mode as a feminist method of practice that will allow for united action across 
those differences, while respecting racial, ethnic or cultural specificities. 
Here again, Braidotti evokes Deleuze's concepts of nomadic becoming and 
deterritorializing 'lines of flight'. A Deleuzian approach, she argues, stresses 
emphatic proximity and intensive interconnectedness, while resisting any notion 
of a centre, originary site or authentic identity, notions that can lead to movements 
of imitation, reproduction and appropriation. 'Some states or experiences can 
merge simply because they share certain attributes' (pp. 5-6). For Braidotti, one of 
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the historical tasks of the feminist as nomad is to 'restore a sense of 
intersubjectivity that would allow for the recognition of differences to create a 
new kind of bonding, in an inclusive (i. e. nonexclusionary) manner' (p. 36). 
Braidotti calls this process a collective 'becoming polyglot' in which feminists can 
become fluent in a variety of styles and disciplinary angles and in 
many different dialects, jargons, languages, thereby relinquishing 
the image of sisterhood in the sense of a global similarity of all 
women qua second sex in favor of the recognition of the 
complexity of the serniotic and material conditions in which 
women operate. (p. 36) 
In linking the figuration of nomad to the multiplicity of languages, and to the 
complex interrelations between the discursive and the material, Braidotti again 
echoes a Deleuzian move that contests a unitary focus on Language as a system: 
there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic 
universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs and specialized 
languages. [ ... 
] There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover 
by a dominant language within a political multiplicity. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988, p. 7) 
At the level of questions of agency, Braidotti argues for a nomadic style because 
for her it captures the need to recognize the distinctions between conscious and 
unconscious processes and the interconnections between both of these and power 
(Braidotti, 1994, p. 3 1). It is important at this point to clarify how Braidotti uses 
the terms subjectivity and identity, since her usage is rather atypical of feminist 
theorists. Throughout Nomadic Subjects, Braidotti returns to the point that it is 
important to distinguish between 'subjectivity in the sense of historical agency, 
and political and social entitlement' (p. 163), and identity, which, for her, is linked 
to desire, the politics of the personal, and which especially, 'bears a privileged 
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bond to unconscious processes' (p. 166). For Braidotti, the nomadic mode 
expresses the need to respect both levels, as well as the need to develop points of 
transition and overlapping between them, to 'negotiate between unconscious 
structures of desire and conscious political choices' (p. 3 1). 
Braidotti makes strong claims for the nomad to both embrace the transformative 
possibilities and correct the perceived shortcomings of other feminist alternative 
figurations. She claims that her nomad is like Haraway's cyborg, but equipped 
with an unconscious and a psychoanalytic pedigree which Haraway resists. She 
is also Irigaray's 'mucous', or 'divine', but 'endowed with a multicultural 
perspective' (p. 3 6). The nomad's route is indeed far-ranging, enlisting under her 
banner a variety of projects, from de Lauretis' 'eccentric subjects', to Laurie 
Anderson's performance art, to the cockroach-eating G. H of Clarice Lispector's 
novels. 
Yet I find Braidotti's figuration of the nomad, who 'has no passport - or has too 
many of them' (p. 33) disturbing, particularly when looked at closely in terms of 
the space it leaves for differences between women. I want to examine the 
problems in this respect from two angles: first, in terms of the status of the nomad 
herself as described by Braidotti; and second, in terms of Braidotti's methodology 5 
in privileging the nomad. On both levels, I want to argue that Braidotti's nomad 
fails to thoroughly think through the differences that race, nation and other 
community identities might make to her model. 
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2. THE NOMAD AND A POLITICS OF LOCATION 
As we have seen, one of Braidotti's reasons for privileging the nomad is to 
capture the complexity of the many differences between women. But the 
figuration of nomad, as Braidotti has drawn it, begins to cause problems as soon 
as we start thinking about the specificities of those differences. Braidotti's nomad 
is all about mobility: 
All that counts is the going, the process, the passing. (p. 170) 
The nomad is only passing through: s/he makes those necessarily 
situated connections that can help her/him to survive, but s/he 
never takes on fully the limits of one national, fixed identity. The 
nomad has no passport - or has too many of them. (p. 33) 
Nomadism [ ... 
] is [ 
... 
] an acute awareness of the nonfixity of 
boundaries. It is the intense desire to go on trespassing, 
transgressing. (p. 36) 
But to put all the emphasis on the going, on the transgressing of boundaries, is to 
sidestep the question of place in the construction of a sense of self And to simply 
sidestep the question of place makes it particularly difficult to engage seriously 
with the kinds of differences that race, nation and ethnicity can make for women. 
To be marked by one's race or ethnicity, as are women of colour and'postcolonial' 
women in a world which takes whiteness and Western-ness as the invisible, 
unmarked norms, is to be 'placed' in ways that Braidotti's nomad never is. Also, 
as we saw in Part One, women's particular relationship to place can 
be key to the 
emergence of specific raced and national identities. One can work to complicate 
that placing, to undermine the apparent unity and fixity of that 
location, to explore 
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what Paul Gilroy has called the creative tension between 'roots and routes' 
(Gilroy, 1993, p. 13 3), but one cannot simply forget about 'roots' and take to the 
road. 
That Braidotti is aware of this problem with her paradigm is indicated by her 
attempt to graft a 'politics of location' and a notion of 'situatedness' - which she 
recognizes is not in itself a nomadic concept (Braidotti, 1994, p. 32) - onto the 
nomadic framework. Indeed, each of the three passages quoted above is either 
preceded or followed by mediating or qualifying statements that attempt to bridge 
the gap between what Donna Haraway calls 'views from somewhere' and the 
nomad's delight in her permanent dis-location on the road. But these always 
remain general statements, and Braidotti never follows through on her 
commitment to a politics of location that involves a specific 'attention to and 
accountability for differences among women' (ibid, p. 2 1) by actually engaging 
in any detail with, for example, the ways in which Black or postcolonial. feminists 
work with notions of place in the construction of gendered-raced-national 
identities. 
Without this kind of detailed engagement, which I think would significantly alter 
the content of her concept of nomad itself, Braidotti's version of a politics of 
location remains little more than a gesture towards recognizing differences 
without having them trouble the patterns of her wanderings. And it is hard not to 
see those wanderings as just a bit too comfortable. I understand that for Braidotti 
the nomad is a fiction that allows us to think a politics of 'as if, to begin to break 
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away from the actual constraints of predominant theoretical paradigms and power 
relations, and not simply a description of the way we can simply be by choice. 
But to speak of having 'no passport, or too many', of being able to pick and 
choose the connections one finds most useful, of never taking on'fully the limits 
of one national, fixed identity' (p. 33) strikes me as a fiction that can only emerge 
from a position of considerable privilege at a number of levels. There is, of 
course, the suggestion of class privilege that allows for the purely joyful and 
voluntary mobility of the nomad as high-flying academic, which has little in 
common with the forced, or at least more uncomfortable and complicated 
trajectories of migrants, exiles, and others who travel without tenure. But I would 
also argue that Braidotti's figuration emerges from an unexamined race- and 
nation-inflected privilege as well. Put simply, it is so much easier for white 
Westerners to refuse the limits of fixed racial or national identities, when 
'whiteness' and Vestern-ness' continue to function as the invisible, unmarked 
norms that don't seem to fix identity at all. There is a crucial difference between 
Braidotti's nomad who is'only passing through'(p. 33) the various locations on her 
itinerary, and a theoretical approach which begins by rigorously examining its 
own location in terms of gender, race, nation, etcetera, and then works to 
undennine the apparent unity and fixity of that location. 
Maria Lugones identifies two different approaches to what she calls 'world' 
travelling, by which she means the acquired flexibility of shifting between 
different constructions of life in which the self may feel more or less at home 
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(Lugones, 1990, p. 390). For Lugones, 'world' travelling is a necessary skill for the 
outsider, but it is also something that those at ease in the mainstream can exercise. 
The outsider is often compelled to travel to hostile 'worlds', but this should not 
obscure the enabling possibilities that the skill to 'play' across worlds can embody. 
What is important for Lugones, however, is what kind of play is at stake. 
Lugones distinguishes between agonistic and loving playfulness. Agonistic play 
is all about competence: it takes pleasure from knowing the rules and from feeling 
at ease to compete and to overcome the uncertainty of different worlds (ibid, 
p. 399). Loving playfulness across worlds takes a different kind of risk: it involves 
sustaining an openness to being changed by the worlds one travels to, and to 
changing the ways in which one understands those who live there (pp. 401-2). 
In Deleuzian terms, competence is part of the tree logic of reproduction and 
tracing (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, pp. 12-3), of travelling in order to 
reterritorialize. As Caren Kaplan has remarked in a different context, those from 
the mainstream who play across worlds without recognizing that they travel with 
'all [their] cultural baggage intact' or that there is no pure deterritorialization, run 
the risk of engaging in theoretical tourism (Caplan, 1987, p. 19 1). In stressing that 
'all that counts is the going', Braidotti runs the risk of revelling in her nomad's 
competence to travel across worlds, without sufficiently attending to how and 
why she travels, where she comes from, and what she takes with her. 
Indeed, if Braidotti had taken this question of location more seriously, another 
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version of the nomad might have been privileged. As Eleanor Porter has argued: 
the nomad survives, not through 'transitory attachment' to the 
land, as Braidotti suggests, but on the contrary through intimacy 
with it. Rather than flying endlessly over undifferentiated space 
the nomad travels with specific needs across landscapes she or he 
can know and use. [ ... ] The nomad must be aware of herself as a being that dwells in space, that is dependent upon that space, 
whose sense of self is built through interaction with a highly 
differentiated and storied environment. Narratives of identity then 
grow out of this engagement with local space. (Porter, 1995, p. 9) 
Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari argue that'[i]t is [ ... ] false to define the nomad by 
movement' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 3 8 1). Rather, 'the nomad distributes 
himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, holds that space' (ibid). 
What is important then, even within the terms of a Deleuzian project, is not'the 
going', but a different kind of relationship with the space one inhabits, that resists 
the striations of binary logic. Other appropriations of the nomadic subject have 
placed more emphasis than Braidotti on the necessary tension between a located 
identity and the openness to movement and change. In Lawrence Grossberg's 
version, for example: 
The nomadic subject is amoeba-like, struggling to win some space 
for itself in its local context. While its shape is always determined 
by its nomadic articulations, it always has a shape which is itself 
effective. (Grossberg, 1988, cited in Woolf, 1995, p. 119) 
A second way in which the dis-location of Braidotti's nomad suggests an 
unexamined privilege is in her relation to the polis. Recalling the etymological 
origins of the term nomad, Braidotti argues that 'noumos [plot of land] is a 
principle of distribution of the land and as such it came to represent the 
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opposition of the power of the polis because it was a space without enclosures or 
borders [ ... ] Metropolitan space versus nomadic trajectories' (Braidotti, 1994, 
p. 27). Adopting Deleuze's opposition of the smooth space of nomadism to the 
stratified civil space of the State (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, pp. 351-423), 
Braidotti suggests a possible privileged position for the nomad outside the 
structures and constraints of power relations. Deleuze and Guattari's warning, 
'Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us' (ibid, p. 500) seems to 
have been forgotten as Braidotti instead presents the smooth space of the nomad 
as just such an unproblernatised site of salvation. 
So, for example, Braidotti criticizes Seyla Benhabib for her figuration of the 
critical feminist intellectual as the exile camping outside the city gates. For 
Braidotti, the temporary exile who seeks eventual readmission to the citylpolis on 
new tenns suggests a 'diaspora of the chosen few; she counterposes it to her 
image of 'active nomadism' as 'a massive abandonment of the logocentric polis, 
the alleged "center" of the empire, on the part of critical and resisting thinking 
beings' (Braidotti, 1994, p. 32). But whatever the problems with Benhabib's 
project to reform the project of modemity and its moral and political 
universalisms (Benhabib, 1992, p. 2), which cannot be discussed here, her 
emphasis on 'situatedness' within specific power relations and social systems is 
something that Braidotti's nomad allows to slip away. There is a difference 
between asserting one's 'nonconfidence in the capacity of the polis to undo the 
power foundations on which it rests' (Braidotti, 1994, p. 32), with which I would 
sympathize, and thinking that it is ever possible to strategically or symbolically 
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'abandon' the polis, to find an unsullied space that already functions 'according to 
different rules and designs' (ibid). Braidotti makes the noumos-polis opposition 
too absolute, and the claim for a massive nomadic abandonment of the polis is 
simply too strong. Are the 'masses' really outside the polis and can the nomads 
so easily get them there, especially if they never go inside the city gates to find 
them? 
3. PRIVILEGING 
METHODOLOGY 
THE NOMAD: BRAIDOTTI'S 
As we saw earlier, Braidotti privileges the Deleuzian style of 'nomadic becoming' 
as one of her ways into the question of respecting the differences between 
women, of identifying those experiences that 'merge simply because they share 
certain attributes' (ibid, pp. 5-6) while resisting acts of reterritorialization or 
appropriation. But knowing when attributes are 'simply shared' is not simple: it 
requires an attentiveness to the specificity and complexity of each difference. To 
do this it is not enough, as Braidotti suggests, to be clear and explicit about one's 
own location, one's own experiences of deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
(p. 6), although, as we shall see in the next section, we can also question the 
degree to which Braidotti is explicit about her own location. While Braidotti 
states that she wants to avoid romanticizing or appropriating the exotic, or the 
other, I do not think she has given herself the tools to do it. 
Precisely because of the ever-present multiplicity and interconnectedness she 
celebrates, each particular 'embodied genealogy'(p. 6) includes its connectedness 
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to practices and discourses that are contested from other subject-positions. This 
is important when feminists seek to establish 'rhizomatic connections' with anti- 
racist and postcolonial theorists in refiguring the place of gender, race and 
national differences in new models of the self or alternative subjectivities. We 
need to know enough about those other locations so that we do not come up with 
new figurations that simply appropriate or reterritorialize in new ways. Equally, 
in foregrounding a particular figuration, such as the nomad, it is important not to 
do so in ways that de-authorize other figurations that, from other subject- 
positions, are seen as productive ways into theorizing questions of the self, 
identity and agency. I think there are a number of occasions when Braidotti is 
guilty of this. 
An example of this appears in her book's introductory essay, 'By Way of 
Nomadism'. Braidotti begins by stressing the importance of developing relations 
between women based on respect and understanding of differences, using the 
example of white intellectuals (like herself) and the 'domestic foreigners' in 
Europe who are either migrants or exiles (pp. 21-22). But her text then shifts into 
a celebration of the nomad, a celebration that is in part achieved through pointing 
out the limitations of the 'exile' and the 'migrant' as alternative liberatory 
figurations. Since she is the only nomad in the text at this point, it is very difficult 
not to read this as reinforcing a hierarchy in which the First World feminist stands 
above those Third World women and women of colour who are migrants and 
exiles. 
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Braidotti also reveals here her lack of attention to the ways that terms might be 
contested in a postcolonial mode. Her dismissal of the image of the traveller as 
'banal and hegemonic' (p. 24) jars with the work of Paul Gilroy who argues against 
'the folly of assigning uncoerced or recreational travel experiences only to whites 
while viewing black people's experiences of displacement and relocation 
exclusively through the very different types of travelling undergone by refugees, 
migrants and slaves' (Gilroy, 1993, p. 133). For Gilroy, the history of what he has 
termed the 'black Atlantic' includes an important tradition of writers and thinkers 
who associate questions of self-exploration with the exploration of new 
territories, and who ground their theory in the fruitful tensions between'roots and 
routes' (ibid). 
Similarly, Braidotti oversimplifies the complex concept of the diaspora which has 
proved so important to many black and postcolonial theorists when she 
reductively locates 'diasporic' thinking within a simple framework of nostalgia for 
a lost origin (Braidotti, 1994, p. 24). In contrast, Gilroy privileges the idea of 
diaspora, as an intermediate concept that helps to 'break the dogmatic focus on 
discrete national dynamics which has characterised so much modem Euro- 
American cultural thought' (Gilroy, 1993, p. 6). Analogously, Avtar Brah uses the 
concepts of diaspora and 'diaspora space', precisely in order to critique the kinds 
of discourse of fixed origins that Braidotti claims are part of 'diasporic thinking' 
(Brah, 1996, p. 180). For Brah, the concept of diaspora takes'account of a homing 
desire which is not the same thing as desire for a "homeland... (ibid); it thus holds 
together questions of location and dislocation. The concept of diaspora space, in 
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which both 'native' and 'migrant' are implicated, also problematises the question 
of origins, by stressing the 'entanglement of genealogies of dispersion with those 
of "staying put"' (ibid, p. 18 1). 
Gilroy's and Brah's projects are as much about unsettling and dispensing with 
dualisms as Braidotti's nomadism is. However, because these two theorists of the 
diaspora are working from different specific subject-positions, in which race and 
national differences cannot ever be set aside, they privilege a concept that 
Braidotti dismisses. There is a certain irony in a self-proclaimed polyglot nomad, 
who relishes her position between several languages (Braidotti, 1994, p. 12) not 
recognizing sufficiently that feminists, anti-racists and postcolonial theorists may 
not all speak the same language, and may contest meanings among themselves. 
In her reductive reading of exiles and migrants, Braidotti makes an exception for 
the 'postcolonial. position'; but this also is based on a too-simple reading of a 
highly contested and complex figuration. Braidotti says that both the exile and the 
migrant are caught in nostalgic and debilitating relationships with time. In 
contrast, because the postcolonial condition is linked to movements of political 
resistance: 
time is not frozen for the postcolonial subject, and the memory of 
the past is not a stumbling block that hinders access to a changed 
present. Quite the contrary, the ethical impulse that sustains the 
postcolonial mode makes the original culture into a living 
experience, one that functions as a standard of reference. (ibid, 
p. 25) 
Braidotti's only reference for this sweeping statement is an article by Gayatri 
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Spivak on The Satanic Verses (Spivak, 1990). But the relationship between time 
and the 'postcolonial mode' is a point of great contestation within postcolonial 
theory. As we saw in Part One, for many postcolonial theorists, it is precisely the 
problematising of questions of time, origin, pre-colonial culture or tradition, 
rather than their certainty as reference point, that is emblematic of the 
postcolonial condition. 
Thus, whilst appearing to embrace the insights of postcolonial theory in her 
project, Braidotti has in fact oversimplified those insights to the point of 
misreading them. This over-simplification, like the de-authorizing of important 
concepts discussed earlier, suggests that Braidotti has not sufficiently armed 
herself against the dangers of reterritorialization that she identifies. These 
problems in methodology can, I believe, be linked both to her speaking/writing 
position, and to the theoretical assumptions underpinning her brand of sexual- 
difference feminism. In both cases, I will argue, Braidotti closes down the open- 
ended possibilities of her nomadism by failing to take issues of race and nation 
differences between women sufficiently into account. 
4. WHO IS SPEAKING HERV: THE SPEAKING/WRITING 
SUBJECT OF NOMADIC SUBJECTS 
Braidotti introduces her book., and her concept of nomadism, through her own 
In addition to those already discussed in Chapter One, such as Chakravarti (1990), Mani 
(1990) and Sangari and Vaid (1990), see Bhabha (1990), Chakrabarty (1992), Loomba 
(1991) and Sangari (1987). 
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autobiographical experience as structurally displaced. She says that her multi- 
lingual experience has left her in no stable relationship to language, evoking 
Kristeva's view that the state of translation is the common condition of all 
thinking beings. Her own nomadism between a number of countries and cultures 
has also, she says, left her with no stable relationship to a fixed identity (Braidotti, 
1994, p. 12). But Braidotti's lack of fixity in linguistic and cultural terms is still 
always from a position of relative privilege - her whiteness, her Europeanness - 
however careful she may be at times to deconstruct the apparent unity of these 
terms (ibid, p. 9). What concerns me is a tendency to elide all displacements, 
deterritorializations and nomadisms together, without giving them the benefit of 
their own complexity, and without examining the implications of her own 
position of privilege. 
An example of the ways in which Braidotti's speaking/writing position closes 
down the question of differences between women can be found in her chapter 
'Sexual Difference as a Nomadic Political Project'. This chapter begins badly, as 
Braidotti first lists over a dozen US-based black and postcolonial feminists in 
three sentences and accompanying footnotes, and then refers to them as 'ethnic 
and colonial thinkers' (p. 155). The latter designation suggests a stunning 
insensitivity to the meanings these terms bear in anti-racist and anti-imperialist 
movements, and is another example of the carelessness with terms discussed 
earlier. We might, perhaps, give Braidotti the benefit of the doubt, and assume 
that an intended 'postcolonial' was turned into 'colonial' by careless proofreading. 
But the 'ethnic' designation suggests that Braidotti believes that only non-white 
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and non-Westem people have 'ethnicities'. 
The undifferentiated listing also repeats a move which occurs all too frequently 
among white Western feminists approaching questions of race and nation, and 
that is to lump together widely varying projects under the same rubric. To assume 
that simply because the feminists concerned are all US-based'women of colour', 
or more offensively, 'ethnic and colonial thinkers'. they also automatically share 
theoretical starting points, methodologies or overall approaches is to deny these 
women the 'privilege of complexity' that white Europeans have denied their 
'others' since colonial times (Mani, 1992a). In producing lists in this way, rather 
than selectively engaging in some detail with the very different ideas these 
women are developing, there is no way that uninitiated readers can get any sense 
of either the richness of debate within black and postcolonial ferninisms, or of 
their pertinence to white Western feminists. 
Braidotti then moves on to briefly discuss the focus on feminism, race and 
ethnicity in Europe. She argues that the issue of race and ethnicity has been more 
difficult to articulate in Europe than in the US, 'partly because national 
differences in brands and styles of feminist political cultures have always been so 
great that no one dominant feminist line or standpoint has ever emerged' 
(Braidotti, 1994, p. 155). But this apparent explanation, on closer examination, 
proves to be no explanation at all. Does Braidotti want to argue that it takes some 
kind of monolithic feminist hegemony to focus the mind enough to produce 
critiques of racism or ethnocentrism? If so, such a position presumes a level of 
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homogeneity that has never existed within US feminism and, more importantly, 
erases the significance of anti-racist and anti-colonial/imperialist movements in 
putting these issues on everyone's agenda, including the agendas of feminism. 
Or does she think that feminism needs to sort out 'its' theory and agenda first, 
before it can deal with these complicating factors of race and ethnicity? If so, this 
is precisely the type of attitude black and postcolonial feminists around the world 
have been contesting for at least two decades - that feminism is a white Western 
project to which other women will be asked to contribute, but on 'our' terms and 
at'our' invitation. 
Braidotti's only examples of pre- I 990's feminist consideration of issues of race 
and ethnicity in Europe leave the assumptions of her own brand of feminism 
unexamined. She speaks of the resistance by southern European feminists to the 
'hegemony of English-style feminism' and its focus on 'gender', and argues that 
it is this resistance which helped put ethnicity and race on the agenda of feminist 
practice (p. 156). Bewilderingly, as an example of this, she cites (American 
feminist theorist) Elizabeth Spelman's critique of de Beauvoir's treatment of 
issues of race (see Spelman, 1990, ch. 3). If Braidotti could not find a continental 
European feminist critique of racism within feminism to cite (and if there are 
none, she should be asking why), she could at least have turned to the work of 
black British feminists, or to feminists working within continental Europe's 
former and neo-colonies. 
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Indeed, Braidotti seems to have forgotten how central colonialism and racism 
have been to Europe and European thought for centuries. Thus, she suggests that: 
More recently, as a reaction to the multicultural nature of 
contemporary European societies, and also to widespread increase 
of racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and neo-colonialism in the 
European community, the focus on race issues has become 
sharper. (Braidotti, 1994, p. 156, emphasis added) 
Such a statement simply ignores the work of many postcolonial and anti-racist 
theorists, like Said (1978) or Gilroy (1994) who argue that orientalism and racism 
must be seen as not merely accompanying certain periods of European history, 
but rather as part of the constitutive ground of modem Western European thought. 
While it is admirable that Braidotti's Women's Studies Department in Utrecht is 
involved in an inter-European exchange network committed to analyzing 
specifically European issues of race and ethnicity (Braidotti, 1994, p. 15 6), 1 see 
nothing in her discussion of this work that points to an awareness that racism, 
(neo)colonialism and ethnocentrism may have left their traces within European 
feminism as well. Race and ethnicity are important for analyzing the 'out there': 
'anti-Semitism, the persecution of gypsies and other nomads, the various forms 
of economic neo-colonialism and phenomena such as intra-European migration' 
and their effects on women and their identities (ibid, p. 15 6). However, they seem 
less pertinent categories of analysis for interrogating the assumptions 'in here' that 
ground feminist theory. The question Braidotti never asks is the self-reflexive 
one: is there anything about the racial/national (white, European) positioning of 
sexual difference theorists that makes it easy for them to presume the primacy of 
sex, as the ontological difference at the heart of signification and subjectivity, and 
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to leave relatively unexplored their own unmarked categories of race and nation? 
5. THE PLACE FOR RACE AND NATION WITHIN SEXUAL 
DIFFERENCE FEMINISM 
Braidotti's apparent resistance to questioning her own starting assumptions and 
exclusions continues when she moves on to delineate what she means by a 
nomadic feminism of sexual difference (pp. 15 8-167). At the outset, she asserts 
a desire to redefine female subjectivity so that it captures 'notions of the self as 
process, complexity, interrelatedness, postcolonial simultaneities of oppression 
and the multi-layered technology of the self (p. 15 7, emphasis added). However, 
as Braidotti develops her argument, she allows the focus on race and nation to slip 
away, and this is despite her insistence that identity is a site of differences, 
including variables of sex, race, class, etcetera. How does this happen? 
Braidotti works to insert race and ethnic differences between women by 
proposing a three-level cartography of sexual difference. For Braidotti these three 
levels refer to 'different structures of subjectivity, but also different moments in 
the process of becoming-subject' (p. 158). As such they are not necessarily 
sequential, and may well exist simultaneously. She describes these three levels 
of sexual difference as: (1) differences between men and women; (2) differences 
among women; and (3) differences within each woman. 
Level one involves exposing the move that links the masculine to the universal 
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and that constructs 'Woman' as devalorised other to that male-identified universal 
(p. 15 9). The feminist response at this level is to 'assert the specificity of the lived, 
female bodily experience' (p. 160), and to refuse for women the position of 
'Woman' as man's other. It also entails a refusal of 'homologation', i. e., 
emancipation on the model of 'masculine' modes of thought, practice and values 
(p. 160). Level two involves a deepening of the analysis by an insistence that 
'Woman-as-other' does not correspond to 'real-life women' who are rather 
characterized by, among other things, their embodiment, situatedness, and a 
multiplicity of differences. Thus it is at level two that Braidotti first brings 
questions of race, nation, etcetera into her framework (p. 163). 
Level three involves developing a model of the 'female feminist subject' as a 
multiplicity in herself, in which both conscious subjectivity and unconscious 
identity interplay, and in which such multiple variables of identity as 'class, race, 
age, sexual choices' (p. 165) are seen as 'successive identifications, that is to say 
unconscious internalized images that escape rational control' (p. 166). 
There are at least three problems with this three-level model. The first is the 
uncritical reliance on a psychoanalytic account of how subjects are constituted, 
that underpins each level. Nowhere is it recognized that the privilege given to sex 
in the psychoanalytic account of subject-constitution might be problematic for 
considering other differences, and that this account is a contested one. I am not 
saying that the psychoanalytic account can never deal adequately with other 
differences. We have already seen how many of Irigaray's guerilla forays into the 
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Lacanian model can produce resonances with postcolonial feminisms, and how 
Butler works to insert race into the centre of the Lacanian symboli&. But it seems 
to me that anyone working within this framework, and aware of the criticisms of 
racism and ethnocentrism within feminism, needs to recognize that such accounts 
will be contested. Braidotti does not seem to feel this need. I will return to this 
point later. 
The second, related problem is that when Braidotti comes to talk about the 
differences between women, she has nothing specific to say about the difference 
race or efluiicity may make. In fact, after making some general statements about 
the need to recognize that women are not all the same, and on the importance of 
a politics of location (p. 163), Braidotti moves back to look at the way in which 
a few white Western feminists deconstruct and challenge the concept of Woman 
(p. 164). Her examples here are de Lauretis, Butler, Irigaray and Wittig. The 
absence of any discussion of the differences between women at Level One is 
problematic as well. As I discussed in Part One, many Indian feminists would 
argue that race and nation do make a difference to the ways in which 'Woman' is Cp 
posited as 'Man's other', and in which 'Man' hides behind assumptions of the 
universal. These moves can work through institutions, discourses and practices 
that are as much structured by the categories of race and nation as they are by sex, 
but this consideration is absent from Braidotti's Level One. 
There is a growing body of literature within Black feminisms, and increasingly within 
postcolonial feminisms, on the question of race and psychoanalytic models. See, for 
example, Abel, Christian et. al. eds. (1997), Seshadri-Crooks (1994) and Spillers (1987 
and 1996). 
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It is in her chapter'The Politics of Ontological Difference' that Braidotti begins 
to make more explicit what I have argued she has been suggesting up to this 
point: that sexual difference is prior to all other differences, and that all other 
differences can be productively subsumed under the umbrella of sexual 
difference. For Braidotti, sexual difference is ontological: 'For me, "being in the 
world" means already "being sexed, " so that if "I" am not sexed, "I" am not at all' 
(pp. 175-6). The question for feminism then becomes 'how to connect the 
"differences within" each woman to a political practice that requires mediation 
of the "differences among" women, so as to enact and implement sexual 
difference' (p. 180). Braidotti's argues that 'My "being-a-woman" just like my 
"being-in-language" and "being-mortal" is one of the constitutive elements of my 
subjectivity' (p. 18 6). And it is only once this is established, that we can take up 
the question of differences between women: 
The recognition of the sameness of our gender, all other 
differences taken into account, is a sufficient and necessary 
condition to make explicit a bond among women that is more than 
the ethics of solidarity and altogether other than the sharing of 
common interests. Once this bond is established [ ... 
] the basis is 
set for the elaboration of other values, of different representations 
of our common difference. (p. 186) 
But how useful is it to locate the differences between women (or within each 
woman) under the general umbrella of sexual difference? However careful one 
is to remember to mention the other differences, it does seem to suggest a certain 
prior existence, or privileged status to sexual difference. This makes sense if one 
accepts a Lacanian account of the constitution of the subject in language, but not 
if one questions this account as the only possible description of how we come to 
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be selves in language and in society. This is the great 'unsaid' in Braidotti's 
project, and yet it seems to me to be vital for any feminist working to open up the 
space for differences between women. 
If we take differences between women seriously, then we need to recognize that, 
for many women, being-a-woman, being-in-language and being-mortal are not the 
only constitutive elements of their subjectivity. Being raced, or being marked by 
both the discursive-symbolic and bodily-material codes of Particular national, 
ethnic or religious communities may also be fundamentally constitutive of 
subjectivity. And it is precisely the'bond of common gender'that is blocked until 
these 'other differences' are 'taken into account. While Braidotti has recognized 
that black and postcolonial feminists have problems with the sexual difference 
approach, 'for its globalizing tendency that cancels out all other differences by 
submitting them to its overarching importance', she has never done more than 
'regret not being able to pursue' this critique in her writing (Braidotti, 1994b, 
p. 170). But this response itself suggests that Braidotti is still seeing the question 
of those 'other differences' as something that needs to be added onto a pre-existing 
theoretical framework, rather than as evidence of a need to move beyond 
prevailing paradigms. 
The third problem with this approach, which I will discuss in the final section, is 
the underlying model of language that Braidotti turns to, and the way she 
positions desire, reason, the unconscious and resistance in relation to this model 
oflanguage. 
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6. THE UNIVOCAL POLYGLOT? 
As we saw in section one, Braidotti's evocation of the nomad as polyglot seems 
to agree with a Deleuzian focus on a multiplicity of languages rather than a 
universal system of Language, and on the ways in which languages intersect with 
'diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc. ) that bring into play 
not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status' 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 7). This could have been an entry point to 
redressing some of the difficulties that occur when feminist theorists work with 
a singular model of language that focusses primarily on exclusion. 
Thinking about the feminist as polyglot could also have offered a site from which 
Braidotti might move away from the Lacanian model of entry into language and 
subjectivity, which, as we saw above, leads to a privileging of sexual difference 
over all other differences. Instead, Braidotti takes the figuration of the nomad as 
polyglot in quite a different direction, one which reinstates a univocal model of 
language that in turn closes down the space in which to consider both women's 
complexity and their possibilities of resistance. 
One way that Braidotti does this is by linking her own experience as polyglot to 
the arbitrariness of language. She begins by charting her own multilingual 
trajectory from Italy, through Australia and France to the Netherlands (pp. 8-12). 
ý11 However, the important point for heraDOUt living between a number of languages 
becomes, not the specificities of different languages, but rather the way they are 
all the same in their arbitrariness (Braidotti, 1994, pp. 14-5). She holds on to the 
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Lacanian view that 'all tongues carry the name of the father and are stamped by 
its register' (ibid, p. 11). It is this kind of univocal 'being-in-language' that 
Braidotti evokes in her problematic privileging of sexual difference discussed 
above. If 'being-a-woman' always means 'being-in-language' in this way, then 
where is multiplicity to be found? 
For Braidotti, the 'key notion to understanding multiple identity is desire, that is 
to say unconscious processes' (p. 14). Language and the 'imperialism of rational 
thought' (p. 198) need to cover over the excess that is pre-discursive, pre- 
conscious affectivity and desire, and what Braidotti refers to as the non-thought 
at the heart of thinking (p. 14). It is these 'unconscious internalized images that 
escape rational control' (p. 166) which can point to the 'steps, the shifts, and the 
points of exit that would make it possible for women to move beyond the 
phallogocentric gender dualism' (p. 170). Following this language model then 
means that both multiplicity and resistance are to be found in some space at the 
edge of language, consciousness and reason. 
As in her unproblematized celebration of the nomad space as a kind of power-free 
zone, Braidotti seems to be celebrating unconscious desire as the pre-discursive 
foundation for a new model of the subject that takes multiplicity as its starting 
point (p. 198). But this brings us back to that binary logic in which language only 
works through excluding multiplicity and indeterminacy, and which posits an 
foutside' as the only possible space of resistance. As a feminist project for 
rethinking identity, this can turn attention away from the differences between 
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women in two ways. First, by positing some pure space of unproblematic 
multiplicity that is 'outside' language and the polis, it turns attention away from 
the complex intersections of discourses, material practices and social institutions 
in which specific differences emerge. Second, it can disarm feminists into 
thinking that their resistance is safe from the dangers of reimporting those power 
relations into their projects. In Braidotti's project, we see both of these dangers 
materialized; she neither has anything very specific to say about differences of 
race, nation and other community identities, nor does she remain attentive to the 
ways in which she re-centres the white Western feminist subject in the name of 
nomadism. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that Rosi Braidotti's project to rethink identity 
through the figuration of the nomad fails to follow through on its promise to 
maintain a double focus on women and their differences. Braidotti's difficulties 
emerge from her failure to take the question of location adequately into account, 
on a number of levels. First, while the Deleuzian image of the nomad might have 
led her to rethink the tenns within which location and dis-location are related, 
Braidotti opts instead for a pure celebration of dislocation. This closes down her 
project from engaging with some of the most important insights of postcolonial 
feminisms. 
Second, Braidotti fails to take her own locatedness sufficiently into account, both 
in terms of the ways her celebration of the nomad re-centres the experiences of 
white Western women, and in terms of her failure to question the privileging of 
sexual difference over differences of race, nation, etcetera in her model of 
identity. Third, by locating resistance in a space outside language and power 
relations she fails to break out of the inclusion/exclusion paradigm of a logic of 
dualisms to a more complex model of identity and difference. 
One of the feminist theorists Braidotti claims to draw inspiration from in her 
development of 'sexual difference as a nomadic political project' (p. 146) is Donna 
Haraway. Haraway too begins from a desire for a feminist theory of difference 
that breaks out of a logic of binaries in order to hold sex, gender, race and other 
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differences analytically together. In the next chapter, I discuss how her approach 
to this challenge differs fundamentally from Braidotti's and opens up possibilities 
that Braidotti closes off. 
198 
Chapter Six 
DONNA HARAWAY'S PROMISING 
MONSTERS 
INTRODUCTION 
At the start of this thesis I quoted Donna Haraway as she argued that feminist 
theory and politics will always have trouble holding together sex/gender, race 
and other identity categories without 'a theory of "difference" whose 
geometries, paradigms, and logics break out of binaries, dialectics and 
nature/culture models of any kind' (Haraway, 1991, p. 129). Haraway's 
arithmetical challenge to feminism - that it learn to 'count to four' - is a call 
to think about paradigm shifts that would problematise many of the assumptions 
about ontology, power and language that much of feminist theory still takes as 
its starting points. 
Thus, while her work has many points of convergence with that of Irigaray, 
Butler, and Braidotti, I will argue in this chapter that Haraway's project is also 
a highly distinctive one within Western feminist theory. Where Irigaray, Butler 
and Braidotti, in different ways, work to unsettle the stability of dualistic 
systems of thought, Haraway works to elaborate an alternative system that 
embodies a different logic altogether. 
Where Irigaray aims to locate the transgressive excess that can jam the 
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theoretical machinery of Language as a system, Haraway argues that a more 
complex and unstable field already exists in which languages, codes and 'cyborg 
noise' intertwine. Where Butler discounts any move to ontology as reinstating 
a logic of pure origins and stable, pre-discursive identities, Haraway argues for 
a redefined ontology of impurity, based on 'mutation, metamorphosis and 
diaspora' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 378), in which it is possible to acknowledge that 
all stories begin, not at a site of pure origin, but 'in the middle' (ibid, p. 280). 
Furthermore, where Braidotti celebrates a dislocated 'line of escape' from a 
logic of dualisms that actually leaves that logic intact, Haraway works with a 
more complicated model that redefines situatedness within impure spaces. 
I argued in Part One that one of the key insights to emerge from a reading of 
Indian feminisms is that women's location within and across identity categories 
such as gender, race and nation cannot be easily contained within binary 
models. In this context, Haraway's attempt to elaborate a different model of 
difference, and her insistence that evidence of such a model already exists, takes 
on particular significance. Whilst not always completely successful, Haraway's 
project to think multiplicity outside a logic of binaries allows her to address 
many of the complications to feminist theoretical approaches to identity and 
differences between women that emerge from my reading of Indian feminisms. 
In this chapter, I discuss four aspects of Haraway's work. I begin by looking 
at the alternative model of the self that emerges from Haraway's efforts to 
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rethink multiplicity outside a geometrics of dualisms. In section two, I discuss 
Haraway's approach to the questions of location and dispersal, and the 
underlying model of power that shapes her insistence on situating both 
knowledges and selves in impure spaces. I then consider the implications of her 
model of situatedness for feminist politics. Section three looks at the ways in 
which Haraway challenges many of the assumptions about language as a system 
that are predominant within Western feminist theory. In the final section, I 
evaluate the degree to which these problematisations in terms of ontology, 
epistemology and politics enable a double focus on 'women' and their 
differences. 
1. COUNTING TO FOUR - THINKING MULTIPLICITY 
OUTSIDE A GEOMIETRICS OF BINARIES 
Writing from the intersecting space of the history of science, political economy 
and feminist theory, Donna Haraway argues that fundamental paradigm shifts 
are already underway in the late 20th century that provide the possibility of 
different ways of conceptualizing the self and difference. These emerging 
paradigm shifts might allow us to rethink the self outside the selflother, 
part/whole framework that has hitherto dominated Western thought. Haraway 
identifies these break-points in current discourses and practices across a wide 
field: in science and technology; in science fiction literature; in the 
reorganization of capitalism in the late 20th century; and in a variety of political 
resistance movements, including feminist politics. 
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Haraway brings these disparate elements together in a writing style that is 
notoriously complex and multi-layered, but which also engages the reader by 
its rich use of irony and playfulness. All this makes Haraway's work 
particularly difficult to summarize, without over-simplifying it in ways that 
suggest a homogeneity across the different fields she incorporates into her 
work. At the same time, there is a tendency in Haraway's work that does lend 
itself to such totalizing readings. For example, when she presents wide-ranging 
lists and tables of the varied human activities that converge to produce a single 
'informatics of domination' or which locate 'women in the integrated circuit', 
it is tempting to conclude that she is arguing that the world always works in one 
way (see Haraway, 199 1, pp. 161-2 and 170-2). 
The repeated use of terminology drawn from militarized communications 
technology, such as CH - command-control-communications-intelligence - can 
suggest that there is a single, monolithic grid on which we are all positioned as 
'code problems' (ibid, p. 175). There is also at times a slippage from 
considering the globalising effects of technological change (which may be 
highly specific and varied in different places) to suggesting a single view of the 
globe. These elements of a grand narrative, with its totalizing claims, actually 
work against Haraway's project for acknowledging complexity by freeing 
difference from the constraints of a logic of dualisms. 
Rather than focus on the Haraway who perhaps tries to make too many 
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connections in order to tell us how things are, I find it more useful to look at 
the Haraway who tells us how things might be. The specific paradigm shifts that 
she identifies in her travels across disciplinary boundaries remain contested and 
contestable models. However, by challenging the logic of the self/other, 
part/whole paradigms from which they emerge, these shifts offer possible ways 
out of those paradigms. Haraway argues that the world has moved beyond the 
'organic, hierarchical dualisms ordering discourse in "the West" since Aristotle 
still ruled' (Haraway, 199 1, p. 163) and that our models need to keep pace. In 
a world in which the codes and standards that process information are in a 
perpetual state of reconstruction, and where, consequently, any component can 
be interfaced with any other, there are no sacred bodies, spaces, or objects 
anymore (p. 163). The self that emerges from these paradigm shifts is both 
'dissassembled and reassembled' and 'collective and personal'. Feminists need 
to learn to code this self outside the familiar frame of dichotomies between mind 
and body, public and private, organism and machine, men and women, etcetera 
(ibid). 
Two key aspects of these alternative models of the self are a problematizing of 
origins, and also of distinctions between inside and outside. As we saw in Part 
One, these are also crucial factors to developing a more complicated 
understanding of women's location within and across identity categories such 
as race and nation. The models that interest Haraway in her search for 
multiplicity outside a frame of dualisms give up the desire for stories about a 
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I pure' origin, and work instead with noise and pollution (ibid, pp. 175-76). They 
are illegitimate couplings that subvert 'the structure and modes of reproduction 
of "Western" identity, of nature and culture, of mirror and eye, slave and 
master, body and mind' (p. 176). 
In a telling contrast to Braidotti's reductive reading of 'ethnic and colonial 
thinkers', Haraway repeatedly engages in detail with the ideas of black and 
postcolonial feminists to suggest who these 'illegitimate' selves might be. She 
often evokes Trinh T. Minh-ha's notion of 'inappropriate/d others', who are 
inappropriate within prevailing paradigms and so, perhaps never fully 
appropriated. Haraway engages with Chicana. feminist retellings of the story of 
Malinche, the indigenous South American woman who was Cortez' first 
interpreter, and who was, as his mistress, 'mother of the mestizo "bastard" race 
of the new world' (p. 175). Reviled within male-centred Chicano, nationalist 
discourse as the whore who bears the shame of conquest and national impurity, 
from a feminist perspective, Malinche can be refigured as a different kind of 
model of the self and of identity that does not depend on access to an original 
language and the right to 'natural' names, father's or mother's. Malinche's 
mastery of the conqueror's language is seen as an illegitimate production that 
ensures a survival of the self, based not on innocence, but on the ability to live 
without a founding myth of original wholeness (see Moraga, 1986, and 
Alarcon, 1994). 
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Haraway also returns often in her writing to the work of black science fiction 
author Octavia Butler. Butler's work is concerned with disturbing the 
boundaries between self and other as they are worked through categories of 
gender, race, species and kind. Haraway is interested in its 'resistance to the 
imperative to recreate the sacred image of the same' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 378), 
in its promise of 'an ontology based on mutation, metamorphosis and diaspora' 
where there is no simple access to origins (ibid). 
Haraway looks to new formulations in areas such as immunology, computer 
communications and the foetal economy to contest the power to define of 
traditional inner/outer, self/other paradigms. In immunology, traditional 
paradigms of the external invader assailing the body's internal defence 
mechanisms are being challenged; instead it is suggested that the molecules of 
the immune system work by mirroring and rehearsing responses to possible 
interactions with other molecules. In such a system, inner/outer distinctions lose 
their power to define (Haraway, 1991, pp. 218-9), and a 'radical conception of 
connection emerges unexpectedly at the core of the defended self' (Haraway, 
1992b, p. 323). 
Computer communications 'break-down' can be re-conceptualized, not as a 
purely negative situation where boundaries break down, but rather as a 
productive moment in which the different components in a network of 
relationships become more visible (Haraway, 1991, pp. 214-5). She also uses 
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the example of the foetal economy which only functions because the immune 
system works to mask rather than expose the foreignness of foetal tissue, so that 
it is accepted by the maternal body (ibid, p. 253, fh8). These new formulations 
in scientific discourse suggest ways of holding on to a notion of self by shifting 
the terms within which it is understood. The fiction of an economy of the same, 
in which contained selves only reach truth by excluding the other, gives way to 
a semi-permeable, but still finite self: 
Immunity can also be conceived in terms of shared specificities; 
of the semi-permeable self able to engage with others (human 
and non-human, inner and outer), but always with finite 
consequences; of situated possibilities and impossibilities of 
individuation and identification; and of partial fusions and 
dangers. (p. 225) 
Haraway's best known counter-model of the semi-permeable self is, of course, 
the cyborg, which has attained a certain cult status both within and beyond 
feminist theory, and which has helped to inspire a variety of brands of 
I cyberfeminism' (see Marsden, 1996). For Haraway, the figure of the cyborg 
emerges at the breakdown of boundaries between human and animal, organism 
and machine, physical and non-physical, nature and culture (Haraway, 1991, 
pp. 150-3). Like Haraway's other counter-models, it both rejects recourse to 
pure unified origins and confounds categorical distinctions. But with the figure 
of the cyborg Haraway also introduces a third challenge to a logic of dualisms. 
She challenges binaries by refusing to assign one term with the status of 
I resource for appropriation or incorporation' for the other (ibid, p. 15 1): 
It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation 
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between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and 
what is body in machines that resolve into coding practices. 
(p. 177) 
Haraway's cyborg is a model that refuses the binary separation into object and 
subject. In dualistic paradigms, the machine might be viewed as the 'object' 
upon which the human 'subject' acts. For Haraway, that 'object' is rather 
always 'an actor and agent, not a screen, or a ground or a resource' (p. 198). 
For Haraway, the cyborg is a protean monster that can break through 'the maze 
of dualisms' (p. 18 1) by not foreclosing on the possible connections that might 
be made between 'problematic selves and unexpected others' (Haraway, 1992b, 
p. 300). But protean monsters will, by their nature, have unintended 
manifestations, and the cyborg has taken on a number of different shapes within 
feminist theory, not all of which are equally amenable to the reading of 
Haraway I am proposing in this chapter. This shape-shifting of the cyborg is, 
to some extent at least, a product of Haraway's style and determinedly eclectic 
theoretical approach. In making her enthusiastic and wide-ranging connections 
to articulate a cyborg-self, she often puts together terminology from a variety 
of theoretical approaches, including deconstruction and psychoanalysis. This 
has led some feminists to engage with the cyborg as operating either within a 
deconstructive or psychoanalytic frame, usually to conclude that it does not 
fully succeed within these terms. 
For example, Mary Ann Doane has characterized the cyborg in deconstructive 
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terms as 'a performative utterance -a staging of an uninhabitable feminist 
position' (Doane, 1989, p. 209). Analogously, Christina Crosby criticizes 
Haraway for not fully following through on what she identifies as a 
deconstructive desire to 'open a text beyond any thematic coherence' (Crosby, 
1989, p. 208). I agree with Crosby when she questions the ways in which 
Haraway sometimes juxtaposes theories that don't fit together (ibid, p. 207), but 
disagree with her conclusion that Haraway is trying, and failing, to work within 
an overall deconstructive approach. 
To be more explicit in my criticism of such readings of Haraway: a 
deconstructive approach argues that the apparently stable and coherent subject 
depends on the excluded, abjected ground of the object, and that this exclusion 
needs to be made visible in order to destabilise Language as a system. But what 
interests Haraway is 'not just literary deconstruction but liminal transformation' 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 177). For her, the presence of such counter-models as the 
cyborg demonstrate that it is already possible to move beyond destabilising 
binary systems to a different paradigm altogether. It is not identifying an 
'uninhabitable feminist position' within a single symbolic system that interests 
Haraway, but rather identifying the inhabitable 'inappropriate/d' positions that 
are already emerging from a multiplicity of discursive and material practices. 
Moving from deconstructive to psychoanalytic models, Mary Ann Doane also 
criticizes Haraway's cyborg for its rejection of a narrative of origins (Doane, 
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1989, p. 210). For Doane, this leads Haraway to foreclose on the possibility of 
a theory of subjectivity. What she means is that Haraway rejects a 
psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity, which is not necessarily the same thing. 
For Haraway, it ought to be possible to have a sense of self without reference 
back to a single, stable origin, and without a binary division between the 
subject-self that acts and the object of desire and appropriation. Haraway seeks 
to work with something other than the 'paradigmatic psychoanalytic question' 
that always views the self in terms of '(always unrealizable) identity; always 
wobbling, it still pivots on the law of the father, the sacred image of the same' 
(1992b, p. 324). 
For Haraway, psychoanalytic paradigms still hold on to the subject/object 
binary she argues is both unnecessary and obsolete. So, when Irigaray asks 
questions such as 'what if the "object" started to speak? ' and 'if the earth turned 
and more especially turned upon herself-T (Irigaray, 1974, pp. 135 and 133), 
Haraway might answer, 'the object' already does. When Braidotti argues for a 
' cyborg equipped with an unconscious' (Braidotti, 1994, p. 36), Haraway would 
question the need for any such additional baggage. 
Rather than limiting feminist theory to destabilizing the ways in which nature 
is positioned as the ground of culture, sex as the resource for gender, woman 
the specular mirror for man, etcetera, Haraway argues that we can already re- 
vision the world as composed of both human and non-human actors, as a 
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fcoding trickster with whom we must learn to converse' (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 201). Nature, sex, etcetera, are not 'natural' but 'artifactual', with their own 
specific histories. They are not resources but 'an achievement among many 
actors, not all of them human, not all of them organic' (Haraway, 1992b, 
p. 297). 
Although this insight of Haraway's has often been used to focus on revisioning 
humans' relationship with nature or with machines (see, for eg. Alaimo, 1994, 
and Halberstam, 1991), 1 think it has important implications as well for thinking 
about women and differences. Such an approach suggests ways of both holding 
on to and transforming the 'woman-as-ground' formulation that I have discussed 
in relation to Irigaray, Lata, Mani and other Indian feminists. It allows a double 
focus that simultaneously recognizes that (1) Woman and women can be 
positioned within prevailing power relations as the ground upon which 
gendered, raced and national identities are constituted; and that (2) that ground 
is never fully silent, abjected or objectified, but is rather always a fertile one, 
with agency and a voice that are always playing their part in its re-constitution. 
1D ch Refiguring the ground as already speaking and acting means that sources of 
instabilities and resistance are to be found from within prevailing power 
relations and not from their abjected, excluded outside. For Haraway, what 
needs 're-coding' is not just the binary logic that locates 'Woman' and 'women' 
as object, ground or resource, but also the conceptualization of that ground as 
inert. 
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Through counter-models such as the cyborg, Haraway is making the strong 
claim that it is possible to think multiplicity outside the frame of dualisms. But, 
as the above discussion suggests, this is not an unproblernatised flight into an 
'elsewhere' such as is offered at times by Braidotti's nomadic trajectory. 
Haraway avoids many of the pitfalls I identified in Braidotti's nomadic project 
through her very different approach to the question of location, and through the 
model of power which underpins her work. I turn to these points in the next 
section. 
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2. PROMISES AND RISKS, PLEASURES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
Haraway calls her counter-models of the self 'promising monsters' (Haraway, 
1992b); they are the misfits that reside within and potentially work against 
currently dominant paradigms. But precisely because these alternatives emerge 
from within prevailing paradigms, and from within power relations as 
structured by those paradigms, they are never secure from the destructive 
monsters those same paradigms produce (Haraway, 199 1, p. 190). A careful 
reading of Haraway shows that each of her alternative figurations is always 
contested and contestable. They are possible but dangerous articulations of an 
alternative world that emerge from within a complex network of power 
relations; they are the unintended, but never innocent, results of productive 
power that enables as it constrains. 
Haraway's cyborg is often enlisted in projects that aim for a more contingent, 
relational and shifting view of the subject. Ironically, this paradigm of 
undecidability, of category confusion, is evoked at times in decidedly, 
categorically unproblematised ways, including by Braidotti (Braidotti, 1994, 
pp. 102-110). But this is to read a one-dimensional character onto the cyborg 
that Haraway herself consistently resists: 
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From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final 
imposition of a grid of control on the planet [ ... 
I. From another 
perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and 
bodily realities in which people are [ ... ] not afraid of 
permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The 
political struggle is to seefrom both perspectives at once because 
each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable 
from the other vantage point. (Haraway, 199 1, p. 154, emphasis 
added) 
Thus 
, one of the strengths of Haraway's approach is that, whilst making a 
passionate and committed argument for alternative feminist visions, she works 
hard to sustain an awareness that the constructs she evokes remain contested and 
heterogeneous (ibid, p. 212), promising and risky, possible and dangerous. 
This underlying model of power, which recognizes both that there are no pure 
power-free zones, and that power is productive of the means of contestation, is 
important to understanding Haraway's approach to questions of location. If 
Braidotti's nomadic self takes pleasure in transgressing boundaries, Haraway's 
cyborg adds to that pleasure the complicating factor of accountability for their 
construction (p. 150). This means that Haraway's project of envisioning an 
alternative model of the self always holds questions of location and dispersal in 
productive tension. For Haraway: 
boundaries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are 
drawn by mapping practices; 'objects' do not pre-exist as such. 
[ 
... 
] But boundaries shift from within; boundaries are very 
tricky. What boundaries provisionally contain remains 
generative, productive of meanings and bodies. Siting (sighting) 
boundaries is a risky business. (p. 201) 
There are four interconnected moves involved here. First of all, boundaries do 
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not simply exist, they emerge via social interactions and relationships. Second, 
then, boundaries are contestable, shifting and permeable. Third, however, we 
can't do without boundaries. Fourth, then, we need to be accountable for how 
we construct those boundaries. By 'counting to four' in this way, Haraway 
reclaims a more complicated sense of locatedness that derives from a 
recognition of the impurity of all spaces. 
The need to draw contestable borders and to to be accountable for how we draw 
them, is also central to Haraway's concept of 'situated knowledges'. This has 
implications for the way she views differences between women widiin a feminist 
politics: 
The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, 
whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and 
stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with 
another, to see together without claiming to be another. 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 193) 
The feminist subject-position sought by Haraway is not one that claims a unified 
identity for all women, but rather one that starts from recognizing situatedness 
and partiality. It is our inevitable incompleteness that makes partial connection 
possible, not our ability to represent the complete range of women's experiences 
and identities. There is no single privileged standpoint, since there is no way 
to be simultaneously and fully in all positions structured by gender, race, nation 
and class. The search for such a position is 'the search for the fetishized perfect 
subject of oppositional history' (ibid, p. 193). Being everywhere is just the flip 
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side of being nowhere, the disembodied Eye-1, the 'god-trick' of infinite vision. 
Feminists need to counterpose this either/or model with one that privileges 'the 
joining of partial views and halting voices into a collective subject position that 
promises a vision of the means of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within 
limits and contradictions, i. e. of views from somewhere' (ibid, p. 196). This is 
quite different from Braidotti's nomad, who is in a sense claiming to be 
nowhere in particular, and therefore everywhere. 
Recognizing that feminists need to be accountable for the borders they 
necessarily draw in developing their 'views from somewhere' means that 
Haraway is also consistently more attentive to the dangers of 'multilingualism' 
than Braidotti's polyglot nomad. Whilst Haraway's 'situated knowledges' have 
become common currency for many feminist theorists, including Braidotti, few 
present the concept with as much attention to the difficulty of the process as she 
does. Nor do all appropriations of Haraway share her insistence that 'views 
from somewhere' involve political and ethical choices: 'politics and ethics 
ground struggles over knowledge projects' (p. 193), including within feminist 
theory. 
In terms of a possible feminist politics that combines pleasure in transgressing 
boundaries with responsibility for their construction, Haraway privileges the 
idea of coalitions, based on affinities, rather than any model of identity politics. 
For Haraway, 'affinity groups' recognize that negotiating differences will be an 
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intrinsic part of their politics (Haraway, 1992b, p. 318). They come together, 
not because of an assumed, pre-existent and 'natural' identity, but because they 
are 'imperfectly stitched together' as partial, differently situated selves. They 
are 'wary of holism but needy for connection', looking for 'united front politics 
without the vanguard party (Haraway, 199 1, p. 15 1). Affinity groups thus 
involve an acknowledgement of difference - that no one individual or collective 
political position can ever be fully representative of all those it claims to 'speak 
for' - rather than an assumption of a representable identity of interests as the 
basis of their politics (Haraway, 1992b, pp. 311-313). 
Haraway has defined affinities as 'related not by blood but by choice' 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 155), although we need to be careful in how we read her use 
of the term 'choice' here. While Marsden (1996, p. 14) has accused Haraway 
of allowing a 'decisionist vocabulary' and a concept of 'transcendent agency' 
to creep back into her project through her use of terms like choice and 
responsibility, I think it would be wrong to conclude that Haraway is working 
with an unproblematized understanding of these terms. She clearly rejects 
definitions of 'choice' framed in terms of a 'liberal epistemology and politics' 
that posits an autonomous human agency which pre-exists its social and 
discursive locatedness (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). Elsewhere, she describes 
possible feminist coalitions based on affinity as 'adopted families and imperfect 
intentional communities, based not so much on "choice" as on hope and 
memory of the always already fallen apart structure of the world' (ibid, p. 121). 
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I will return to Marsden's critique of Haraway at the end of this section, but 
first, I want to pursue a bit further the distinction Haraway makes between 
'identity' and 'affinity politics'. 
My understanding is that Haraway distinguishes between identity 'by blood' and 
affinity 'by choice, in order to stress that feminist political unity needs to be 
achieved rather than presumed. The category 'women, as the subject of/for 
feminist theory and politics, is not something that is 'natural', 'organic', or 'in 
the blood'; it is rather a difficult achievement, which involves making many 
non-innocent choices. For Haraway, feminists: 
must negotiate the very fine line between appropriation of 
another's (never innocent) experience and the delicate 
construction of the just-barely-possible affinities, the just-barely- 
possible connections that might actually make a difference in 
local and global histories. (Haraway, 199 1, p. 113) 
The never innocent 'intentional imperfect communities' that emerge in the 
impure space of an 'already fallen apart structure of the world', need to replace 
those apparently more 'natural' unities of 'mothers and daughters, co-wives, 
sisters, or lesbian lovers' (p. 121) that presume unity as a resource, rather than 
as an achievement. For Haraway, then, feminist politics always needs to be 
ready to ask 'who are "we"'9. This is, for her, an inherently open question: 
I one always ready for contingent, friction-generating articulations' (Haraway, 
1992b, p. 324). These articulations involve making 'terms of agreement', 
putting 'things together, scary things, risky things, contingent things' (ibid). 
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Haraway's version of feminist politics has been criticized from two quite 
different directions from within feminist theory. On the one hand, some read 
the cyborg who is 'needy for connection' as a possible route to relativism. 
Thus, Christina Crosby has argued that Haraway's cyborg may not know how 
to say 'no' to some of its possible and more problematic connections. Since 
Crosby wants a feminist politics of exclusion as well as inclusion, she questions 
whether Haraway really provides a basis on which to 'make the right 
connections and block the wrong ones' (Crosby, 1989, p. 208). But this is to 
read only one half of the double move I have argued Haraway sustains 
throughout her work. The cyborg who is 'needy of connection' is also 'wary of 
holism'; she/it is a promising and dangerous monster who both takes pleasure 
in transgressing boundaries and is accountable for constructing them. 
Similarly, Stacy Alaimo wonders about feminists' ability to separate from what 
she calls 'phallotechnology' if they embrace the cyborg (Alaimo, 1994, p. 149). 
Alaimo argues for a reversal of Haraway's affinity formulation: 'Instead of 
grounding politics in affinity (which often slides into essentialist definitions) 
[] feminism could ground affinity in politics' (pp. 149-50). But this is to mis- 
read affinity as something easy to establish - as something 'in the blood' - rather 
than as the difficult and ongoing achievement that Haraway describes. 
On the other hand, others have accused Haraway of falling back into a 'security 
system of humanist values' by holding on to such concepts as responsibility, 
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choice and progressive politics (Marsden, 1996, p. 14). In particular, Jill 
Marsden argues that Haraway's cyborg feminism can only defend itself from 
technological determinism by allowing appeals to 'political accountability', 
'transcendent agency' and a 'decisionist vocabulary' to sneak in by the back 
door (ibid, p. 14). But is responsibility inevitably linked to a concept of 
transcendent agency? Is agency only and always transcendent? Why does 
holding on to some concept of responsibility have to lead to taking on the whole 
package of 'humanist values"? Indeed, it seems to me that, in Haraway's usage, 
responsibility for constructing boundaries is a way of working against 
transcendence. It is about recognizing that things never free-float for ever; that 
they do, if only contingently and impermanently, coalesce in a kind of stability; 
that there is no transcendent outside to these bounded times and spaces from 
which to act politically; and that therefore we need to be vigilant about what 
political effects these borders will have, so that, when necessary, they can be 
re-drawn. 
Marsden also criticizes Haraway for failing to note the contradiction between 
her rejection of 'the tradition of progress, the tradition of the appropriation of 
nature as resource for the productions of culture' (Haraway, 199 1, p. 150) and 
her continuing to advocate 'effective progressive politics' (ibid, p. 165, cited in 
Marsden, 1996, p. 16, fh63). But this is to put together two different things. 
One is to contest a particular definition of progress, one that posits a teleology 
and a single agent of progress. The other is to judge some actions progressive, 
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because they give those who are subordinated greater space in which to speak 
and act. To unapologetically call such actions progressive (as Haraway does), 
is not necessarily to accept the teleological narrative of progress as the triumph 
of human culture over nature. 
Marsden simply asserts that agency is necessarily 'transcendent'; she never 
engages directly with the ways in which Haraway problematizes agency in 
terms of her model of the self or her model of power. Marsden never discusses 
Haraway's attempts to de-link agency from the model of the 'humanist subject' 
in its binary relation with an acted-upon object. Haraway's use of concepts 
such as agency and responsibility needs to be placed in the context of her 
alternative model of a 'semi-permeable' and situated self, and of her view of 
power as a 'field of enabling constraints' (Haraway, 1991, p. 135). It is only on 
the basis of re-working the relationship between self, other and power that 
Haraway can speak of the possibility of 'agency - or agencies - without 
defended subjects' (ibid, p. 3). 
3. LANGUAGE, LANGUAGES, CODES AND NOISE 
As I have already argued, although Haraway uses some poststructuralist 
terminology throughout her work, it would be wrong to conclude that her 
overall project depends either on a Lacanian or a Derridean-inspired focus on 
Language as a system. Like many feminists, Haraway is highly critical of the 
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tendency to organize thought around binary categories. But while most feminist 
appropriations of poststructuralist theories focus on the inevitability of the 
binary within Language as a system (even when there is a move 'beyond' the 
binary), Haraway is more interested in the political and social history of 
particular binary categories in specific languages. And this is an approach 
which leaves more space open for the susceptibility of linguistic categories to 
variation and to change. 
Haraway's essay 'Gender for a Marxist Dictionary' is a good example of this 
approach. Beginning from a reflection on the difficulties involved in 
comprehensively defining any term within a single language, let alone trying to 
find its 'match' in any other language, Haraway's focus is on specific languages 
as sites of political contestation (Haraway, 1991, pp. 128-148). She explores the 
different meanings of gender within and between languages. She notes that the 
sex/gender distinction that English-speaking feminists often now take as a 
given, has its own unruly history, and is also difficult to sustain in other 
languages. She looks at how the work of black American feminists and other 
women of colour unsettles the sex/gender binary by insisting on adding race to 
the equation. What emerges from these historically specific discussions is a 
view of languages as unstable, as directly related to power relations and as 
polyvocal. 
Whilst moving from a focus on Language to languages, Haraway's engagement 
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with changes in technology and their social and economic impact suggests that 
we need to work with a still broader field of meaning and communication. Both 
communications science and modern biologies view the world as a problem of 
coding (Haraway, 1991, p. 164). Furthermore, codes do not work in the same 
way that it is generally assumed natural languages do. As we saw in the 
consideration of Butler's work in Chapter Four, theorists who take Language 
as the model on which identity is constituted and power is exercised, privilege 
differentiation and exclusion. In Butler's view, the logic of Language still rests 
on binaries, so that coherence and control are always purchased at the price of 
abjection, and assering an identity always entails a loss of connection and 
complexity. 
But, within infonnatics and biology codes do not function according to a logic 
of exclusion, and this model of coding has also had an impact on current 
paradigms of knowledge. Here, codes work through connection, not exclusion, 
and control is gained, not through fixing boundaries, but by finding codes that 
open up transitions between apparently separate and bounded components 
(Haraway, 199 1, pp. 164-5). For Haraway, in a world increasingly fashioned 
through microelectronics and biotechnology, the logic of control through 
connection needs to be taken into account, at least as much as the logic of 
differentiation drawn from language models. 
In this more complex field of mechanisms of control and of meaning, resistance 
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has to come from more than one direction. One of those directions is the 
cyborg's: 
struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that 
translates all meaning perfectly [ ... 1. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, rejoicing in the 
illegitimate fusions of animal and machine. These are the 
couplings which make Man and Woman so problematic, 
subverting the structure of desire, the force imagined to generate 
language and gender. (Haraway, 199 1, p. 176) 
As I read it, in this passage Haraway is arguing that cyborg 'noise' contests 
both the code logic of control through connection and the Language model logic 
of control through differentiation. Cyborg noise challenges coding attempts at 
perfect communication, but it also resists those clear binary distinctions of self 
and other, of a self separated from and desiring the other, that are I imagined to 
generate language and gender' 
But in the same passage Haraway also claims that cyborg politics 'is the 
struggle for language' (ibid, emphasis added). I read this in the context of 
Haraway's view of languages as a site of political contestation, but also in the 
context of her alternate model of 'illegitimate' or impure selves who give up on 
the search for original languages and 'natural names, mother's or father's' 
(p. 175). Against the dream of a common language, Haraway privileges 'a 
powerful infidel heteroglossia [ ... ] an 
imagination of a feminist speaking in 
tongues' (p. 18 1). 
Whilst on the surface this might sound very similar to Braidotti's polyglot 
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nomad, there are important differences. Where Braidotti's polyglot focusses on 
the arbitrariness of meanings, thus folding the many voices of the polyglot back 
into a single Language system, Haraway focusses on political contestations, over 
meaning, stressing that multiple 'symbolic systems' are at work. If Haraway 
rejects the model of a single symbolic at the level of language that Braidotti 
deploys, it is not surprising that she also rejects Braidotti's strategy of 
privileging sexual difference in relation to questions of identity. In the final 
section of this chapter, I discuss how Haraway locates 'women' in the more 
complex field of identities, power and languages that she is working with. 
4. WOMEN IN THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT 
In my discussion of debates within Indian feminisms in Part One, I suggested 
that one recurring underlying issue was the way in which different theoretical 
approaches to power and identity position women. Is women's subordination 
always achieved through their exclusion, marginalization or displacement, or 
do we need to look also at how they are made central to processes of identity- 
constitution and to specific networks of power relations? Of the four Western 
feminists examined in this thesis, Donna Haraway is most explicit in her 
insistence that women's positioning cannot be adequately expressed in terms of 
exclusion models alone. For Haraway: 
The marked bodies of race, class and sex have been at the 
center, not the margins of knowledge in modern conditions. 
These bodies are made to speak because a great deal depends 
upon their active management. (Haraway, 1992a, p. 289) 
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If a great deal depends upon the active management of the marked female body 
in modern conditions of power and knowledge, then feminists must begin by 
recognizing that women are 'fully implicated in the world' (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 176); feminist theory needs to give up on the illusion that it can speak from 
the comfort of the margins as a space of 'moral superiority, innocence or 
greater closeness to nature' (ibid). 
While I have already criticized some of the totalizing tendencies of Haraway's 
description of 'Women in the Integrated Circuit' in section one of this chapter, 
Haraway also evokes this image in more promising ways. Technological and 
economic changes in the age of globalization restructure women's locations as 
they dissassemble and reassemble traditional boundaries between home and 
work, public and private, etcetera. In these emerging 'social relations of the 
new technologies' (ibid, p. 169), there is no one, easily discernible 'place' for 
women, 1 only geometrics of difference and contradiction [ ... 
]. The issue is 
dispersion. The task is to survive in the diaspora' (p. 170). 
Haraway's image of 'Women in the Integrated Circuit' thus repositions women 
in two ways that resonate with the work of Indian feminists discussed in Part 
One. First, women's activities are seen as crucial to reconfigurations of social 
relations. Second, it is women's dispersal across a multiplicity of fields of 
social relations, their hyper-visibility across a 'profusion of spaces and 
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identities' (ibid) that needs to be taken into account, not their marginalization 
or invisibility. In this view, women's social location is complex and, as such, 
is not easily contained within an inclusion/exclusion binary. 
Because it is women's dispersal across a profusion of spaces and identities that 
needs to be taken into account, Haraway also resists focussing only or even 
primarily on dualisms structured around gender or sexual difference. As I read 
her, it is the more general tendency to structure thought around 'endless socially 
enforced dualisms' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 3) that she identifies as the problem. 
Haraway therefore turns her attention to a mutliplicity of relationships that 
rework the self/other binary. As a biologist and historian of science, she is also 
very attentive to the ways in which the nature/culture binary is at work in 
delineating differences of gender, race, class and ethnicity. 
Haraway's principal strategy, then, is neither, like Braidotti's, to open up 
sexual difference so that other differences can be contained within it, nor, like 
Butler's to destabilize sex and gender. It is, rather, to take a step back from 
sex/gender altogether. As a feminist, she is interested in seeing how 'Woman' 
and 'women' function as both sign and 'material-semiotic actor' across all the 
differences that evoke, or are worked through, the self/other divide, including 
sex, race, ethnicity, class, but she never makes a claim for the primacy of, or 
a privilege to sexual difference. Rather, she looks for 'Woman' and 'women' 
in more than one place at once. 
226 
The danger in Haraway's approach is that in making connections between a 
multiplicity of dualisms she might collapse the differences between them and 
erase their specificities. The lists and tables of dualisms that Haraway 
sometunes produces can have the same totalizing effect discussed in section one 
above (see, for eg. 1992a, pp. 11- 12). For feminists, this could mean that 
women's specific strategic and discursive location gets lost in the process. The 
promise of her approach is that, by trying to keep more than one set of 
differences in play at once, she can produce a richer, more complicated picture 
of how these differences interact with each other. This is where Haraway's 
attentiveness to the contestability of the constructs she uses becomes so crucial, 
in order to see both the dangers and promises simultaneously. 
For Haraway, the danger of not looking in more than one direction at once, in 
privileging sexual difference above all other differences, is to risk being 
insufficiently attentive to the other relations of power and domination at work 
that relate to differences between women. It makes it too easy, for example, to 
unproblematically celebrate female sexuality, orjouissance, without recognizing 
how the history of racism can make this a contestable concept for black women. 
Given the history and continued impact of racist characterizations of black 
women as highly sexualised and as, therefore, closer to an animal state, 
'universalizing discourses about sexual pleasure as a sign of female agency' 
reinscribe feminism 'within one of the fundamental technologies for enforcing 
gendered racial inequality' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 355). 
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For Haraway, sexual difference, even understood as a complex cultural 
construct, is not a sufficient starting point for feminist theory. Drawing on the 
work of black feminists such as Hazel Carby (1987) and Hortense Spillers 
(1987), Haraway suggests that bringing in questions of race doesn't just 
complicate the Lacanian symbolic, as Butler would propose. Given the context 
of slavery, for example, it becomes questionable whether a single symbolic can 
be said to apply when some females become 'women' and others become 
property: 
free men and women inherited their name from the father [ ... ]. 
Unfree men and women inherited their condition from their 
mother [ ... 1. They had no name 
in the sense theorized by Uvi- 
Strauss and Lacan. [ ... I In these 
discursive frames, white women 
were not legally or symbolically fully human; slaves were not 
legally or symbolically human at all. (Haraway, 1992c, p. 94, 
emphasis in the original) 
In Haraway's terms, 'each condition of oppression requires specific analysis 
that refuses the separations but insists on the non-identities of race, sex, 
sexuality and class' (ibid, p. 95). This means that race can neither be subsumed 
within a sexual difference framework, nor viewed as a distinct category. 
Instead, what is required is a simultaneous focus on 'racial and sexual 
difference in specific historical conditions of production and reproduction' 
(ibid). 
As I argued in Chapter Three, Irigaray's feminism of sexual difference 
produces some unexpected resonances with postcolonial feminist explorations 
of women's positioning in relation to national and raced identities. One of the 
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sites of this convergence is Irigaray's focus on how the specifically female 
capacity for birth becomes appropriated in origin narratives that privilege the 
male/masculine subject. But feminisms of sexual difference seem to have great 
difficulty taking seriously the difference that race and nation can make, as we 
have seen in both Irigaray's and Braidotti's projects. On the other hand, 
Butler's project of destabilizing sexual difference can, as we saw in Chapter 
Four, lead to losing any focus on the specifically female. Haraway's work is 
important in this regard, because she seems to be able to find a place for the 
question of appropriation of birth and origins, without insisting on the 
privileged focus on sexual difference. 
For example, a recurring theme in Primate Visions, Haraway's most extensive 
and least discussed work, is the constitution of self through modern myths of 
male birth (Haraway, 1992a, pp. 117,232, and 280). Here, Haraway takes a 
step back from gender or sexual difference to look at how questions of origins 
are played out through the nature/culture divide. Nature - as fixed, certain 
origin - becomes the stable ground on which white European man can construct 
a sense of truth about the self. Haraway tracks the recurring fascination with 
communication across the nature/culture divide within modem primatology: the 
gesture of trust from animal to human 'in the field'; cyborg apes in space 
communicating with their human controllers on the ground; bringing gorillas 
'into culture' by teaching them sign language. Each of these 'dramas of touch' 
(ibid, p. 149) is, for Haraway, a working through of a framing myth about 
229 
contact wit , and control over, the origins of the human self. 
In these narratives of origin, gendered, racial and ethnic specificities all come 
into play. It is white western Man who secures his sense of self through the 
fiction of controlling his own origin. White women are often positioned as 
intermediaries between man and nature, but '[w]oman in these narratives fulfills 
her communicating, mediating function because of a triple code, only one part 
of which is gender' (ibid, p. 149). Haraway looks simultaneously at how race 
and class also work through the bodies of women (pp. 149-156). 
From the history of primatology, Haraway draws very similar insights to those 
of Irigaray: '[i]n the major western narrative for generating self and other, one 
is always too few and two are always too many' (p. 352). And it is women, and 
the female capacity for birth, which is most troubling to the modern western 
conception of the unencumbered self: 
Ontologically always potentially pregnant, women are both more 
limited in themselves, with a body that betrays their 
individuality, and limiting to men's fantastic self-reproductive 
projects. To achieve themselves, even if the achievement is a 
history-making fantasy, men must appropriate women. Women 
are the limiting resource, but not the actors. (p. 353) 
The difference is that, by approaching the question of origins through the 
nature/culture divide, Haraway works with a more complex field which includes 
gender, race, nation and other community identities. In her view, Woman is 
defined as closer to nature, as origin, and is thus positioned as the 'limiting 
resource' for a variety of origin narratives about identity. Feminists need to 
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attend to a multiplicity of processes of differentiation so that 'women's part in 
the building of persons, families and communities cannot be fixed in any of the 
names of Woman and her functions' (Haraway, 199 1, p. 123). 
For Haraway, one of the ways of doing this is to give back to nature its unruly 
history, as she does, for the particular field of prirnatology, in Primate Visions. 
This relates back to Haraway's strategy, discussed in section one, of dispensing 
with dualisms by refusing the subject/object divide, by insisting on seeing the 
lo ect' as 'actor'. In terms of the nature/culture divide, bringing back into 
view nature's 'artifactuality', its historical genealogy, is important because it 
is precisely by covering over this history that nature - as fixed, certain origin - 
becomes the stable ground for identity narratives. Within these narratives, 
getting back in touch with the self's origins 'is about boundary crossing, about 
the drama of touch across Difference, but not about the finite, difference-laden 
worlds of history' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 149). 
Haraway's move places the contentious 'difference-laden worlds of history' 
right at the centre of her project. Rather than trying to open up a single 
symbolic system to contestation and resistance, Haraway begins from the 
polyvocal, noisy and always uncertain spaces in which specific differences are 
constituted. Her strategy then is to track the sometimes conflicting, sometimes 
mutually constitutive ways in which 'Woman' is evoked, and 'women' are 
located, across the historical categories of sex/gender, race, nation, and class. 
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In this way, she argues, feminists might begin to be able to 'count to four'. 
In my reading of her, then, Haraway seems to offer a way of sustaining a 
simultaneous focus on 'women', the specifically female, and the differences 
between women. Nevertheless, it needs to be recognized that Haraway is not 
always completely successful in keeping all these aspects in view. Whilst I have 
privileged those moments in her work where 'women' are seen as 'promising 
monsters', Haraway is not always consistent in her approach. As I argued in 
section one, her enthusiasm for making cyborg connections sometimes puts 
together theoretical approaches that work against each other, and this creates a 
certain ambivalence in Haraway 's approach to 'women' and the specifically 
female. 
For example, in both 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs' and 'The Promises of 
Monsters', Haraway argues for a shift from paradigms of birth and 
reproduction to models of re-generation. Traditional narratives of identity use 
concepts of birth and reproduction to support models of pure origins, of 'the 
sacred image of the same, of the one true copy' (Haraway, 1992b, p. 299). 
Haraway suggests that 'cyborgs have more to do with regeneration and are 
suspicious of the reproductive matrix and of most birthing' (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 18 1). Regeneration, for Haraway, suggests possibilities of change, difference, 
and the 'interpenetration of boundaries between problematic selves and 
unexpected others (1992b, p. 300) that rebirthing cannot. For Haraway: 
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We require regeneration, not rebirth, and the possibilities of our 
reconstitution include the utopian dream of the hope for a 
monstrous world without gender. (199 1, p. 18 1) 
If we read these moves on their own, it could be concluded that, for Haraway, 
the specifically female capacity for birth has been so tainted by its 
appropriations within prevailing identity narratives that feminists cannot ever 
hope to re-define it. This reading of Haraway would put her quite close to 
Butler's view that any feminist re-definition of the specifically female is bound 
to re-intro uce the abjection it seeks to resist. The similarities with a 
deconstructive position like Butler's are also suggested when Haraway argues 
that 'destabilizing the positions in a discursive field and disrupting categories 
for identification might be a more powerful feminist strategy than "speaking as 
a woman "' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 3 10). 
On the other hand, as we have seen above, Haraway also argues that 
reproduction and birth don't actually fit into prevailing self/other paradigms, 
however hard 'masculine myths of self-birth' try to contain them. 'The issue 
from the self is always (an)other' (ibid, p. 352), never a sacred image of the 
same. The female body's 'troubling talent for making other bodies' and the 
confounding of clear inner/outer distinctions of the foetal immune system 
(1991, p. 253, fn8) are part of Haraway's evidence for her alternative model of 
the 'semi-permeable self'. 
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Reading this Haraway, it would seem clear that she makes a distinction between 
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the ways the specifically female has been appropriated to produce the various 
'names of Woman, and the 'women' who resist those names in order to remain 
promising monsters. This distinction seems to hold when she argues, towards 
the end of the Cyborg Manifesto, that: 
there is another route to having less at stake in masculine 
autonomy, a route that does not pass through Woman, Primitive, 
Zero, the Mirror Stage and its imaginary. It passes through 
women and other present-tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of 
Woman born [ ... ] These cyborgs are the people who refuse to 
disappear on cue. (Haraway, 199 1, p. 177, emphasis added) 
It is when we remember that Haraway includes women in her list of 
'illegitimate cyborgs' that her work can be most productively used to sustain a 
simultaneous focus on women and their differences. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout this chapter I have concentrated on Donna Haraway's attempts to 
rethink identity outside a logic of dualisms at the levels of ontology, 
epistemology and politics. While not always completely successful, Haraway's 
alternative approach to models of the self, location, politics and language 
produce some 'promising monsters' for feminist attempts to keep a space open 
for multiplicity and difference. Through counter-models like the cyborg, she 
redefines the self within an ontology of impurity, change and diaspora. In 
calling for feminist politics to combine the pleasure of transgressing boundaries 
with the responsibility for constructing them, she offers a more complicated 
sense of locatedness that recognizes the impurity of all spaces. She resists the 
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constraints of working with a model of a single symbolic system of Language, 
to focus on a more complicated field of contested and contestable meanings 
which includes languages, codes and 'cyborg noise. ' 
In resisting the limitations of a 'logic of dualisms' at all these levels, Haraway's 
project repositions women in two ways. First, she looks for 'Woman' and 
'women' not only at the margins of identity categories and power relations, in 
those spaces where they are made invisible, but also at their highly visible 
centres. Second, she positions 'Woman' and 'women', not within a single 
symbolic system, but across a multiplicity of historically specific and variable 
categories of identity. This offers the possibility of a simultaneous focus on the 
specifically female and on the differences between women. 
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Part Three 
AGAINST PURITY 
236 
Chapter Seven 
POWER, IDENTITY AND IMPURE SPACES 
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of Part One of this thesis, I identified four challenges to feminist 
theories of identity and difference that emerge from a critical reading of Indian 
feminist scholarship: 
First, feminist theoretical approaches to identity need to focus on the 
productive but subordinated role that 'Woman' and 'women' play in the 
simultaneous emergence of multiple categories of social identity, including sex, 
gender, nation, race and other community identities; 
Second, they need to recognize that women's location within this 
intersecting landscape of social identities is a complex one that is not easily 
contained within a logic of dualisms; 
Third, they need to take into account not only discursive constructs of 
the feminine, but also the female body and its relation to women's activities; 
Fourth, they need to redefine, and not only destabilize or deconstruct 
models of the individual self and its relation to collective identities. 
Throughout my discussions of the work of Irigaray, Butler, Braidotti and 
Haraway in Part Two, I began to suggest some of the ways in which their 
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theoretical approaches invite and/or resist a productive engagement with these 
complications. In Part Three, I will expand on these initial suggestions to 
discuss how the insights I have drawn from Indian feminisms can be taken on 
board within Western feminist theory, in order to develop more complicated 
models of power, identity and the self. I argue that it will only be possible to 
sustain a simultaneous focus on women and their differences if feminist theory 
works against purity on three levels. First, it requires a model of power that 
gives up on the search for pure, power-free zones and works instead with the 
instabilities power produces as it both enables and constrains women. Second, 
it is necessary to see 'women' as a complex, impure category that bleeds across 
the borders of apparently discrete identities, such as sex, gender, race and 
nation. Third, we need to develop alternative models of the self that take these 
complex, impure spaces as a valid and valorised position from which to speak 
and act. In this chapter, I will discuss the question of models of power. In 
Chapter Eight, I turn to questions of 'women' as a complex category, and 
alternative models of the self. 
In both chapters, I follow a similar structure in an attempt to keep clear the 
many different voices of Indian and Western ferninisms that I am working with, 
and to indicate how I think they might be brought together. I begin by 
reviewing the main insights to be drawn from the Indian feminist material I 
have examined; in this chapter I focus on the implications of underlying models 
of power to explain how 'women' are positioned in the emergence of social 
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identities. In tenns of the four challenges delineated above, I look particularly 
at what it means to say that (1) women's role in constituting these multiple 
identities is both productive and subordinated, and (2) that women's strategic 
and discursive positioning in the emergence of these identities is a complex one 
that is not easily contained within a binary logic of exclusion and inclusion. I 
then look in turn at the models of power at work in the projects of Irigaray, 
Butler, Braidotti and Haraway to see if they do or do not provide a space in 
which to accommodate these insights. In the final section of this chapter, I draw 
from all these sources to outline the key elements of the more complex model 
of power I believe is necessary, and discuss its implications for feminist politics 
and resistance. Before turning to these specific points, however, I want to 
briefly discuss why I believe that feminist attempts to re-think identity cannot 
proceed without a simultaneous attention to models of power. 
1. WHY MODELS OF POWER MATTER 
When feminist theorists confront the difficulties of taking seriously the 
differences between women, they tend to focus on the problems caused by the 
concepts 'Woman' or 'women. Whether the issue is to capture the complexities 
of the ways in which women are socially subordinated, or to delineate a non- 
exclusionary but nevertheless effective 'subject of/for feminism', the principal 
task has tended to be to re-define, problematize, or even move beyond, 
'Woman I and 'women' as the key category of feminist inquiry. In the final 
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chapter of this thesis, I will return to this troublesome category, and propose 
my own reading of what it might mean to theorize women 'in a postcolonial 
mode'. But first, I want to focus on another concept which is as crucial to 
feminist efforts to theorize the differences between women, and yet which is 
much less often interrogated in feminist debates - the models of power that 
underpin different theoretical approaches to questions of identity, self-other 
relations and feminist politics. 
For example, in one of the most frequently cited examinations of the exclusions 
at work in Western feminist scholarship, Chandra Mohanty takes issue with the 
tendency to posit women as a category of analysis in ways that assume that 'all 
of us of the same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially 
constituted as a homogeneous group identified prior to the process of analysis' 
(Mohanty, 1991, p. 56). Within this framework, the focus is on women as an 
1 always already constituted group', made singular by its 'shared oppression' 
(ibid). Mohanty then goes on to argue: 
This focus is not on uncovering the material and ideological 
specificities that constitute a particular group of women as 
'powerless' in a particular context. It is, rather, on finding a 
variety of cases of 'powerless' groups of women to prove the 
general point that women as a group are powerless. (p. 57) 
Mohanty then moves to explore how Western feminism constructs a 
paradigmatically powerless 'Third World Woman' as its necessary other, 
against which it can define a subject of/for feminism, and can assert its 
authority to speak for all women. 
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Mohanty's article has been tremendously influential in getting Western feminists 
to rethink the 'non-innocence of the category "woman"' (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 157). It is one of a handful of key references that recur in footnotes and 
introductions whenever the subject of differences between women is broached. 
It has become so familiar, indeed, that a rather general reference by the author, 
and an equally generalized response from the reader, seem to be all that is 
required. Citing Mohanty is a useful shorthand for raising the problem of the 
univocal category 'women' and, in particular, the problem of constructing a 
'homogeneous category of Third World women who stand as Other to western 
feminists, who define Third World women as powerless victims of patriarchy' 
(Young, 1994, p. 715). What seems to go unnoticed in most of these references, 
as in Iris Young's cited above, is that there are two issues at play in Mohanty's 
critique - first, that there is a universal category 'women' being constructed, 
but second, that it is characterized by powerlessness. 
Mohanty herself focuses on the first of these issues, and so it is perhaps not 
surprising that most of her commentators do the same. But the issue of the 
model of power at work follows behind the main thread of her argument, like 
some persistent, troublesome shadow that is caught only at the corner of the 
eye. If we turn around and look at it fully, we need to ask, why does feminism 
need to define women as 'powerless victims of patriarchy"? Why does it need 
to define itself against these paradigms of powerlessness in order to locate its 
own agency? Why does it have to presume that if women are oppressed or 
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subordinated, then they must also be powerless? If feminists can only define 
themselves as agents against a powerless other, are they not complicit in the 
same kind of hierarchical logic of dualisms as they identify in patriarchy? 
Mohanty's critique of Western feminism calls out as much for a rethinking of 
the models of power at work in the texts she examines as it does the model of 
'women' she contests. 
Just about any statement regarding 'women' as the subject of/for feminism is 
also, implicitly, a statement about a model of power. Consider Iris Young's 
claim: 
The very act of defining a gender identity excludes or devalues 
some bodies, practices and discourses at the same time that it 
obscures the constructed, and thus, contestable character of that 
gender identity. [... ] [G]ender discourse tends to reify the fluid 
and shifting social processes in which people relate, 
communicate, play, work and struggle with one another over the 
means of production and interpretation. The insistence on a 
subject for feminism obscures the social and discursive 
production of identities. (Young, 1994, pp. 715-6) 
Here, the power to define identity is seen only from the point of view of 
excluding, devaluing, and as something that works by covering over 
complexity. A model of a subject that flows from this understanding of power 
will obscure the more fluid and shifting social processes through which 
identities can be constituted, as do models of the subject that claim a pre- 
existence to, or autonomy from power relations. 
But, as I have argued throughout this thesis, there is another view available to 
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feminist theory, derived mainly from the work of Michel Foucault, which 
recognizes power as both exclusionary and productive. For Foucault, our 
understanding of power must be taken out of a logic of repression, exclusion 
and abjection, and placed instead within a logic of proliferation. Power is 
productive, continuous, diffuse, unstable and multi-vocal. Perhaps most 
important to my purpose here is Foucault's concept of 'subjectification', what 
I have called the double move of productive power, which both enables and 
constrains as it produces impure subjects. Within a logic of proliferation, power 
requires not abjected or devalued bodies and impassive objects, but knowable, 
useful bodies and sub ects. Within a logic of proliferation, power is not viewed j 
as a 'great absolute Subject which pronounces the interdict' (Foucault, 1977b, 
p. 140); viewing power as diffuse and multi-vocal multiplies the possibilities of 
instabilities and resistance emerging from within power relations. When 
feminist theorists work with this more complex model of power, a different 
understanding of 'gender identity' and of the kinds of subjects produced in 
power relations can emerge. 
Each of the four theorists discussed in Part Two argues, in different ways, that 
the linguistic and conceptual tendency to construct systems of dualisms needs 
to be challenged by feminism. There is a broad consensus in contemporary 
feminist theory that the linking of 'woman' with body, object, other, etcetera 
in binary systems has deep-seated philosophical and political effects (see also 
Gatens, 1996). But the dualisms such as mind/body, subject/object, self/other 
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that have proved so inimical to acknowledging women's status as full subject 
in both philosophy and the body politic, are also underpinned by a model of 
power that focuses on the power to control through exclusion. The mind 
controls and excludes the body, just as the self is established by excluding and 
controlling the other. 
Viewing power as something that some people have and some people do not is 
to stay within a logic of dualisms; subjects exercise power and objects have 
power exercised upon them. Foucault's model of power, in which all are fully 
implicated, through which all are simultaneously made subjects and subjected, 
confounds this kind of easy binary division. Changing the model of power we 
work with, therefore, is a crucial part of destabilizing the mind/body, self/other 
divides, of thinking beyond dualisms. 
2. POWER'S DOUBLE MOVE 
The first insight I want to draw from my reading of Indian feminist scholarship 
is the double focus on women's productive and subordinated role in constituting 
social identities informed by differences of gender, race, nation and other 
marked community categories. Much of the work that I discuss in Part One 
simply cannot be made sense of within a purely negative model of power that 
looks only at how women are controlled, excluded or abjected in specific 
relations of power. While few of the Indian feminists I have engaged with in 
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this project refer directly to the work of Foucault, or make specific the model 
of power they are working with, I read much of their work as supportive of a 
Foucauldian feminist approach. The 'women' that emerge from this work are 
simultaneously enabled and constrained. 
On the one hand, women are not a completely silenced, abject 'ground' upon 
which a masculine subject stands, or upon which national, racial and other 
community identities are constituted. Women's material practices are actively 
productive of those social identities, as are the competing discursive norms of 
'Woman', of the feminine and of the female body that produce women as 
'subjects of a particular kind'. On the other hand, the social identities that 
women help to produce continue to constrain them within assymetrical relations 
of sexed/gendered power. The specific ways in which they become 'knowable', 
'visible' and 'useful' tend to re-constitute systems of power and knowledge 
which privilege both the masculine, and particular groups of men. 
Foucault's notion of power that works by making bodies 'useful' is particularly 
relevant to much of the feminist scholarship emerging from India. Of course, 
we need to distinguish between the specific ways in which bodies are made 
useful within power relations that continue to subordinate women, and some 
unproblematised celebration of the female body. As I discussed in Chapter 
Two, the work of a number of Indian feminists suggests that the specifically 
female body is viewed as a problem to be overcome for many models of 
national or racial identity and of the subject-agent (see, for example, 
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Chakravarti, 1989 and Basu, 1995). But this is not the only aspect to be 
considered. If the female body remains highly unsuitable for housing a subject- 
agent that continues to be modelled on masculine lines, it is not something that 
is simply excluded or abjected. It remains rather a focus of intense interest and 
importance in terms of securing the borders of identity categories. 
Tanika Sarkar's work suggests that, in both the nationalist movement of pre- 
independence India and in the current communalist movement of the Hindu 
right, women's activities and the symbolic meanings invested in the female 
body are a crucial focus for the construction of a pure space of national and 
communal identities (Sarkar, 1987, p. 2011, and 1995, p. 186). Urvashi 
Butalia's work on both the 1947 India-Pakistan Partition Crisis and on current 
Hindu-Muslim communal violence within India also suggests that concepts of 
purity and impurity of national and racial identities are defined via the female 
body (Butalia, 1993, pp. WS14-5 and 1995, p. 59). 
Amrita. Chhachhi argues that the concept of the boundaries of community 
identities, and hence of what is inside and outside the community, works 
through a feminized language of 'kinship' and 'home' and through a focus on 
the activities of women (Chhacchi, 1990, pp. 163-7). Mrinalini Sinha looks at 
how, in the colonial period, definifig the norms of the female body became a 
way of constituting norms of both masculine and national identities (Sinha, 
1987, p. 224). Male appropriations of the language of motherhood and maternal 
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power become important ways of legitimating nationalist authority (see Sarkar, 
1987; Alexander, 1989; Loomba, 1993; Ganesh, 1990). Lata Mani, looking at 
competing discourses on sati during the colonial period, suggests that norms of 
womanhood, inscribed on women's bodies, constitute the ground upon which 
norms of nationhood are constituted (Mani, 1990). 
As I suggested in Part I, Mani's characterization of the female body as the 
ground of national identities might be seen as support for a model of power that 
focusses only on abjection or exclusion. But as I also argued in Part 1, Mani 
resists such a reading herself. More importantly, when her work is placed in the 
context of the other examples given here, it suggests not an abjected or silenced 
ground, but rather a highly fertile, if still subordinated, one. I will return to this 
point in the next section, and in the next chapter, I will also discuss how and 
why it is the specifically female body that is made useful for national and raced 
identities. But the first point to note here is that it is as a useful, and not only 
as an abjected or excluded, body that 'women' are put into play in these power 
relations. 
Power's productive double-move is at work through the law as well. The 
debates on personal laws and a Unifonn Civil Code currently underway within 
India (and within Indian ferninisms), that I discussed in Chapter Two, are a 
good example of this. Zoya Hasan argues that the personal laws produce an 
authorized version of communal identity, and do so primarily through defining 
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appropriate behaviour for women (Hasan, 1994, p. 61). Of course these laws 
work in part by excluding and constraining women. Thus, women are denied 
full participation in devising the laws, and according to Hasan, the laws also 
constrain women by denying them the right to a distinct gendered identity that 
is not reduced to the homogenized interests of 'the community' (Hasan, 1994). 
To speak only of exclusion in this context is, however, only to tell part of the 
story. These laws, and the power relations of which they are a part, produce 
women as subjects of a particular kind, and these women's activities in turn 
enable the production of particular community identities. Contesting these legal 
productions which identify 'women' solely with their religious communities, 
while at the same time respecting the very real differences in identities between 
Hindu and Muslim women that these discourses have produced, is a major 
challenge for the Indian women's movement (Menon, Butalia and Chakravatri, 
personal interviews, 1995). A model of power which focusses only on the ways 
in which women have been excluded from the legislative process 'as women', 
and on how their interests now need to be included, cannot address the ways in 
which power relations help to produce women and their specific differences. 
Nor is it enough to say that the identities so produced are simply manifestations 
of 'false consciousness, or that they represent an ideological burden for 
women. These are the impure resources with which women must and do resist, 
mining the discordances between their simultaneous centrality and marginality, 
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their visibility and invisibility within relations of power that continue to 
subordinate them. The specific ways in which power's double-move works need 
to be explored by feminist theory if it is to address the persistent complaint 
raised against feminism's portrayal of women as powerless. How often do we 
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near women who are not feminists, in both First World and postcolonial 
settings, object that women are valued in their culture; that motherhood is 
valorised; that women hold a powerful place in the family; that women are at 
the centre of daily life? 
In part, women's rejection of feminism on this basis derives from hegemonic 
caricatures of feminist goals and discourse. In part it is because feminism asks 
women to give up the security of whatever authority they do derive from their 
position within the family, and within existing cultural traditions, to destabilize 
the status quo without any guarantee of what might replace it (Sarkar and 
Butalia, 1995, p. 7). But in large part it is also due to feminism's failure to adopt 
a model of power that takes these productive moves seriously. Since such lines 
of resistance to feminism often come from outside white Western settings, from 
women in 'Third World' countries, and from black and other diasporic 
communities in the West, it is even more important that Western feminist theory 
take this question on board when it wants to consider the space it creates for 
differences between women. 
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3. MARGINS 
BINARIES 
AND CENTRES, AND DISPENSING WITH 
The second, related insight about models of power that emerges from debates 
within Indian feminisms is the need to dispense with a logic of dualisms that 
characterizes women's social and discursive positioning in binary terms of 
margins and centres. These debates suggest that to locate 'Woman' and 
'women' only at the margins, is to capture only one part of the ways in which 
identity is secured and power is exercised. 
Tanika Sarkar's work on the pre-independence nationalist movement, discussed 
in Chapter One, problematises the man/woman, public/private, world/home 
binaries that have become so familiar to feminism (Sarkar, 1987). In her 
discussions of the ways in which the nationalist movement mobilised women 
and appropriated 'feminised' imagery and actions as part of its political 
iconography and tactics, a complex sense of women's location emerges that is 
not easily contained within these binaries. 'Woman' and women's activities may 
often figure as the 'home' men can retreat to, but women's presence in the 
'world' of public politics is also necessary. By bringing the pure space of the 
'private', the 'home' into the public field of political contestation, women's 
presence reinforces the nationalist movement's claims for authenticity of 
identity and representativity. 
More generally, Kumkurn Roy argues that feminists need to take account of 
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women's 'curious visibility' in both colonial and postcolonial discourses and 
practices (Roy, 1995, p. 10). In the context of contemporary Indian politics, 
Zoya Hasan places legal and discursive constructs of 'the Muslim woman', as 
well as Muslim women's activities, at the centre of the communal political 
imagination and of redefinitions of 'authentic' community identities (Hasan, 
1994b, p. 61) The foregrounding of women militants in the Hindu communalist 
movement involves a similar mobilisation of 'authenticity' of racialized 
identities through the presence of women (see Sarkar, 1991 and 1995, Roy, 
1995 and Basu, 1995). 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the foregrounding of women as militants and 
leaders in the right-wing Hindu communalist movement has sparked some 
interesting debates within Indian feminisms. For some, like Susie Tharu and 
Tejaswini Niranjana, the foregrounding of women in political projects that 
reinforce gendered, racialized, class and caste hierarchies represents an 
indictment of feminism itself (Tharu and Niranjana, 1994). For others, it 
presents feminism with the challenge to positively re-think its concepts of 
agency, consent, and women's positioning within complex power relations (see 
Sarkar, 1995 and Sangari, 1993). 
I would argue that, at heart, these debates are about the different models of 
power that feminists work with. Whilst there seems to be a broad consensus 
among Indian feminists that women can't be fruitfully discussed without 
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mapping their relation to a complex network of identity categories, there is less 
consensus about how to characterize that relationship and, perhaps more 
basically, where to look for it. By this I mean, are women always to be found 
on the margins, as the displaced, repressed or excluded ground upon which 
these identities are consolidated? Or is their location more complex, one that 
cannot be easily plotted along a binary exclusion/inclusion divide? Are women 
only made invisible in processes that allow a male, national or raced subject to 
emerge, or is their problematic visibility also a crucial element in these 
processes? 
When framed in this way , these specific Indian debates are part of the same 
problematic facing feminist theory in the West, and they suggest a further 
complication which Western feminist theory needs to take on board. Whilst the 
consensus many Indian feminists have reached on the intersectionality of gender 
with race, nation and community identities is one that is still to be reached 
within Western feminisms, this consensus remains only one part of the problem. 
Even when feminists agree to look for intersectionality, the models of power 
they are working with will impinge on where they find that intersectionality, 
and how they place women within it. And this has consequences for the extent 
to which those models are able to keep a space open for complexity and for the 
specific differences between women, without folding difference back into some 
version of sameness. 
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As I discussed in Chapter Two, at least some Indian feminists who work with 
poststructuralist theoretical models start from the assumption that women are 
subordinated primarily through a process of marginalization. For example, 
Tharu and Niranjana take as their starting point, the now-familiar 
poststructuralist narrative that the 'subject of modernity', or of 'Western 
humanism' is produced through exclusion (Tharu and Niranjana, 1994). 
Underpinning this narrative is a view that power also works primarily through 
exclusion, and through making those who are excluded invisible and marginal. 
If power works in this way, then feminism's project must be to make women 
visible and central. If women are made visible and central in problematic 
circumstances, as in the right-wing Hindu communal movement, and the 
examples of caste, class and nationalist politics that Tharu and Niranjana 
examine, then feminism must be at fault. 
In contrast, a Foucauldian. model of power as productive complicates the binary 
logic behind this conclusion. Foregrounding women, making them 'visible, 
useful and knowable', can be one way of constraining them within power 
relations that continue to be informed by gender hierarchies. Women's 
subordination will not always proceed through their objectification, silencing 
or abjection. The simultaneous foregrounding and limiting/containing of women 
as 'communal subjects' (Sarkar, 1991) points to the need for a model of power 
that holds these two processes together. Without such a model, the 'positive' or 
I productive' can be conflated with the unproblematically 'good', with serious 
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consequences for feminism. 
If Tharu and Niranjana have so much difficulty dealing with the hyper-visibility 
of women within projects like that of the Hindu right, is it perhaps because they 
begin with a theoretical assumption that women's 'proper' place within this kind 
of project should be limited to one of exclusion or, at best, displacement? As 
in the West, both Lacanian and Derridean. language models have gained a 
certain currency within Indian academia, including among some feminist 
academics. Without wanting to over-generalize a complicated, heterogeneous 
and rapidly growing body of literature, I do want to suggest that part of the 
baggage that comes with these language models is an over-emphasis on power 
as exclusion and an over-estimation of the degree to which women are 
marginalized or silenced. 
We see this kind of assumption validated by Gayatri Spivak's frequently cited 
statement that: 
Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and 
object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into 
a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the 
displaced figuration of the 'third-world woman' caught between 
tradition and modernization. (Spivak, 1993, p. 102) 
Spivak wants to counter the tendency in Western thought to equate the excluded 
Third World Woman with silence and nothingness. Following a Derridean 
framework, she wants to replace silence with the 'violent shuttling' of 
displacement. But she is only questioning the mode of exclusion, without 
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questioning the privilege given to exclusion itself. To say only that 'Woman' 
disappears, is excluded, displaced, is to stay within the terms of a model of 
power as negative. 
Women don't simply disappear - they are produced in higWy visible ways. it 
is this production of women as (impure) subjects - managed, contained, but also 
valorised, enabled and empowered - that helps to make their subordination so 
persistent. This is power in its capillary mode, at its most insidious. The 
complexity of this kind of process cannot be captured with a model of power 
that focuses on exclusion alone. 
I do not want to suggest that it is not useful to recognize the ways in which 
particular groups of women constitute an excluded or marginalized ground upon 
which social identities and models of the (male) subject might stand. But I do 
want to suggest that focussing only on this aspect carries with it the danger of 
closing off from view other aspects of women's complex social and symbolic 
locations, and that this both closes down the space in which difference can be 
considered, and covers over the instabilities that can generate resistance. The 
Indian feminist material that I find most productive combines an attention to 
women's exclusion with an acknowledgement of the ways in which they are also 
enabled, foregrounded, and made central to processes of identity-constitution. 
In the following section, I turn to the models of power underpinning the work 
of Irigaray, Butler, Braidotti and Haraway, and discuss the degree to which this 
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double focus is sustained in each of their projects. 
4. WESTERN FEMINISMS AND MODELS OF POWER 
Luce Irigaray: What if the Object Began to Speak? 
In my discussion of Irigaray's work, I argued that her locating of 'women' as 
the 'still silent ground' of a male-centred economy of the same, is both a 
productive and problematic insight for feminism. On one level, of course, 
Irigaray is working with a model of power that stresses the negative - the power 
to exclude. Hers is a model in which Language as a system, the social order 
built with/through language, and the sanctioned route to subject-status within 
that symbolic order, all require the gesture of exclusion in order to proceed. Of 
all the theorists examined in this study, she might be thought furthest from a 
Foucauldian model of power. When readings of Irigaray focus only on the 
exclusion of the feminine, on an image of woman only as passive ground, as 
that which cannot speak or be spoken, then she might seem to be working with 
a system which is ultimately closed and stable. If we see 'Woman' only as 
passive ground, we fail to capture the dynamic complexity of the multiple 
networks of power and women's place in them, and the possibilities of 
discordance between those multiple networks. 
However, I would argue that Irigaray complicates her reading of 'Woman-as- 
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ground' in two important ways. First, in her analysis of the prevailing symbolic 
order, she locates 'Woman'-Mother-Matter as simultaneously necessary and 
excluded. When taken outside Irigaray's exclusive landscape of sexual 
difference, this insight is enriched by postcolonial feminists like Lata Mani who 
locates 'women' as the excluded but necessary ground upon which what might 
be called competing national economies of the same are constructed. 
In looking at how the economy of the same is built upon masculine 
appropriations of birth and access to origins, Irigaray defines the maternal, not 
merely as abject and excluded, but rather as simultaneously potent and 
constrained within a regime of sameness (Whitford, 1991a, p. 55). The power 
of the maternal is both mobilised and contained in order to serve as the place 
in which, and out of which, the masculine subject defines his 'truths'. Woman- 
as-place is 'experienced as all powerful where 'she' is most radically powerless 
in her indifferentiation' (ibid, p. 53). By holding together a sense of female 
potency with a sense that it is confined within an economy of the same, Irigaray 
can be said to share some aspects of a Foucauldian model of power that both 
enables and constrains. When Irigaray asks, 'what if the object started to 
speak', or 'if the earth turned, and turned upon herself', she could be said to be 
working with a model of power that locates sources of resistance from within 
this field of enabling constraints. 
Second, Irigaray further complicates the 'Woman-as ground' formulation by 
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arguing for a different symbolic order based on the specifically female. Thus, 
women are not trapped within a single symbolic, nor are they always limited to 
disrupting a unified system from its margins, or from the weak side of the 
binary. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Irigaray privileges the interval, or the 
space between, as a site that confounds the dualistic logic of a specular 
economy. It is this in-between space that she works for its possibilities of 
heterogeneity and fluidity, as a space from which women might speak (as) 
woman now, and from which a different economy might eventually emerge. 
The in-between suggests, not a margin, but a new mode of relationality; thus, 
in this aspect of her work, Irigaray again seems to privilege a more complex 
model of power than those based on exclusion/ inclusion paradigms. 
In my reading, there are two models of power at work in Irigaray's project. She 
remains indebted to the Lacanian. model Foucault criticizes, of a symbolic order 
that works by saying 'No', yet in moving away from that model, she also brings 
in elements of power as productive. Because Irigaray does not stay within the 
terms of the Woman-as-Other model that informs both the Lacanian project and 
much of feminism, because she tries to think through a model of Woman as 
Other-of-the-Same, I would argue that she is also opening up a space in which 
to consider power's more productive aspects. 
'Saming' does not work only through exclusion, but through actively producing 
norms of Woman that conform to the needs of a specular economy. And while 
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in Irigaray's terms that specular economy needs a 'Woman' who is signified as 
' nothing [ ... ]a lack, an absence' (Irigaray, 1974, p. 50), she also sustains a 
sense that this 'nothing' continues to bear within it the potency to disrupt that 
economy, and to provide the basis of a new economy. 
Even though Irigaray works with a model of Language as functioning primarily 
through exclusion, she is also arguing for a fundamental instability of that 
system, and for the possibility of overturning its reliance on a logic of dualisms. 
I would argue that it is not coincidental that it is in those spaces where Irigaray 
allows a more complex model of power to emerge, that her resonances with 
Indian feminisms are at their strongest. These occur when she explores how an 
economy of the same both acknowledges and appropriates the potency of the 
female capacity for birth and access to origins. They also occur when she 
explores the possibilities of resistance that emerge between and across binaries, 
a point I will return to in the next chapter. 
Judith Butler. - Do Bodies Matter? 
As I discussed in Chapter Four, Judith Butler engages extensively with 
Foucault's model of productive power. Butler recognizes that, if subjects are 
always both regulated and produced by and through workings of power 
relations, then their agency cannot derive from some pure space, defined by 
primary identities, but only from the possibilities that emerge from within those 
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power relations (Butler, 1993, pp. 12-5). These emerge from the instabilities 
of normative power, whose results are not always predictable or containable, 
and from the fact that power can only regulate those subjects that it enables, that 
it makes useful and knowable. Thus resistance is never a pure opposition, but 
'a difficult labour of forging a future from resources inevitably impure' (ibid, 
24 1). 
Butler's title Bodies that Matter is rich in resonances with a Foucauldian model 
of power. It suggests that bodies are made to matter within relations of power, 
that they are made useful and knowable. Butler's use of the concept of 
'materialization' also promises to hold together an attention to both discursive 
and material processes, through which embodied subjects 'materialize' or 
emerge. 
But from a promising focus on 'bodies that matter', Butler's project moves 
increasingly to focus on the bodies that are made not to matter. As I argued in 
Chapter Four, Butler's engagement with Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
Derridean deconstruction leads her to over-emphasize the 'gesture of 
constitutive exclusion' that she identifies at the heart of processes of 
signification and identity- constitution. Her attempts to hold Foucault, Lacan 
and Derrida together can lead her to a position where power remains productive 
only to the extent that what is produced is 'foreclosure [ ... ]a set of constitutive 
exclusions' (Butler, 1993, p. 207). 
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Her focus repeatedly shifts between a model of power working in a complex 
field of 'institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of 
origin' (Butler, 1990, p. xi) and what she defines as the imperatives of exclusion 
and abjection at work in an overarching system of signification. That system's 
instabilities and sources of resistance seem to come primarily, not from the 
specific ways in which particular bodies and subjects are made to matter, but 
from those 'bodies' which have been abjected and marginalized. 
Butler's privileging of parody, and of 'the repetition that fails to repeat loyally' 
do suggest a model in which new possibilities of resistance emerge from the 
workings of productive power. However, she focusses primarily on those 
parodic speech acts which destabilize identities produced through abjection, 
through the 'logic of non-contradiction by which one identification is always 
and only purchased at the expense of the other' (Butler, 1993, pp. 118-9). This 
can turn attention away from those identities that are produced in other ways, 
most notably through a logic of proliferation, in which 'positive' redefinitions 
of 'Woman' and 'women' are put into play to produce national, raced and other 
community identities. 
Another example of this turn to exclusion models occurs when Butler discusses 
how authority is constituted through 'perpetual deferral', through an 'infinite 
deferral of authority to an irrecoverable past' (ibid, pp. 107-8). Indian feminists 
such as Chakravarti (1990), Sunder Rajan (1993) and Mani (1990) have also 
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argued that national identities are legitimated through reference to an 
'irrecoverable past'. And yet, to speak only of deferral in this context is not to 
capture the complexity of these authority-constituting moments. While the 
power to define national identities may be legitimated by referral/deferral to a 
lost past, there is also a productive move involved. As Chakravarti, Mani and 
others have shown, there is an ongoing active production and reproduction of 
that past, through constructing norms of purity and authenticity, which include, 
importantly, the norms of pure, authentic woman-hood. In turning to exclusion 
models, Butler turns away from considering how specific female bodies are 
made to matter in legitimating both identity categories and relations of power. 
Rosi Braidotti: Smooth Space and the Nomad 
As we saw in Chapter Five, Braidotti refers more often to the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari than to Foucault for her model of power. Nevertheless, Deleuze 
and Guattari's elaboration of the necessary and inescapable tension between the 
molar and the molecular, between striated and smooth spaces, shares many of 
the same concerns as Foucault's model of power. First, it too is an attempt to 
think about power beyond a binary logic of inclusion and exclusion. Second, it 
also locates resistance within, rather than outside of power relations. 
However, Braidotti herself seems to slide into a model of power that reads 
positive-productive as good, and that locates the positive and negative workings 
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of power in two, relatively separate spaces, the molecular and the molar. It 
might be argued that Deleuze and Guattari's model, with its proliferation of sets 
of two (molar/molecular, rhizome/tree, striated/smooth, polislnomos, etc. ) does 
lend itself more easily to this kind of division than does a Foucauldian model 
where productive power enables as it constrains. Yet Deleuze and Guattari are, 
it seems to me, very careful not to make this kind of division themselves and 
to keep their twos in interdependent tension. 
In contrast, Braidotti's unproblematized privileging of the nomad as a counter- 
force to molar identities and oppressive forms of power forgets a key part of 
both the Foucauldian and Deleuzian models of power that she claims to be 
working with: that there is no pure space that can be relied on, that can't be 're- 
territorialized' or 're-striated'. Deleuze and Guattari's warning, 'Never believe 
that a smooth space can save us' (Deleuze and Guatari, 1988, p. 500) in this 
sense echoes Foucault's 'There are no margins to gambol in' (Foucault, 1977b, 
14 1). 
Every move to re-define identity is caught up in power relations. Braidotti 
insists that the nomad is not a new model of a 'humanist' subject, another 
attempt to fix a molar identity, to provide a centre, and is instead a 'way of 
becoming' (Braidotti, 1994, pp. 111-3). But even so, it is never immune from 
the impure field of enabling constraints from which it emerges. Braidotti forgets 
this, and this, in part, is what allows her not to see the ways in which the space 
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she has delineated for the feminist-as-nomad is itself striated: by the hierarchical 
gradations oi rence that result from her prioritization of sexual difference; 
and by the ways in which she de-authorizes 'ways of becoming' that have been 
privileged within postcolonial theory. Both these moves retract the space in 
which i rences between women can be taken into account, and both derive 
from a failure to sustain an understanding of power's double move. 
Further difficulties are produced by Braidotti's uncomfortable combination of 
a psychoanalytic model of subjectivity and the unconscious, drawn from 
Irigaray and Lacan, and Deleuze's anti-psychoanalytic account of desire. Thus, 
Braidotti locates many of the 'lines of escape' of feminist resistance at the level 
of unconscious desire (Braidotti, 1994, pp. 166-170). This re-imports a logic of 
dualisms to considerations of power, by locating resistance in some space 
outside consciousness and language. 
Donna Haraway: Promises and Risks 
Of the four Western feminists examined in this thesis, Donna Haraway most 
consistently applies what I have identified as a Foucauldian feminist model of 
power as productive, continuous, multi-vocal and unstable. For Haraway, 
power is productive because it is through the 'active management' of useful 
bodies, not through their abjection or marginalization, that contemporary 
relations of power and knowledge are deployed. Thus the 'marked bodies of 
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race, class and sex have been at the center, not the margins of knowledge in 
modern conditions' (Haraway, 1992a, p. 289). 
Recognizing that power is continuous means that there are no pure power-free 
zones. Haraway's image of promising and dangerous monsters suggests both 
that resistance emerges from within power relations and that resistance is never 
immune from re-appropriation. Thus, she sustains a dual focus on both the 
dangers and the possibilities that emerge from the specific ways in which power 
relations produce impure subjects, who are both enabled and constrained. 
Power is multi-vocal because it works, not through the exclusionary imperatives 
of a single symbolic system, but through a more complex field which includes 
languages, codes and 'cyborg noise', as they intersect with and help produce a 
multiplicity of material practices and institutions. Perhaps most importantly, 
each of these components carries with it its own 'unruly history' of contestation 
and change. 
If the field of power relations is productive, continuous and multi-vocal, then 
it is also unstable, producing unintended, if never innocent means of 
contestation. For Haraway, contemporary power relations are always producing 
those 'inappropriate/d others' that defy the constraints of a logic of dualisms, 
and which can be built upon to produce alternative forms o resistance. 
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In the final section of this chapter, I look at what this alternative understanding 
of resistance might mean for feminist politics, and in particular at how a more 
complex model of power enables a simultaneous attention to 'women' and their 
differences. 
4. PONVER, RESISTANCE AND FEMINIST POLITICS 
As I argued in the Introduction to this thesis, a Foucauldian model of power 
makes the possibility of social change 'very urgent, very difficult, and quite 
possible' (Foucault, 198 1, p. 155). It requires a shift in perspective in terms of 
where we look for possibilities of resistance, and how we try to structure that 
resistance in political movements. In this final section, I want to look at how 
such a view of resistance can be useful for a feminist politics that aims to keep 
the space open for differences between women. 
In order for feminism to sustain a dual focus on women and their differences, 
we need a model of power that can do several things at once. First, in analyzing 
the ways in which women are socially and discursively subordinated, it needs 
to keep a space open for the differences between women. Second, it needs to 
propose a way out of that subordination, by locating the instabilities and points 
of resistance within prevailing power relations. But third, it needs to do this in 
ways that do not simply reproduce, in a slightly different space, the forms of 
domination it is contesting. In particular, it needs to give us tools to contest the 
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tendency to construct a pure feminist T by excluding such differences as race 
and ethnicity, by creating our own 'others of the same'. On all these levels, we 
need a model of power that works from the perspective, not of purity and 
authenticity, but of impurity. 
Impurity and Resistance 
The first insight to be drawn from a Foucauldian model of power is that the 
field of power relations is an impure space which produces its own instabilities 
and means of resistance. Feminist theory therefore needs to sustain the double 
perspective that resistance is both possible within, and can only happen from 
within, the complex web of existing power relations. 
The question of the models of power feminist theory works with is also a 
question of whether one locates women's subordination within a closed or an 
open system. There can be many different ways of defining 'the system' one 
wants to contest: Language as a single symbolic system whose overriding logic 
structures the social; a more complex network of discourses, practices and 
institutions that produce hierarchical relations of domination and subordination; 
a distinct system of patriarchy that works alongside other discrete forms of 
oppression and exploitation; a composite system of gender-race-class 
hierarchies that mutually construct and reinforce each other 'materially' and 
'ideologically', etcetera. 
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My point here is not to choose among the many definitions of the system on 
offer within feminism, but to argue that naming the system is only one part of 
the challenge. Just as important, it seems to me, is how we think power is 
exercised within that system. If power works primarily through excluding that 
which it wants to subordinate, then the system's instability, and sources of 
resistance, must come from outside, from the space of exclusion. If, in 
contrast, we understand power as producing that which it subordinates, and as 
only being able to subordinate that which it has also made useful, then the 
possibilities for instability, for unexpected sources of resistance from within 
systems of power relations, are multiplied. 
An overarching model of exclusionary power, based on gender or sexual 
difference as the single, primary difference, backed by a univocal view of 
language, gives us a closed system which is far more stable than I think we 
should concede. When, for example, Irigaray works with such a view, it leads 
her to conclude that we need to construct a whole other economy -a 'female 
sociality..., a female symbolic, a female social contract' (Whitford, 1991b, 
p. 78) - and this would represent an enormous restructuring at both conscious 
and unconscious levels. 
As I have argued above, and in Chapter Three, Irigaray's work is more nuanced 
than this. Even when she is focussing on an overarching economy of the same, 
she does locate instabilities within it, and she also argues for the possibility of 
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a speaking position for women within it. But between the tremendously 
demanding guerilla warfare of jamming the theoretical machinerY of 
hom(m)osexuality in Irigaray's philosophical texts, and the rather anodyne, and 
politically naive, prescriptions for valorising the female in her latest work, there 
is little middle ground for considering what might constitute effective political 
resistance for feminists in the impure and complex world of contemporary 
power relations. 
In different ways, both Braidotti and Butler also suffer from the constraints of 
working with a closed system. If Irigaray makes resistance too difficult, 
Braidotti makes it too easy, by positing a pure space outside power relations for 
her nomad. But by siting resistance outside the polis, and to a large extent, 
outside consciousness, Braidotti leaves the 'molar' space of prevailing 
hierarchies relatively intact. Butler, on the other hand, works hard to destabilize 
the system of signification she critically adopts from Lacan, by complicating 
and displacing each of its elements. She also argues that the whole 'system' 
only emerges gradually over time, and that it is, thus, is subject to social 
change. But her deconstructive moves to destabilize the Lacanian system can 
only proceed once she has decided to work with its model of an overarching 
symbolic to begin with, with its overriding logic of exclusion and abjection. In 
so doing, she turns away from the inherently more open system she takes ftom 
Foucault. 
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Many feminists have, of course, read Foucault's model of productive, 
disciplinary power as positing an overwhelming, monolithic force that produces 
completely docile bodies, with no possibilities of effective resistance. ' These 
readings fail to follow through on the full implications of Foucault's move from 
power as repressive to power as productive. It is only when power is 
understood within a logic of exclusion, repression and abjection that it can be 
thought to result in fully docile bodies. It is only when power is understood to 
have one single, overriding logic - as the Subject who says 'No' - that it can be 
thought of as an overwhelming and monolithic force. 
As I read it, a Foucauldian model of power resists both these moves. By 
shifting from a logic of repression to one of proliferation, Foucault is working 
with an inherently unstable and open-ended model. Within this model, there is, 
of course, a proliferation of discourses and practices that sustain prevailing 
hierarchies and structures of domination. But there is also a proliferation of 
possibilities - of knowledges, of subjects, and of 'useful bodies' that are 
'inappropriate/d' to the relations of power from which they emerge. 
I understand Haraway to be working with this kind of model of power when she 
insists that 'The System is not closed; the sacred image of the same is not 
coming. The world is not full' (Haraway, 1992b, p. 327). It is, in part, because 
she starts from the assumption of an open system that Haraway looks for, and 
' See, for example, McNay (1992), Fraser (1989), Singer (1989) and Hartsock (1990). 
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finds a proliferation of promising, if always dangerous monsters, emerging 
from the instabilities of late 20th century scientific and political culture. 
Impure Subjects or Abjected Others? 
This is closely related to the second insight I think needs to be drawn from a 
Foucauldian. model of power: that is, that sites of resistance come not just from 
where women have been excluded but also from where they have been made 
central, where they have been, in Haraway's terms, 'actively managed'. Models 
of power that position women primarily as abjected others create a number of 
problems for feminism. First, they overstate the degree to which women 
disappear, are made invisible or marginal within power relations. Second, they 
make it difficult to distinguish between moves that foreground women in order 
to actively manage them, and women-centred contestations of that management. 
Third, if women are always positioned as abjected others, then the question of 
their agency is always seen as a problem. How and why does the 'object' begin 
to speak? Does it speak with a purer voice because it is untainted in its 
powerlessness? When it speaks in ways that seem to legitimate its object status 
is this a 'false' voice that covers over its 'true' interests? Both these options 
have proved very problematic for feminism because they continue to lock 
questions of agency and resistance into narratives of purity. 
In contrast, working with a model of power that positions women as impure 
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subjects complicates the ways in which women are subordinated, but also 
multiplies the possible sites of resistance. It recognizes that women's 
subordination does not always work in one way, that women are not always 
objectified and abjected, and therefore, that different ways of subordinating 
women can have different effects. Some of those effects can be partially 
enabling for women, and these can be worked for their destabilizing potential. 
Women's agency, then, is never a pure space immune from the workings of 
power, but it also does not need to derive from some pure and difficult-to-attain 
space outside those workings of power. 
Putity and Identity Politics 
The third level at which feminist models of power need to contest purity is in 
terms of the 'we' of feminist politics. Speaking of the questions 'we' expect 
po itics to address, Foucault argued: 
the problem is [ ... ] to decide if it is actually suitable to place 
oneself within a 'we' in order to assert the principles one 
recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, 
necessary, to make the future formation of a 'we' possible by 
elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that the 'we' 
must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result - 
the necessarily temporary result - of the question as it is posed 
in the new terms in which one formulates it. (Foucault, 1984, 
p. 385) 
When feminism follows the model of identity politics, that presumes a stable 
and unified identity for women as the basis on which to organize, it makes the 
'we' previous to the political questions it aims to resolve. 
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Butler echoes Foucault's problernatizing of the 'we' of identity politics, when 
those politics are based on fixing a pure space of identity as the pre-condition 
for political action; within Western feminism, she argues, each attempt to fix 
the identity of feminism's constituency in advance produces the very 
factionalization it is supposed to overcome (Butler, 1992, p. 14). Donna 
Haraway also points to the dangers for feminism of imagining women's unity 
as something 'in the blood', to be presumed, rather than as a difficult and 
ongoing achievement. 
I would argue that most versions of feminist politics as identity politics rely on 
a narrative of purity in two inter-related ways. First, they cover over both 
power differentials between women and the inevitable, necessary contestations 
over what constitutes women's identity and interests in particular conditions. 
Second, they claim a fixed, coherent and discrete space for women as a 
category of gender, or sexual difference, separated out from that category's 
intersection with race, nation, class, etc. 
The problems posed by viewing feminist politics as identity politics can perhaps 
be best illustrated through a specific example. Flavia Agnes' discussion of the 
difficulties faced by the Bombay women's movement during and after 
communal riots in the 1990's shows a number of the dangers of purity models. 
Agnes explains that before the riots, women's groups had identified violence 
against women as a gender issue uniting all women. After the riots, when 
273 
Muslim women had seen the men of their community attacked indiscriminately 
as rapists, a strategy based purely on gender identity or on women's unity could 
not have the same impact (Agnes, 1995, pp. 149-5 1). Insisting on a pure gender 
unity outside the context of differences, or taking gender outside the frame of 
the multiple and intersecting networks of power within which it operates, would 
simply have reinforced communal differences between women. 
In addition, even if the women's movement imagined itself in some pure space 
where gender unity overrode the workings of multiple networks of power 
relations, those power relations continue to have an impact within the 
movement. For example, over the years women's organizations had sought to 
prove their populism and 'Indian-ness' by drawing on traditional images, in the 
face of criticisms that they represented only middle class and 'westernized' 
women. But, given the prevailing hegemony of the majority Hindu culture, 
many of the images appropriated by the movement relied on that majority 
hegemony, 'rather than on the history of a pluralistic society that encompassed 
within its framework the cultural idioms of minority communities' (Agnes, ibid, 
p. 139). In order to secure their identity, women's movements tapped into the 
same repertoire of images used to define communal identities. The full and 
bitter irony of such a move was realised when women militants of the Hindu 
right re-appropriated feminist slogans and tactics in order to direct attacks 
against Musli-ins (p. 141). 
Amrita Chhacchi has called communalism a form of identity politics (Chhachhi, 
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1994). In making a link between communalism and identity politics, she 
suggests the dangers for feminism, and any movement for social change, in 
basing a politics on fixed, pure identities. Chhachhi suggests that communalist 
discourses tend to construct woman as the border of community identities, and 
argues that women need to contest this and insist as well on their right to define 
those borders and identities (Chhacchi, 1991, pp. 168-9). Might we not take her 
analysis a step further and argue that feminists also need to question the nature 
of those borders as well, and find different models of identity on which to 
proceed politically? 
This does not mean giving up on the 'we' of effective politics, but shifting the 
terms within which it is understood. Rather than presuming a 'we' of shared 
values and experiences, of pre-given identities, in order to resist, the 'we' is 
fashioned, shifts and comes to know itself in the process of resisting. Haraway's 
distinction between identity and affinity politics is useful in this context. Where 
identity politics presumes a sameness as the basis on which to act politically, 
affinity politics presumes differences, that will need to be negotiated. It is not 
because 'we' are all the same that we can act politically; it is rather because 
'we' are all partial, different, and faced with particular political problems that 
connect us, that 'we' need to act together politically. It is only on this basis that, 
for Haraway, 'who are 'weT can be re-formulated as an inherently open 
question, 'one always ready for contingent, friction generating articulations' 
(Haraway, 1992b, p. 324). In the impure world of complex power relations, yet 
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another model of purity, identity based in sameness, will not do if future 
feminist communities of resistance are to produce 'something other than the 
sacred image of the same, something inappropriate, unfitting and so, maybe, 
inappropriated' (ibid, p. 300). 
CONCLUSION 
If sustaining a simultaneous focus on women and their differences requires that 
feminist theory refuse a logic of dualisms, then one crucial area in which this 
must happen is in the underlying models of power we work with. 
Conceptualizing power in negative terms perpetuates a logic of dualisms by 
arguing that power requires an abjected other upon which the subject acts. 
Feminist theory and politics suffer in a number of ways when they rely on this 
model of power. 
Viewing women as only abjected covers over the many ways in which women 
are actively implicated in the production of social identities and of power 
relations. It perpetuates the illusion that feminism, 'speaking for' those abjected 
others, can speak from a pure space of exclusion from power relations. Such a 
model makes it difficult to remain attentive to the way power differentials work 
within feminism, and to thereby keep a space open for respecting differences 
between women. 
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Such a model also makes it difficult to ackowledge the extent to which women 
are enabled by the power relations that constrain them. This makes it hard to 
conceptualize women's agency without recourse to a language of 'false 
consciousness' that must be overcome, or some notion of authentic gender 
interests that can be separated from other aspects of women's identities, and 
from the power relations in which these identities are constituted. Again, this 
re-imports into feminism a narrative of purity that turns attention away from the 
differences between women. 
Finally, positioning women only on the margins covers over many of the 
specific ways in which women's activities, and discursive constructs of the 
female and the feminine, are central to the emergence of gendered, racialized 
and national identities. If we fail to look at how the 'active management' of 
women helps to produce these different community identities, then we cannot 
take women's differences adequately into account. 
Conversely, if we do view women as impure subjects, fully implicated in the 
complex and impure spaces of power relations, then our attention is turned both 
to the differences between women, and to the possibilities of resistance that 
emerge from those impure spaces. If power produces subjects of a particular 
kind, how can we think about the particular subjects called women 'in a 
postcolonial mode'? If possibilities of resistance and change emerge from within 
complex relations of power, what are the possibilities for alternative ways of 
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conceptualizing the self and agency that are emerging as enabling for feminism? 
These issues will form the focus of my final chapter. 
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Chapter Eight 
THEORIZING'WOMEN'IN A 
POSTCOLONIAL MODE 
INTRODUCTION 
Feminism as a political movement and feminist theory as a field of intellectual 
inquiry are supposed to take 'women' as their central focus of attention. Yet 
women are all different. Can we speak of something like a unified category 
'women' when this unity is constantly undermined by divisions of race, nation, 
ethnicity, class, sexuality, etcetera and by differences in the category's social 
meaning fashioned in specific times and spaces? One of the most common ways 
of framing this dilemma in contemporary feminist theory is to argue that 
holding on to some kind of unified category of 'women' is a tactical move that 
effective politics requires, even while recognizing that it is dangerous because 
of the exclusions that this necessarily entails. 
Feminists have come to some variation on this position from different starting 
points. Gayatri Spivak (1987, pp. 197-221) has suggested that 'strategic 
essentialism' may be necessary to effective politics, and writers like Diana Fuss 
have taken up this concept with some reservations and modifications (Fuss, 
1989, pp. 31-3). Moira Gatens has argued that, in countering the 'implicit and 
explicit masculinity' of the modern body politic, which serves to deny an 
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autonomous political or ethical representation to female embodiment, feminists 
may need, initially, to assert la certain homogeneity in the specific situations of 
women' in order to make a political space for themselves (Gatens, 1996, p. 56). 
Gatens cautions that such an assertion derives more from tactical necessity than 
from 'an ontological truth about women that is closed to history' (ibid), and that 
feminism also needs to develop a more open-ended ontology that can move 
beyond such a position. 
In making the move to questions of ontology, Gatens takes this position further 
than someone like Judith Butler. As we have seen, for Butler, there is also a 
tactical need to work with the necessary fiction of 'women' as a 'political 
signifier', while recognizing that 'one is f ... ] used and positioned by it' at the 
same time (Butler, 1993, p. 29). But Butler, unlike Gatens, discounts the move 
to an alternative ontology that might begin from reconsidering specifically 
female embodiment. For Butler, 'women' remains a signifier, that is, something 
that is always already constrained by the system of language and its necessary 
exclusions. This signifier can be destabilized to some extent and its 'necessary 
injuries' can be reworked to subvert dominant social and symbolic systems to 
some extent. However, the move to redefine 'women' on the basis of an 
alternative model of the self, self-other relations or a subject, or to reconsider 
female embodiment or a specifically female subject-position from a different 
basis, is not a route that Butler chooses to take. 
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In this final chapter, I want to argue that feminism cannot do the work of 
sustaining its focus on women, whilst also attending to the differences between 
women, wi out addressing questions concerning the models of the self and of 
identity that underpin our theory and politics. But I also want to argue that it is 
possible to push Gatens' type of position a little further, so that the sustained 
focus on women - as a category of analysis and political practice - is more than 
a concession to the tactical requirements of politics, one that necessarily 
involves some downplaying of the differences between women. 
As I suggested at the beginning of Chapter Seven, this requires that we work 
against purity in a number of ways. Feminism needs to move beyond analytical 
approaches to social identity that view 'women' only as a category of gender or 
sexual difference. If 'women' is a category, it is a complex one, that refers to 
questions of specific community identities like race, nation, ethnicity and class, 
as well as to gender or sexual difference. This is both because women's 
identities are constituted as much by race, nation, and other categories of 
identity as they are by sex or gender, and because, both symbolically and 
strategically, the 'active management' of Woman/women seems, in turn, to play 
a key role in determining the 'truths' around which these identities are 
constructed. 
Here, the impurity we need to draw on is the way 'Woman' and 'women' seem 
to bleed across the boundaries of these apparently coherent categories of 
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gender, race, and nation. The purity we need to contest is the attempt to fIx 
'Woman' and 'women' as the unchanging ground upon which these apparently 
discrete categories stand. Additionally we need to underpin this kind of analysis 
of social identities with alternative theoretical models of the self that take these 
complex, impure spaces as a valid and valorised position from which to derive 
a sense of self, and from which to act and to speak. 
'Recognizing that women's identities are constituted as much by race, nation, 
and ethnicity as by sex and gender, or that these categories are mutually 
constitutive, is not a terribly new insight for feminism, even among white 
Western feminists, who have been notoriously resistant to taking it on board. 
But Western feminisms in particular still seem to view this insight as a problem 
to be overcome, rather than a possibility to be explored. They still tend to see 
women as primarily related to gender, or to sexual difference, and therefore 
everything else is seen as a complication that needs to be inserted into this 
frame. 
In part, I think this is because feminists have tended to look at only one side of 
the relationship between women and these categories of identity, that is, what 
the categories of identity 'do' to women. But the other side is that the active 
management of 'Woman' and 'women' also helps to construct those categories 
to begin with. Contestations over what 'Woman' stands for, and what 'women' 
do, are key to the stability or instability of these categories. Much of the 
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material discussed in Part I suggests a more positive way of looking at the 
relationship between women and these different identity categories. I want to 
suggest that the way both the 'female' and the 'feminine' are actively managed 
across categories of identity might create some points of unity across the 
differences normally assigned to those categories. These points of unity then 
become a basis for talking about a category 'women' that 'looks in several 
directions at once'. 
Thinking more positively about the relationship between women and the 
different categories of social identity involves breaking out of what Donna 
Haraway has called the geometrics of binaries, and thinking about ways to 
refigure multiplicity outside the geometry of parts and wholes (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 3). Much of feminist theory is perhaps still unnecessarily beholden to binary 
thinking in two ways. First, there is a tendency to think about 'women' as 
referring primarily or even exclusively to gender or sexual difference, rather 
than to a more complex economy that cannot be contained within the 
conventional dualisms that appear to structure categories or concepts like 
gender, race, nation. It may be necessary to take a step back from gender or 
sexual difference, in order to focus more clearly on women. 
Second, much of contemporary feminist theory tends to rely on language 
models that describe the system of language as working through exclusion and 
the fixing of discrete and univocal meanings, without questioning whether these 
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models adequately reflect either language itself or its interplay with material 
practices in society. In both cases, they give the system (whether it be 
'language' itself or a social system built through/in language) credit for more 
stability and uniformity than should be conceded. 
In this chapter I will first review some of the themes which emerge from my 
examination of Indian feminists, that open up different ways of thinking about 
women and differences. I will then look at how these themes complicate 
'women' as theorised in the projects of Braidotti, Butler, Haraway and Irigaray. 
I am not suggesting that any kind of easy translation is possible of analyses of 
the situation of women in India to any other particular context. What I am 
suggesting is that some of the questions asked of 'women' in a postcolonial 
context might be profitably asked of 'women' in Western feminist analyses as 
well, although the answers are likely to be quite different. I will also argue that 
some theoretical frameworks within Western feminism make these questions 
easier to ask than others. In the final section, I discuss the elements of an 
alternative model of the self that can emerge from a considering 'women' as a 
complex category. 
1. 'WOMEN' IS A COMPLEX CATEGORY 
My starting point for much of what I find useful in the work of Indian feminists 
is the frequent reference to the ways in which either national or racial/religious 
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community identities are constituted on or through the bodies of women. This 
suggests that women's actions, and discursive constructs of woman, cannot be 
looked at merely in terms of what they do to produce what might be called 
gendered or sexed identities, or social relations structured by gender or sexual 
difference. 'Women' and 'Woman' circulate across the apparently discrete 
categories of gender, nation, race, religion, caste, etcetera. In the work of 
Indian feminists we see women and Woman 'travelling' in this way from anti- 
colonial contestations of various forces within the nationalist movement', to 
contemporary cultural constructs of a unified national identity, to 
racial/religious identities in both Hindu and Muslim communitid, to the 
particularities of caste' and even local or regionae identities. The work that 
women and women's bodies are expected to do simply cannot be contained 
within the analytical borders of a category like gender, or sexual difference. 
But, at the same time, it seems that in order to legitimate those particular 
community identities, women's bodies and behaviour need to be controlled and 
discursive constructs of Woman need to be promoted as a stable, unchanging 
and pure ground of those identities. Both strategically and symbolically, there 
' See Sinha (1987), Mani (1990), Chakravarti (1990) and Sarkar (1987). 
' See Rajan (1993) and Natarajan (1994). 
See Sarkar (1991 and 1995), Butalia (1993 and 1995), and Hasan (1994). 
See Geetha and Jayanthi (1995). 
' See Niranjana (1994a). 
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is something about the female body that needs to be appropriated for a sense of 
national, race or community identity to persist. It seems clear that at least part 
of what is at stake here is the female capacity for birth, and the access to origins 
that birth represents. Wherever group or community identities are 'imagined', 
to use Benedict Anderson's phrase (1991), to be wholly or partly birth-based - 
and this remains largely the case wherever nations, races, castes and many other 
forms of community are imagined - then exercising the power to define those 
identities must, in part at least, pass through both a symbolic and strategic 
appropriation of birth and the active management of women. 
Identity Work, Women and the Female Body 
We know that, in violent racial and ethnic confrontations, sexual violence is 
common. Urvashi Butalia's discussions of the rape and sexual mutilation of 
Hindu and Muslim women during both the Partition period of the 1930's and 
recent communal rioting in India, and of killings and suicides of Hindu and 
Muslim women in order to 'Protect their purity' in the face of actual or 
perceived attacks, are specific Indian examples of a much broader phenomenon 
(Butalia, 1993 and 1995). Raping women and lynching men who are identified 
as real or potential rapists remain commonplace tools of racial and ethnic terror. 
What is at stake is the purity of a community, safeguarded or defiled through 
the female capacity for birth of community members. 
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Butalia's work is part of a broader theme in Indian feminist scholarship that 
suggests that racial/etlmic terror exercised on women's bodies, or on men in the 
name of 'protecting' women's bodies, is only an extreme form of a process that 
imbues community identity constitution more generally. As long as identities 
are defined, at least in part, as being dependent on birth into a specific 
community, then, as Gabriele Dietrich has noted, there will be a sense that if 
women' s sexuality is not controlled, then 'actual identities will change in 
unimaginable ways' (Dietrich, 1994, p. 44). 
The communal controversies over Hindu and Muslim personal laws that I 
discussed in Part I of this thesis reflect the kind of identity-work that is involved 
in control over the female body and over women's conduct - to form the centre 
of communal political imagination and of redefinitions of national identities 
(Hasan, 1994, pp. xviii-xix). Strategically, by legislating on marriage, divorce, 
custody and inheritance, the personal laws aim to control the relationship 
between women, the issue of their bodies and a community's property. 
Symbolically, in the context of communal conflict, they bear the weight of 
representing the unity of a community identity (ibid, p. 61). 
Symbolic appropriations of birth in order to define national and racial identities 
are seen most directly in the mother-goddess/Mother-India, iconography and 
imagery of both the nationalist movement of the anti-colonial period and the 
contemporary Hindu communalist movement. Some of the 
Indian feminists I 
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discussed more fully in Chapter One interpret this appropriation as providing 
a passive, nurturing ground for a nationalist movement that is largely defined 
by and for merO. Others complicate their analyses by drawing on both notions 
of purity/passivity and a kind of inciting, mobilizing power of the mothei. But 
both approaches suggest that an active discursive management of the maternal 
is involved in the constitution of national and community identities. 
To these direct discursive evocations of the maternal, we need to add the ways 
in which related concepts of time (origin, tradition) and space (home, private, 
inside) are linked to the feminine in order to fix identities. The connection of 
'Woman' to tradition and the identification of women's activities as the bearers 
of a timeless tradition also refers back to questions of origin and bird?. 
Similarly, appropriation of a language and imagery of home as the private and 
pure space unsullied by colonial, or more recently a generalised 'Western' or 
I modem' influence, and the naming of this space as ferninine-maternaf, 
mobilises 'Woman' and 'women' as a discursive ground for national and 
community identities. 
But it is not only through their location in discursive systems that 
See Bagchi (1990), Sen (1993), and Lakshmi (1990). 
See Sarkar (1995), Sangari (1993), Loomba (1993), Alexander (1989). 
Chakravarti (1990), and Rajan (1993). 
See Sarkar (1987), Sen (1993) and Loomba (1993). 
288 
Woman/women mark the borders, the place, or the ground of these identity 
categories. It is also women's activities - how they use time, how they occupy 
space - that are seen as key to constructing community identities and preserving 
their purity'O. It is not just a question of prescribing the times or spaces of 
'purity' or 'inner-ness' that are appropriate for women, because what counts as 
'inside' is higWy variable according to specific social contexts and economic 
needs. It is also that women's presence in turn lends an 'inner-ness', a sense of 
belonging and purity to a particular space, and the purity at stake is one of the 
community-group in question (Niranjana, 1994a, pp. 14-5). 
A similar point emerges from Sarkar's (1995) and Geetha and Jayanthi's (1995) 
discussion of organizations of the contemporary Hindu right, and of Sarkar's 
(1987) and Loomba's (1993) discussions of the pre-independence nationalist 
movement. The ways in which women are mobilised by these movements, and 
the movements' appropriation of certain traditionally private rituals and 
activities, mean that a certain 'private' space gets carried out into the public 
movement with and through women. This is then mobilised by the movements 
in order to claim a certain purity or authenticity of identity for themselves. One 
is reminded of Lou Andreas-Salome's comment, in a completely different 
context, that women always carry a sense of home around with them, as a snail 
carries its shell on its back (Martin, 1991, p. 43) 
See Geetha and Jayanthi (1995) and Niranjana. (1994a). 
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Each of these texts provides a specifically located discussion of ways in which 
particular groups of Indian women are discursively and strategically positioned 
in relation to different community identities. But when we put them together, 
they suggest a more general point that can, I think, be pertinent to feminist 
theory when it aims to focus simultaneously on 'women' and their differences. 
What we see across these specific examples is that 'Woman' and 'women' are 
being pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, we see 'women' 
circulating across a multiplicity of identity categories, refusing to settle down 
inside the analytical borders of social relations structured only by gender. But 
on the other hand, within the fields of individual national, raced, religious or 
caste communities, discourses and practices of purity repeatedly work to 'fix' 
women as the ground of those identities, as the stable markers of authenticity 
and access to pure origins. 
Recognizing that women are positioned in these complex ways across and 
widiin. multiple community identities means that in order to adequately focus on 
'women', we need to look at their productive role in the emergence of national, 
raced and other differences. Focusing on 'women' as a feminist strategy 
becomes a way of looking simultaneously at a multiplicity of identity categories. 
Thus, rather than seeing such a focus as a trade-off between feminist 'unity' and 
attention to differences, it offers a way of thinking outside the geometrics of 
binaries. 
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Women as Citizens 
For a number of Indian feminists, discussion of this issue of recognizing 
women's complex identity has centred around reclaiming and rethinking the 
concept of citizenship. The impetus for this in the Indian context has been the 
rise of communalism in recent years. The communal move is a move from 
plurality to fixity, from negotiating multiple, intersecting categories of social 
identity (caste, class, religion, gender, nation) that accommodate and confront 
each other, to a simplifying process, closing communities and individuals 
around a single religious identity. And much of this rigidifying process has been 
directed at women, by positing a fixed, birth-based identity for women and by 
conflating their identities as individuals with that of a monolithic community. 
The communal move, however, only exacerbates, and makes more visible, a 
general tension that exists between the 'closed' space of community and the 
I open' space of civil identities. It also makes more visible the crucial role that 
women are expected to play in preserving the stability of different forms of 
community upon which the modem 'individual-citizen' still depends for a sense 
of identity". This is not something which is unique to India, or to an 
underdeveloped 'East', although the manner in which this tension is played out 
will be different in different social conditions. Moira Gatens has argued that the 
Western tradition of the body politic also constructs women as 'not whole 
" See Kannabiran and Kannabiran (1995) and Sinha (1995). 
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beings'. There is a tendency to limit ethical relations between the sexes to 
familial and conjugal ethics, in which women are recognized only as wives and 
mothers, and denied the full range of citizenship status (Gatens, 1996, pp. 42 
and 54-6). 
The Indian feminist discussions of citizenship, however, allow us to see more 
clearly that what is at stake is not just an exclusion of unspecified women by 
generic men. Women are positioned in complex ways between a multiplicity of 
'closed' spaces of community identities such as race, religion, or ethnicity, on 
the one hand, and the 'open' space of civil society, on the other. Thus the 
problem of women's access to full citizenship status is not one that can be 
adequately discussed if we look only at questions of gender or sexual difference. 
Nor, as I argued in Chapter Two, is the complexity of their positioning fully 
captured by framing it in terms of a conflict between gender and community 
interests, as Zoya Hasan has suggested (Hasan, 1994, pp. 59-68). Such a 
framework still conceptualizes 'gender' and 'community' as two relatively 
discrete categories. This suggests that women's identity 'as women' is 
something that can be detached from their location in specific communities. But 
what emerges most strongly from the analysis of Indian feminists is that women 
are not only constituted by their communities but that they are quite central to 
constituting them in turn. We therefore need ways to speak of women's interests 
'as women' which take into account the full complexity of their place in identity 
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constitution, a complexity which is not easily contained within the analytical 
borders of either 'gender' or 'community'. 
It is in this context that these Indian feminist discussions of women as citizens 
needs to be considered for what Butler would call their 'radical democratizing 
potential. ' It is not that the status of citizen is, in itself, an unproblernatic ideal 
through which women will gain full emancipation. This would be to stay within 
the limitations of a liberal feminism which seeks only to include women in 
contemporary social and political structures, and which does not challenge the 
way these structures depend on women's subordination. It is, rather, a question 
of exposing women's particular location in relation to the concept of citizen, 
and of using the discontinuities and tensions of that location for their 
destabilizing potential. 
On one level, diinking about women as citizens means insisting that women be 
given the same 'privilege' of a complex identity as men, of circulating across 
all the boundaries of national, racial and other community identities that meet 
in the space of civil society. As I discussed in Part 1, one way some Indian 
feminists have approached this is in terms of their critical support for a uniform 
civil code that would take precedence over religion-based personal laws. For 
these feminists, working to unbind the personal laws via an egalitarian civil 
code gives women the same recognition of complexity as citizens as men. 
At the 
same time, these feminists recognize that women still have to negotiate their 
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way through the various power relations in society, including struggling with 
men around the traditions encoded in the personal laws (Chakravarti, Menon 
and Butalia, 1995, personal interviews). 
This brings us to the second level at which the notion of women-as-citizens 
needs to be reworked. Mrinalini Sinha claims that, in India, the concept of 
citizen depends both on a modem community of identity in the nation-state, and 
on an accommodation and reconstitution of 'pre-modern, 'organic' 
communities of identity, which include religion, race, and caste (Sinha, 1995, 
pp. 49-50). But, as we have seen, 'Woman' and 'women' are repeatedly called 
upon to serve as the ground upon which these community identities are defined. 
If this is so, then we begin to see why it is so difficult for women to be 
recognized as full citizens within such a set-up. The apparent mobility of the 
citizen still requires a fixed, pure place of community identities - home, nation, 
race, religion - to retreat to. If women have to stand in for, and reproduce that 
place, then they cannot 'travel' as citizens. If women refuse to settle down in/as 
that place, then the system's stability is threatened. When women insist on their 
right to travel as citizens, and to redefine both the female/feminine and the 
community identities constituted through them, on a different basis - one which 
refuses the discourses of purity and fixity - they challenge one of the bases on 
which oppressive forms of social cohesion and social identities are wrought. 
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A third point I want to draw out of this discussion of citizenship is that it 
situates questions of multiplicity, and of alternative models of the self, social 
identity and resistance that start from multiplicity, in historically specific social 
circumstances. Such an approach locates its sources of complexity and 
multiplicity not on the margins of Language, 'beyond' consciousness, or outside 
the polis, but firmly inside the realm of the social. It also does this, not by 
moving beyond 'women' as category of identity, but by exploring 'women' as 
a complex category in its own right. For both these reasons, such an approach 
challenges and complicates the analysis of 'women' offered by each of the four 
Western feminist projects I examine in this thesis, suggesting ways of moving 
beyond the limitations each of them experiences in focusing on women while 
keeping a space open for differences. In the next section, I want to look at how 
each of the four goes some way towards a model that captures this sense of 
women as a complex category, and where their approaches turn aside from this 
trajectory. 
2. 'WOMEN', COMPLEXITY AND WESTERN FEMINISMS 
Women as Nomads 
As we have seen, Rosi Braidotti privileges the concept of nomad to express the 
complexity and multiplicity of women. Immediately, we can note a difference 
from the approach I have sketched above. The nomad is precisely not a citizen - 
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she is quite deliberately outside the polis, troubling it from its edges. She 
derives her radical potential to upset the hegemonic order of things from her 
outsider status, not from the fact that her activities and the meanings read onto 
those activities are quite central to maintaining the stability of social identities 
and structures. 
Yet Braidotti starts from a number of points which can be read as speaking to 
the themes I have identified in the first part of this chapter. She says that in 
feminist theory one speaks 'as a woman', but that woman is not a monolithic, 
unchanging essence, and is rather the site of multiple, complex and potentially 
contradictory sets of experience. The nomad as figuration is supposed to capture 
the ways in which different axes of differentiation work simultaneously in 
constituting subjectivity (Braidotti, 1994, p. 4). Women's 'unity' as a category 
comes, not from an originary site or authentic identity, but from the 'emphatic 
proximity and intensive inter-connectedness' of different states and experiences 
(ibid, pp. 5-6). Thus, on these points at least, Braidotti can be said to be arguing 
for an understanding of women as a complex category. 
In addition, Braidotti's insistence on the nomad as polyglot, 'who has no mother 
tongue', in the sense of a fixed and steady origin (ibid, p. 11), could be read as 
a way to resist attempts to construct the Woman/mother as the fixed, steady 
origin that stands as boundary for community identities. Against this move, the 
nomad, like the citizen, insists on her right to travel. 
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But, as I have already noted, the nomad is not a citizen, and it is their difference 
in location that becomes significant in turning Braidotti away from a full 
recognition of women's complexity. Rather than building on her initial attention 
to multiplicity in specific social circumstances, Braidotti takes this insight about 
the woman/nomad as polyglot in quite another direction. The problem, she 
says, is that all tongues carry 'the name of the father' and are stamped by its 
register (ibid, p- 11), and this leads to an inevitable imbalance between pre- 
discursive, pre-conscious desire (the unthought and the non-thought) and the 
symbolic forms available to express that desire. Moving away from considering 
the polyglot as historically and socially situated, Braidotti turns to the 
universalising constraints of language and psychoanalytic models to argue that 
the 'key notion to understanding multiple identity is desire, that is to say 
unconscious processes' (ibid, p. 14). 
For Braidotti, multiplicity - both as acknowledgement of the differences 
between women and as a potential, positive 'line of escape' from women's 
subordination - is no longer to be found in the specific location of women, 
but 
rather in (unconscious) desire, that which language always needs to cover over 
and can never adequately express. This necessarily turns attention away from 
the multiplicity that functions at conscious, social levels, and which also needs 
to be addressed as a possible source of instability and resistance. For Braidotti 
then it is primarily the 'unconscious internalized images that escape rational 
control' that point the way forward to a new model of identity and resistance 
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(p. 166). But this model brings with it its own baggage - its tendency to see 
power in purely negative terms, its elevation of sexual difference to primary 
difference - that tends to fold multiplicity back into a univocal sameness. 
As if in response to Braidotti's privileging of desire, Donna Haraway calls for 
more cyborg 'noise' as a way of 'subverting the structure of desire, the force 
imagined to generate language and gender' (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). 1 think 
what this can mean is that recourse to something 'before' or 'outside' thought 
or language - which is how Braidotti positions desire - is still to stay within a 
geometrics of binarisms. Braidotti wants to locate some kind of 
unproblematically good multiplicity somewhere beyond the noise and impurity 
of the world, instead of dealing with the dangerous multiplicity that refuses to 
separate out these spaces. 
In turning to a language model to frame her project, and a pre-linguistic desire 
as the privileged 'line of escape' for her woman-nomad, Braidotti turns away 
from women in their specificity. This is why, for all her initial claims to attend 
to multiplicity, she has so little to say about women's multiple locations and 
remains so inattentive to the ways in which she folds other differences bac into 
a single frame of sexual difference. 
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Women as Signifters 
Judith Butler's work is informed by the insight that the apparent coherence of 
categories like sex and gender is a product of power relations (Butler, 1990, 
p. 136). For Butler, these are regulatory norms that need to be constantly re- 
materialized, and which are therefore always being contested (or at least the 
possibility of contestation always exists) (Butler, 1993, p-2). She also argues 
that sex and gender cannot be looked at apart from other norms such as race. 
With these two moves, Butler does provide a theoretical basis on which to 
discuss both the underlying instability of apparently discrete identity categories, 
and the ways in which the normalizing effects of power attempt to cover over 
that instability by fixing truths about identity. She also wants to complicate 
Lacan's notion of the symbolic so that, at both psychic and social levels, we are 
dealing simultaneously with sex/gender and race (ibid, pp. 181-2) 
The category 'women', for Butler, 'marks a dense intersection of social 
relations that cannot be summarized through the terms of identity' (Butler, 
1993, p. 218). I take this to mean that for Butler, 'women' won't or can't settle 
down into a stable, unified category of sex or gender. The category 'women' 
is a pennanent site of contest; there can be no closure on the category, nor, 
for 
compelling political reasons, should there be (ibid, p. 221). 
'Women', for 
Butler, ought to remain 'a discursive site whose uses are not 
fully constrained 
in advance' (p. 230) so that this site's 'specific historicity' can 
be exposed, 
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affirmed and reworked (ibid). 
Thus Butler neither dispenses with the category 'women' nor does she 
completely disallow attempts to positively rework it as 'a political signifier. ' 
Nevertheless, as I have argued in Chapter Four, she does close down some 
avenues for fully exploring 'women', both in terms of the ways in which the 
category is put into play in relations of power that subordinate women, and in 
terms of its 'radical democratizing potential' for feminism. In both cases, this 
limits the extent to which her model is one that enables a simultaneous focus on 
women and their differences. 
I would argue that a large part of Butler's problem in this respect comes from 
insisting on thinking about 'women' as a signifier, thereby locking it into a 
language model and thus tending to focus on questions of exclusion and 
disruption to a unified 'system. ' This move constrains her project in two 
interconnected ways. First, as I argued in the last section of Chapter Four, 
Butler's engagement with Lacanian and Derridean language models leads her 
to disqualify any focus on the specifically female, and in particular any positive 
redefinition of 'women' on the basis of the specifically female. This closes off 
consideration of the ways in which birth and the female body are put into play 
in the emergence of race, nation and other communitY identities. It also closes 
off consideration of ontological issues such as alternative models of the self that 
might be based on a reconsideration of female embodiment. 
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Second, the kinds of resistance strategies that Butler privileges are similarly 
limited by her reliance on a language model. Butler's privileged forms of 
resistance - parody, the 'repetition which fails to repeat loyally' - are all aimed 
at disrupting the apparent stability of a unified system. They are about refusing 
origins and any notion of an original identity (Butler, 1990, p. 138); they work 
by marking the 'ground' of identity as 'groundless' (ibid, p. 141). In 
undermining notions of origins and grounds, Butler goes some way towards 
addressing the problem of identities which rely on models of pure origins or on 
an unchanging ground or sense of place. But again, because she has discounted 
a focus on the specifically female, her model does not go on to consider 
women's particular and complex positioning in relation to questions of origins. 
Nor does her model welcome strategies that might move on from disrupting 
prevailing concepts of origins, ground or place to redefining them on another 
basis. 
Clearly, models of race, nation and other community identities that fix 
'Woman' and 'women' as sites of pure origin or unchanging ground need to be 
challenged, and the parodic exposure of their 'groundless ground' may be one 
way of doing this. But parody cannot fully address the strategic need for women 
to also occupy these sites (even if contingently) on a different basis. To adopt 
Irigaray's terminology, parody cannot enable women to take a place and not just 
be the place on which community identities are constituted (Whitford, 1991a, 
p. 53). 
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Women as Cyborgs 
In many ways, Donna Haraway speaks most directly to the 'women' I have 
drawn out of my engagement with Indian feminisms. As I argued in Chapter 
Six, Haraway's work has a strong tendency to step back from sex/gender and 
to focus on women across the multiple manifestations of the self/other, 
nature/culture divides, including race and national differences. Like the Indian 
feminists discussed above, Haraway recognizes that the appropriation of birth 
and origin stories is key not only to gender identities, but also to race and 
imperial narratives. It is from her work that I draw the need to find ways to 
refigure multiplicity outside the geometry of parts and wholes (Haraway, 1991, 
p. 3), to dispense with the geometrics of binaries (ibid, p. 129). 
Haraway argues that 'each condition of oppression requires specific analysis 
that refuses the separations but insists on the non-identities of race, sex and 
class' (ibid, p. 146). 1 understand this to mean that we need to hold together two 
moves. The first is that apparently discrete categories of social identity such as 
sex and race bleed into each other. The second is that these categories are not 
the same and cannot be reduced to each other. Thus, other differences cannot 
be subsumed into sexual difference, as can happen in a project like Braidotti's, 
but women's activities and constructions of 'Woman' need to be seen as 
productive of more than social relations strictly defined by gender. 
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Haraway's evocation of 'women in the integrated circuit' (ibid, p- 170) can be 
read as a way of thinking about how 'women' circulate across categories, 
disassembling and reassembling the boundaries of categories such as 
home/work, public/private (p. 166); through their circulation across categories, 
women become key to the 'social relations of the new technologies' (p. 169). 
For Haraway, then, women are dispersed across multiple networks, and it is in 
this diaspora that we need to learn to survive (p. 170). Haraway's linking of 
women and multiplicity to dispersal and diaspora is significant. Dispersal 
emphasizes the hyper-visibility of women within multiple locations, the multiple 
levels at which women's activities, women's bodies and discursive constructs 
of 'Woman' are called upon to work. It also, of course, suggests Haraway's 
attentiveness to a term which is of central importance in postcolonial theory (see 
Gilroy, 1993 and Brah, 1996). 
Haraway recognizes that if feminism is to hold onto a category 'women' as a 
basis of unity, it needs to take account both of that dispersal and of the attempts 
to lock women into fixed truths through constructs of 'Woman'. For her, this 
means looking for possible affinities and connections that do not begin from the 
assumption that there is a closed narrative into which parts need to be fit 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 113). If 'women' hold together, it is not as anything 
unproblematically natural, organic or authentic, but as 'adopted families and 
imperfect intentional communities' (ibid, p. 12 1). Part of this process means that 
'locally, and globally, women's part in the building of persons, families and 
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communities cannot be fixed in any of the names of Woman and her functions' 
(p. 123). 
Yet there remains a certain ambivalence in Haraway's approach to women and 
the specifically female. At times she seems to share Butler's strategy of moving 
directly to destabilizing sexual difference or male/female distinctions, rather 
than redefining the female. When Haraway argues that 'destabilizing the 
positions in a discursive field and disrupting categories for identification might 
be a more powerful feminist strategy than "speaking as a woman"' (Haraway, 
1992a, p. 310), it sometimes seems as if she is adopting a deconstructive 
strategy rather than any move to re-defte the female. There is also Haraway's 
call for a paradigm shift from reproduction to generation, a move away from 
narratives based on birth, since it is so implicated in traditional paradigms of 
pure origins. Her move to the metaphorics of the cyborg is a move away from 
birth to regeneration as the basis for an alternative narrative of reconstitution, 
which includes the 'utopian dream of the hope of a monstrous world without 
gender' (Haraway, 199 1, p. 18 1). 
Of course, as I have argued in Chapter Six, there are other places in which 
Haraway argues that reproduction and birth do not actually fit into prevailing 
self/other paradigms, despite the recurring attempts to appropriate them. This 
is both because the issue of the self is always (an)other (Haraway, 1992a, 
p. 352), never the same, and because women's reproductive bodies and the 
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specifically female nature of birth do not fit with the model of the singular self- 
contained self. Women's personal bounded individuality is always 
'compromised by their bodies' troubling talent for making other bodies' 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 253, fh8). Men's dream of self-contained autonomy is 
always betrayed by their reliance on women's capacity for birth (Haraway, 
1992, p. 353). In this aspect of her work, Haraway seems to be arguing for a 
revaluing of the specifically female, outside of the prevailing paradigms that 
tend to reduce it to closed narratives and to the 'sacred image of the same'. 
Perhaps this ambivalence is a product of the notorious density of Haraway's 
work; she looks in so many directions at once, both drawing on and 
problematizing so many different theoretical models in the same text, as well 
as speaking in more than one voice in each text. In my own appropriations of 
Haraway, I have tended to focus on her desire to valorise women by breaking 
them free from the constraints of 'Woman' as variously constructed in multiple 
narratives, including the psychoanalytic and language models that have become 
so influential in feminist theory. I have focused on the productive move to link 
'women and other present-tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, 
(p. 177). 
Women as More and Less than One 
With Irigaray there is no doubt that the category 'women' is a promising source 
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for understanding identity in a radically different way, one that privileges 
multiplicity, impurity and category confusion. Of course, Irigaray remains 
indebted to a language model that links women, the feminine and multiPlicity 
together as that which language cannot represent and which language also needs 
to exclude. As I have argued in Chapters Three and Seven, this can close down 
Irigaray's project, both in terms of the space available for considering 
differences between women, and in terms of possible spaces of resistance. Yet, 
ironically and insistently, Irigaray's 'women' lend themselves to a reading in 
a postcolonial mode, at least as much as Haraway's, and far more than Butler's 
and Braidotti's. 
Butler cautiously embraces a problematized 'women' while giving up on the 
specifically female, and Braidotti takes 'women' and the 'female feminine' on 
a nomadic trajectory outside thought, language and the polis. In both cases, this 
limits the extent to which their projects speak to the 'women' who emerge at the 
centre of nation, race and community identities in Indian feminist analyses. 
Haraway, without the constraints of a language model, arrives at many of the 
same locations occupied by these 'women'. But her work can sometimes seem 
to leap beyond women to a post-human landscape, without passing through the 
still-to-be-fought struggles to recognize women as fully, if differently human. 
Irigaray, beginning in almost the opposite space from Haraway and committed 
to sexual difference as the fundamental difference, nevertheless also arrives at 
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many of these same locations. With Irigaray, the commitment to 'women' and 
valorising the female on a different basis remains intact; what is missing is the 
recognition that the locations she visits cannot be contained within a landscape 
of sexual difference alone. To read Irigaray's 'women' in a postcolonial mode 
is to open up that landscape. 
To illustrate this point, I want to return to two moments in the section entitled 
'Volune without Contours' in Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman, first 
discussed in Chapter Three, to suggest how her position takes on an added 
complexity when considered in the light of the themes that emerge from Indian 
feminisms. First, in the opening paragraphs of the section, Irigaray looks at 
how 'Woman', within an economy of the same, serves as the fixed ground or 
place for the masculine subject while being dispersed into multiple places that 
are never gathered together into a space that she defines on her own terms 
(Whitford, 1991a, p-53). 
Irigaray writes of 'woman' functioning 'everywhere elsewhere', of being 
'dispersed into x places which do not gather together in anything which she can 
recognize as herself and which remain the support for reproduction - especially 
of discourse - in all its forms' (ibid). Read in the light of the themes that emerge 
from Indian feminisms, Irigaray's words take on the added complexity of 
'woman' functioning across the categories of social identity to produce truths 
which privilege a male subject, not just in his masculinity, but also in terms of 
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all the communities he constructs as grounds for his identity. 
Irigaray captures the duality of Woman/women both functioning as stable place 
within the terms of individual community identity discourses, while being 
dispersed across categories. She argues that women still need to 'take (a) place', 
to rework their relationship to place on a different basis. She also captures 
something of the duality of being 'all-powerful' and 'powerless' at the same 
time. On the one hand, the maternal-feminine is invested with certain 'truths' 
about access to origin, to timeless tradition or to a purity that sustains 
community identity. On the other hand, men appropriate the right to define 
those truths, and control that access to origin through controlling the activities 
of women. 
Second, it is also possible to read in a postcolonial mode Irigaray's evocation 
of a 'non-specular' female/feminine/woman who can neither be reduced to nor 
universalised into a 'One'. This analysis of 'woman' as 'more-than-One' speaks 
to Indian feminist accounts of the management of women across unequal power 
relations informed by sex/gender, race, nation and community - Her evocation 
of 'woman' as 'less-than-One' is also relevant to the kinds of models of the 
subject and agency feminism relies on to speak 'as women'. 
In 'Volume without Contours' Irigaray evokes women as 'in-fini' (ibid, p .5 
9), 
both infinite and unfinished. Women are more than One: they can never 
be 
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'closed/shut up in one volume' (p. 65), or subsumed 'under one term, generic 
or specific' (p. 59). For Irigaray there is a 'plurality of the female commodity, 
that the (male) subject is always trying to gather up and regroup into a Same- 
One (p. 60). But in Irigaray's terms, women also are, and should be less than 
the universal, generic One: 'one woman + one woman + one woman never 
will have added up to some generic: woman' (pp. 55-6). Here the 'in-fini, 
functions as the refusal to be finished, to be a complete, closed subject along 
male/ masculine lines. 
But what if we take both these moves outside the frame of an unspecified 
male/female or masculine/ feminine and think about the interconnection of 
notions of sex/gender with race, nation, etcetera? In this case, women's 
multiplicity is referred back not only to a morphology of the female body, but 
also/rather to the ways the female, the feminine, 'Woman' and 'women' 
circulate across and between the discourses, practices and institutions that 
produce gender, race, nation, and community. The refusal of 'women' to settle 
down into a One is then seen within a more complex context of interconnected 
power relations that sustain and influence each other, but which also produce 
discontinuities and points of tension. Feminist evocations of the category 
'women' need to sustain and valorise that refusal to settle down as the 'still 
silent ground' hom(m)osexual economies that require to produce gendered, 
raced and national identities. Irigaray's insistence that 'woman' remains 'more 
and less than One' also challenges the notion that there might be a new 
309 
universalising 'generic woman' who provides a univocal feminist response to 
that economy. 
2. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF THE SELF 
To say that feminism can claim a speaking position for 'women' while refusing 
to settle down into a One is to suggest that a different model of the individual 
self is at work. In the final section of this chapter I want to look at how certain 
elements of this different model of a situated and embodied self might emerge 
from theorizing 'women' in a postcolonial mode. 
Place, location and dislocation 
Questions of place or location have been an important focus of feminist debates 
about theorizing difference. Notions of locatedness, in the sense of 
accountability for one's speaking position, have been tremendously important 
in contesting universalising claims that result in exclusions of women, both 
outside and within feminism. Concepts like Adrienne Rich's 'politics of 
location' (Rich, 1986), or Donna Haraway's 'situated knowledges' (Haraway, 
1991) contest the model of a knowing self that transcends its particular 
location 
and gains access to an objective truth through the workings of a 
disembodied 
or universal reason. 
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For Haraway, the self is always partial, located and incomplete. Because it is 
partial and incomplete, it both can and needs to connect to others. Because it is 
located, because it can never be everywhere, because we cannot do without 
drawing borders around the self, we need to be accountable for the ways in 
which we draw those borders. Locatedness - acknowledging and being 
accountable for one's place - should form an important part of feminist 
alternative models of the self which aim to keep a space open for differences 
between women. 
But another important theme in feminist theories of difference focuses on 
dislocation as a source of radical potential. If women are positioned as the 'still 
silent ground' upon which community identities are constituted, then insisting 
on women's 'right to travel' can be transgressive. This privileging of 
dislocation is seen in Irigaray's evocation of 'woman, the fluent'. We also see 
it in Indian feminist discussions of women as citizens, 'travelling' across the 
complex spaces of civil society. We see it as well, if less successfully, in 
Braidotti's celebration of the feminist as nomad. 
However, as Irigaray suggests, women must not only refuse to 'be (the) place' 
upon which identities are constituted; they also ought to take (a) place of their 
own, to define their own relationship to place on a different basis. Thus 
feminist 
alternative models of the self need to hold together the transformative 
possibilities Of both locatedness and dislocation. The preceding 
discussion of 
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'woment as a complex category suggests that one way of doing this is to recast 
locatedness in terms of the impurity of all spaces. My readings of Indian and 
Western feminisms suggests that it is not so much the association of 'women' 
with 'place' that is problematic, but rather the overarching framework of purity 
and authenticity within which predominant notions of 'place' are constrained. 
What can make a difference to prevailing paradigms of social identity, and the 
place of the self within them, is insisting on the right to define 'place' in terms 
that don't rely on purity. 
Vidya Rao's treatment of thumri is evocative of this kind of reworked, valorised 
impure location. She begins from the place conventionally assigned to women 
(small, confined) and re-works, it from within, drawing on its impurity (the lack 
of clear dividing lines between ragas) to expand the space available to the 
women performers of thumri (Rao, 1990). We can add to this Amrita 
Chhachhi's more directly political suggestion that women of particular racial, 
religious or national communities need to claim their place within those 
communities while also insisting on their right to contest monolithic definitions 
of those communities (Chhachhi, 1990, pp. 168-9). Such strategies can also be 
seen as a way of redefining place outside a framework of purity. 
A similar model of the relationship of the self to location can be found in 
Haraway's privileging of those 'illegitimate selves' whose locatedness is 
defined, not by access to pure origins, to 'natural and proper names, ' but 
by 
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'mutation, metamorphosis and diaspora. ' Haraway's promising monsters - 
which include women - offer the possibility of a self that survives and acts by 
coming to terms with, and working the possibilities available in particular 
impure spaces. 
Embodiment 
A similar turn to the possibilities of impurity might also be productive for 
considering women and the embodied self. As I have argued in the first part of 
this chapter, the work that women and women's bodies are expected to do in 
constituting social identities within present systems of power relations cannot 
be easily contained within the analytical borders of such categories as gender 
or sexual difference. Nor do women's hyper-visibility and multiplicity fit easily 
within the symbolic role assigned them in so many discourses of national, racial 
or other community identities, in which 'women' serve as the fixed, passive and 
pure ground upon which these identities are to be constructed. If women are 
called upon to do the 'body work' within these community identities, as so 
much of the work I have examined has suggested, then the body in question is 
one that seems deeply at odds, both with women's activities and with the 
particularities of the female body. 
It is a highly contestable 'imagined body' that is pressed into service to sustain I 
a variety of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991). The material effects of 
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such imagined bodies and communities are not to be denied, nor are the 
constraints they create in terms of possibilities of resistance and change. 
Nevertheless, their dissonance with significant aspects of women's activities and 
women's bodies do make these imagined bodies contestable. This dissonance 
opens a space for other views of the embodied self, because what gets covered 
over in terms of women's activities is also related to what is problematic about 
women' s bodies. 'Women' don't settle down as the borders of separate and 
stable community identities. Like the leaky female body 'women' bleed across 
those borders. Like the productive female body, 'women' give birth to all sorts 
of new identities. Like the female body's 'troubling talent for making other 
bodies' (Haraway, 1991, p. 253, fn8), 'women' cannot be easily contained 
within a closed frame. 
I am not arguing here that it is possible to get in touch with some unproblematic 
core of the 'real' female body as the basis of a different model of the embodied 
self. Feminist re-workings of female morphology and of embodiment are as 
partial and situated as the models they seek to contest. These new feminist 
ontologies remain, at best, promising monsters that suggest alternative ways of 
thinking about the self, but which are never immune from the dangers of re- 
appropriation within predominant relations of power. The challenge 
is to remain 
attentive to the risks while exploring the potential of these alternatives 
to undo 
prevailing paradigms. 
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IRXeading Irigaray through the refracting prism of the postcolonial mode, we can 
argue that female embodiment, and particularly birth, need to be taken out of 
the context of an economy of the same, which links it to multiple discourses and 
practices of rigid community identities. Drawing on the break-points and 
dissonances in dominant models of identity, we can argue with Haraway that 
birth is always the birth of (an)other, and not the reproduction of the same. A 
differently imagined body and birth might provide a different basis on which the 
birth-based identities of communities are imagined, one which places change 
and fluidity-fluency at its centre. 
It might also suggest different ways of conceptualizing the relation between 
individual selves. If the dualistic or dialectical models of the excluding 
self/other relation find their reflection in an imaginary model of the self- 
contained, bounded body, what can be made of the leaky female body and its 
troubling talent for making other bodies? Irigaray suggests, for example, that 
the placental relation between mother and foetus offers the possibility of 
conceptualizing identity as a continuous negotiation between self and other, 
through which both are actively modified, while still remaining distinct 
(Irigaray, 1990, pp. 39-41). 
Vidya Rao draws on the dual nature of the female body as open body - both 
open to pollution and therefore the source of life and continuity - to imagine an 
alternative model of the self. This self takes its impurity as a positive 
basis on 
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which to act, as a source of possibility for expanding the space available to it 
through unexpected connections, and not just of dangers that need to be guarded 
against (Rao, 1990, p. 37). 
Haraway too discusses the female body and the relationship between foetus and 
mother, in terms of re-thinking the immune system and its implications for self- 
other paradigms and for what counts as an individual self (Haraway, 1991, 
pp. 203-230). Her alternative model is of the 'semi-pen-neable self able to 
engage with others [ ... I but always with finite consequences; of situated 
possibilities and impossibilities of individuation and identification, and of partial 
fusions and dangers' (ibid, p. 225). All these re-located bodies suggest a self 
which persists yet which is not constrained or defined by pure distinctions 
between 'inner' and 'outer, 'self' and 'not-self', 'community' and 'outsider'. 
CONCLUSION 
This double move - of holding on to a notion of the individual self while taking 
it out of a framework of pure inside/outside delineation - has important political 
consequences. It has consequences both for the ways power relations are played 
out within feminism, and for the ways Woman/women are mobilised 
in the 
constitution of community identities that are defined by just such 
inner/outer 
distinctions, with potentially violent and violating consequences. 
316 
In Chapter Seven, I discussed the problems that emerge when feminism takes 
on an unproblematized 'we' of identity politics in order to fix a pure space of 
identity as the pre-condition for political action. As Butler has argued, each 
attempt to fix the identity of feminism's constituency in advance produces the 
very factionalization it is supposed to overcome (Butler, 1992, pp. 14-5). 
Presuming a collective subject of feminism as a point of departure tends to 
cover over the power differentials between women and also tends to conceal the 
necessary contestations over what constitutes women's identity and interests in 
particular conditions. 
While feminism makes no sense as either a theoretical or a political project if 
it problernatizes a collective 'women' out of existence, it also needs to be 
attentive to the dangers of subsuming the individual self within a collective 
identity. As I argued in Chapter Two, submerging the individual self within a 
pure and stable collective identity is very much the project of communalism, 
fundamentalism and fascism. Even in its less extreme forms, we have seen that 
the constitution of fixed collective identities mobilizes women in ways that 
perpetuate their subordination. 
Many of the feminists I have discussed in this project argue for the need to re- 
think the nature of collective identity outside of paradigms of exclusion 
in order 
to leave a space open for the differences between women. 
In this chapter I have 
argued that it is possible to re-think the 'we' of 
feminism while holding on to 
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a collective category 'women' precisely because of the discontinuities between 
those paradigms and women's complex place in contemporary power relations. 
Those discontinuities also make possible alternative models of a self, without 
which any project for a collective 'we' runs the risk of folding difference back 
into sameness. 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the questions asked in the Introduction to this thesis is what is lost by 
relying on purity models in theorizing identity. Throughout this thesis I have 
identified a number of ways in which feminist theory has a stake in rejecting 
purity if it is to sustain a simultaneous focus on women and their differences. 
In concluding, I want to review the problems with purity models that I have 
argued become more visible when the complications that emerge from my 
reading of Indian feminisms are placed together with Western feminist 
theoretical approaches to identity. But I also want to reflect on what difference 
it can make to think about identity, the self, agency and feminist politics from 
the starting point of impurity. 
In terms of the ways in which women are socially and discursively positioned, 
I have argued that the fixing of 'Woman' and 'women' as the pure and stable 
markers of community identities emerges as one of the key ways in which 
women are made central to identity constituting processes that continue to 
subordinate them. Feminist theory needs to contest this purity model for two 
inter-related reasons. First, as we have seen in relation to debates within Indian 
feminisms, as long as women and women's bodies are required to stand for the 
pure space of fixed community identities, their 'right to travel' as complex 
subject-agents and as citizens is severely compromised. Second, the community 
identities constituted through these discursive and strategic positionings of 
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'Woman' and 'women' remain the fertile ground for the development of racism, 
ledmic absolutism' and fundamentalisms of all kinds. 
In the relatively peaceful and stable polities of the West, we tend to think of 
these threats as something that happens somewhere else or that may once have 
happened here, but in the distant past. But even if we feel secure from the worst 
excesses of racial and ethnic terror (a security which is more apparent than 
real), we need to recognize that racism and narrow nationalism remain 
persistently part of our political reality. So, for example, when political 
discourses and strategies gesture towards the familiar calls for 'family values' 
or 'back to basics', we need to recognize that 'Woman' and 'women' are being 
positioned by these calls in ways that not only promote a particular version of 
gender relations, but also particular versions of fixed community identities and 
of 'nation-ness'. In the 'diaspora space' of modem Western societies such as the 
UK or the US, these versions of community or of nation reproduce and refigure 
racial and ethnic difference within nations at least in part through the ways that 
they position 'Woman' and 'women'. Some basics, and some family values are 
privileged, as the pure, immutable 'truths' that are to define the community or 
the nation, while others are disqualified, thus marking off, hardening and 
hierarchizing categories of racial, ethnic and class difference. 
Women have a personal stake in rejecting these versions of social identity, since 
racism and fundamentalism have never been particularly kind to most women. 
But, as I have argued throughout this thesis, we need to look not only at what 
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these identity categories 'do to' women, but also at how women are central to 
their emergence. If women are central to their emergence, then they can also 
be central to destabilizing and redefining them, and in ways that break down the 
assumptions of purity and fixed identities on which racism and fundamentalism 
depend. I will return to this point later. 
In this thesis, I have also identified a number of ways in which feminist 
theorizing remains unnecessarily and dangerously dependent on purity models. 
Perhaps most obviously, there is the tendency to view gender, or sexual 
difference, as an identity category that can be isolated from other categories 
such as race and nation, or that is prior to, or more fundamental than, other 
forms of difference. In quite different ways, both Irigaray's and Braidotti's 
projects suffer from constraints imposed by trying to clear a pure analytical 
space in which to consider sexual difference as 'the issue of our age'. As we 
saw most strikingly in the case of Braidotti, models which begin from the 
assumption that sexual difference is the ontological difference, within which 
other differences are to be subsumed or accommodated, result in a re-centering 
of white Western women and a failure to take differences such as race and 
nation adequately into account. Despite the unexpected resonances I have 
identified between Irigaray's focus on the specifically female and many 
concerns of the Indian feminists discussed in Part One, Irigaray's starting 
assumption, that the landscape of an 'economy of the same' can be delineated 
purely through a focus on sexual difference, remains an obstruction to 
hearing 
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those resonances more clearly. 
But I have also argued that there are less obvious, and perhaps therefore more 
insidious ways in which feminist theory remains indebted to purity models. 
Running throughout this thesis has been an argument against underlying models 
of power and language that focus primarily on a logic of exclusion, abjection 
and objectification. I call these purity models because they have a tendency to 
solifidy pure distinctions between inside and outside, centre and margins, 
inclusion and exclusion, subjects with agency and abjected others. Such models 
might also lead us to locate 'Woman' and 'women' in a space outside, or on the 
edges of power relations and language, a space which may be characterized as 
abjected, but which also dangerously promises some kind of purity in its dis- 
connection from power. 
My reading of Indian feminisms through a Foucauldian model of power as 
productive and as simultaneously enabling and constraining women, suggests 
that a focus on pure exclusion/inclusion paradigms covers over many important 
ways in which women are socially and discursively positioned, and in which 
different raced, national and community identities emerge. I also have argued 
that, when feminists work with models of power and language that privilege 
exclusion and that position women as abjected others, then there is a danger of 
returning to a language of 'false consciousness' when theorizing agency and 
resistance, or to locating some space of pure 'gender interests' from which to 
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speak and act. At the same time, feminist characterizations of women as 
powerless, abjected others fail to convince large numbers of women who see 
their social positioning as more complex than this model of power allows. 
As I argued in my reading of Butler, the turn to exclusion paradigms through 
poststructura ist language models can also lead to a turn away from the 
possibility of positively redefining the specifically female. If identity is secured 
only, or even primarily, by what it excludes, then the best we can hope for is 
a perpetual destabilizing of the always unsatisfactory versions of 'women' that 
language and power produce. But if, as I have argued, power and language do 
not only work through excluding indeterminacy and multiplicity, but can also 
work through producing them, then the destabilizing strategy is no guarantee 
against re-appropriation. At the same thne, it surrenders the terrain of positively 
re-defining 'women' and the specifically female to those who want to preserve 
both women's subordination, and assymetrical raced, ethnic and national 
relations of power. 
The four key complications I drew out of my reading of Indian feminisms in 
Part One all suggest that feminist theory needs to dispense with a logic of 
dualisms, to work from an impure space which is not adequately contained 
within the familiar binaries. These complications emerge from reading Indian 
feminist attempts to make sense of specific political issues - in particular the 
place of women in India's anti-colonial struggles and in the recent rise of 
323 
communalism. They suggest that (1) women play a simultaneously productive 
and subordinated role in the emergence of multiple categories of social identity, 
including sex, gender, race and nation; (2) that women's location within this 
intersecting landscape of community identities is a complex one, that cannot be 
contained within an exclusion/inclusion binary; (3) that both the feminine and 
the female are crucial to the emergence of these identities; and (4) that 
alternative feminist models of agency and resistance need to redefine, and not 
only destabilize models of the self and its relation to collective identity. 
I have argued that these insights, which emerge from the complex, messy space 
of specifically located struggles, have a more general theoretical importance, 
and that feminist theoretical approaches to identity need to be able to 
accommodate their complexities. In Part Two, my close readings of the work 
of Irigaray, Butler, Braidotti and Haraway brought these specifically located 
insights into the more general field of theory, to gauge the extent to which these 
four influential theoretical projects succeed in making space for this complexity. 
By submitting these theoretical approaches to a close scrutiny on the basis of 
questions emerging from 'a postcolonial mode', I have identified both 
unexpected resonances with and resistances to the kind of complexity required 
if feminists are to sustain a simultaneous focus on 'women' and their 
differences. 
In Part Three, I proposed my own synthesis of these insights with theoretical 
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models of power and identity. I argued that, by attending to women's complex 
location within intersecting landscapes of sex/gender, race, nation and other 
community identities, feminist models of identity can resist a logic of dualisms 
in order to redefine, and not only destabilize, 'women' as the subject of/for 
feminism. This requires working against purity at three levels. First, it requires 
a model of power that gives up on the search for pure, power-free zones, and 
works instead with the instabilities power produces as it both enables and 
constrains women. Second, it requires seeing 'women' as a complex, impure 
category that bleeds across the borders of apparently discrete identity categories 
such as sex/gender, race and nation. Third, it requires the development of 
altemative models of the self that take these complex, impure spaces as a valid 
and valorised position from which to act and to speak. 
The next step would be to move back from the field of feminist theory to the 
specific political issues that Western feminists face, to see how starting from 
theoretical models of impurity can make a difference to feminist politics, and 
specifically to see how we sustain a simultaneous political focus on women and 
their differences. This kind of detailed, specifically located inquiry is beyond 
the confines of this thesis. However, I want to conclude by suggesting some of 
the ways in which the questions we ask of feminist theory and politics change 
when we begin from a framework of impurity. As Foucault argued, changing 
the terms within which one poses the questions we expect politics to answer, is 
a necessary first step to making possible the future formation of a different kind 
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of political 'we' (Foucault, 1984, p. 385). If a future 'we' of feminist politics is 
to neither theorize women out of existence nor perpetuate the exclusions of 
difference by which it has too often proceeded, then complicating the questions 
we ask may be a crucial starting point. 
Starting from a framework of impurity means, first, looking for women in more 
than one place. It means asking how 'Woman' and 'women' emerge and are put 
into play across a variety of identity categories, and not just in relation to 
gender or sexual difference. It also means looking for women not as abjected 
others, but as impure subjects; we need to look, not only at how women are 
strategically and discursively marginalized or excluded, but also at how they are 
made central to identity-constituting processes, at how they are 'actively 
managed' and how their active management helps to produce specific political, 
cultural, and economic realities across multiple networks of power relations. 
It also means identifying the ways in which women is social and discursive 
positioning defies the neat separation between private and public, margin and 
centre, self and other which has become a rather stale analytical grid into which 
women are inserted. It means acknowledging that women are enabled by the 
same relations of power that constrain them, and that their resistance is, in 
Butler's terms, never "a 'pure' opposition, a 'transcendence' of contemporary 
relations of power, but a difficult labour of forging a future from resources 
inevitably impure" (Butler, 1993, p. 241). 
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But, against Butler, it also means thinking about how models of the self and of 
community identities might be positively redefined. Predominant paradigms of 
identity appropriate the specifically female body and its capacity for birth as a 
pure, silent, stable ground of racial, ethnic and national identities. Rather than 
conceding this terrain, beginning from a framework of impurity offers the 
possibility of working towards a reimagined model of the individual self and its 
connection to community, that starts from redefinitions of the female body. 
Despite her own ambivalence on this question, Haraway's alternative ontology 
of 'mutation, metamorphosis and diaspora' can find a site for its emergence in 
an inappropriate/d female body -a body that is productive, semi-permeable and 
leaky, a body that doesn't settle down easily into the fixed space of purity 
assigned to it in prevailing narratives of identity. 
Of course there are, as Butler argues, dangers in this attempt to positively 
redefine 'women'. This is where Haraway's insistence, that feminists combine 
the pleasure of trangressing boundaries with the responsibility for constructing 
them, becomes so crucial. Accountability for the borders drawn by re-defining 
'women' requires a simultaneous attention to the promises and dangers 
involved, and a resistance to seeing any border as permanently fixed and 
impenneable. But, as I suggested above, the danger in conceding this terrain is 
greater, because, ultimately, this leaves untroubled the ground in which racism. ) 
communalism, and fascism persistently take root. 
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As the reflections of some Indian feminists, faced with the imminent danger of 
racialised social divisions and communal violence have suggested, contesting 
these threats requires both a re-defined individual self and a re-defined narrative 
of community. I have argued in this thesis that what is required is a model of 
the self which resists submersion within the collective, but which also does not 
depend on a rigid differentiation of the subject-with-agency from an abjected 
object. Such a re-imagined self should provide a basis for the emergence of 
radically different models of collective or community identities. One area for 
future research might be to explore the underlying models of the individual self 
and collective identity at work in different forms of feminist politics, and how 
these impinge on the success that political movements have in sustaining a 
simultaneous focus on women and their differences. 
Discussions of women's agency and the possibilities of feminist politics have 
often focussed on the questions, 'do women resistT, or 'how and why women 
resistT. Exploring the creative possibilities of impurity might add some new 
questions that seem crucial to addressing the persistance of racism and 
ethnocentrism within feminist theory and politics. Are there any new ways of 
resisting? What changes occur when political movements start 
from the 
assumption that, in addition to the specific issues that connect them, 
they are 
united by the need to negotiate differences, rather than to assert their sameness? 
What difference does it make to politics when the 'we' is seen, to 
borrow 
Haraway's terms, not as a taken-for-granted ground or resource, 
but as an 
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ongoing, difficult, and possible achievement? 
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